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Aristotle considers friendship the greatest external 
good, one integral to the attainment of happiness.  
However, while Aristotle limits distrust to what he calls 
imperfect forms of friendship, subsequent philosophers have 
stressed our uncertainty regarding the benevolence, 
beneficence and loyalty we may expect of friends.  They do 
so in part because overcoming this uncertainty requires the 
exercise of the virtues of trust and loyalty if our 
friendships are to survive intact.   
For example, insofar as Aquinas holds that we cannot 
scrutinize the wills of others – thus inviting uncertainty 
regarding their present and future conduct – he argues that 
friendship requires the virtue of hope as a cause of 
friendly love, a hope which helps us to make virtuous 
presumptions about others’ wills.  Likewise, Kant argues 
that all de facto friendships are plagued by epistemic 
uncertainty regarding the wills of others.  In consequence, 
he treats loyalty as an unenforceable ideal of virtue 
(rather than as an enforceable and determinable right).  
Kierkegaard goes further, framing his treatment of non-
agapic love – in which he argues that friendship cannot be 
ethically justified – with a discussion of deception in 
Works of Love.   
If Aristotle is correct in thinking that friendship 
‘is a virtue, or involves virtue’ (1155a1), and that 
‘loving is the virtue of friends’ (1159a35), then 
addressing the epistemological, conceptual, and normative 
concerns these philosophers have regarding trust and 
loyalty between friends is needed to understand a central 
goal of the ethical life: the perfection of love.  After a 
historical survey of the thought of these four thinkers 
 regarding the relationship between friendship and loyalty, 
this study suggests that contemporary problems about the 
origins, nature, and limits of loyalty can be fruitfully 
resolved using insights derived from the historical survey. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Three passages of Aristotle have always struck me as 
linked.  The first occurs in the Poetics: 
Imitation is natural to man from childhood, one of his 
advantages over the lower animals being this, that he 
is the most imitative creature of the world, and 
learns at first by imitation.  And it is also natural 
for all to delight in works of imitation.  … To be 
learning something is the greatest of pleasures not 
only to the philosopher but also to the rest of 
mankind.1 
The second occurs late in the tenth chapter of the 
Nicomachean Ethics: 
For as in cities laws and character have force, so in 
households do the injunctions and the habits of the 
father, and these have even more because of the tie of 
blood and the benefits he confers; for the children 
start with a natural affection and disposition to 
obey.2 
The third passage occurs in Aristotle’s Politics: 
… the power of speech is intended to set forth the 
expedient and inexpedient, and therefore likewise the 
just and the unjust.  And it is a characteristic of 
man that he alone has any sense of good and evil, of 
just and unjust, and the like, and the association of 
living beings who have this sense makes a family and a 
state.3 
                     
1 Aristotle, Poetics 1448a 6 – 15. 
2 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.9, 1180a 3 – 6. 
3 Aristotle, Politics, 1.2, 1253a 14 – 18. 
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Of all the things one could say about these texts, I would 
like to trace out the connections they draw between 
familial love, learning, and morality.   
Our first loves are loves we learn from others: warming 
by the fire after an afternoon of sledding; the humorous 
tale of Stuart Little and his friend Margalo; the first 
time you really read Aristotle.  As we age, so do our 
loves.  We develop new loves that attach to new things, to 
new people, and through them to the wide world.  
Multiplying our loves can multiply and challenge our 
loyalties, for our new loves form new bonds of care even 
while our old loves change.  Sometimes they disappear, as 
did my teenage infatuation with rock music and my first 
best-friendship; sometimes our loves deepen and mature, as 
with the love we have for our parents.  Eventually – for 
me, it was when I became a parent – we realize that what we 
most cherish is sharing what we love with others; the 
childhood of this ‘other myself,’ as Aristotle says, makes 
everything new.  And so we come full circle, setting 
patterns in our words and actions that are imitated and 
then owned by each successive generation, patterns that 
bind us as a community, through time, not just in space. 
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While love is shot through with time, our strictest moral 
obligations, on the other hand, resist temporal 
description.  While it makes sense to say that there was a 
moment when I gained the obligation to rear and nurture my 
children (say, at their conception), this obligation once 
gained does not wax or wane.  I may discharge it 
differently at different times, responding to different 
circumstances, but never do I have it more, less, or not at 
all.  The obligations I have towards my children I have 
independently of my feelings on the matter (as we must 
sometimes remind the cad) or other accidental 
circumstances, such as the distance we live from each other 
or my relationship with their mother: that these are my 
children constitutes a fact sufficient to ground their 
right to the support they need in order to mature into 
healthy, intelligent adults.  Their being my children is 
not a necessary condition of having such a right, of 
course.  Others to whom I am specially related have similar 
rights to which I have corresponding obligations, such as 
my wife, my students, and my friends.  I gain these sorts 
of obligations through roles I fulfill or offices I hold 
(as parent, teacher, citizen, Catholic, brother, etc.). I 
hold most of them in virtue of my personal history, that 
is, my ‘place’ in relation to others as well as actions 
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I’ve done and decisions and commitments I’ve made at some 
time or other. 
However, the above description of my ethical obligations 
in terms of rights and duties leaves out precisely the 
facts that we began with: our loves.  Imagine learning your 
spouse is having an affair.  Surely that’s an act of 
injustice insofar as it violates the marital right of 
fidelity.  Imagine the affair was with your best friend.  
That’s worse, in a real sense, than an affair with a 
stranger would be.  An affair with one of your siblings or 
parents is so much worse than an affair with your friend as 
to be nearly unthinkable.  While the unqualified action – 
adultery – is the same in each case, each of our subsequent 
qualified descriptions – adultery with a friend, with a 
relative – is morally worse precisely because of the degree 
of betrayal involved, that is, because of an additional 
fact diametrically opposed to the behavior we expect from 
our friends and parents.  That additional fact is loyalty, 
which requires that they remain practically committed our 
interests even in the face of temptation.  The more we 
think of ourselves as someone’s beloved, the worse do we 
think his or her betrayal. 
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Adding insult to injury is the fact that however patient 
and kind love is, it is never owed.  It cannot be demanded 
of a lover as one’s due.  We have no right that others love 
us.  This pains us the most, perhaps, when the ties of 
dependence and trust are thickest.  It would be 
excruciating to think, for instance, that you are not 
wanted by your parents even if they feed you, clothe you, 
and educate you, as great literature has constantly 
reminded us, say, in the figures of Huckleberry Finn, Harry 
Potter, and Ivan Karamazov: some care is ‘hollow.’  Ivan in 
particular – like David Hume, perhaps – recognizes that the 
ultimate heartbreak would be a god who gave life without 
love.  Our hearts would be restless without respite in such 
a world, and we would be left only the cold comfort Camus 
paints for us in the last lines of The Myth of Sisyphus.4  
There is a sense, then, that lacking what we can justly 
demand by right from others is better than lacking what we 
cannot so demand and that there is no remedy for this.  
That is the risk of love. 
Yet we do expect that once we are loved we will continue 
to be loved, and the name for what we expect is loyalty.  
                     
4 “The struggle itself toward the heights is enough to fill 
a man's heart. One must imagine Sisyphus happy.”  Albert 
Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays (Alfred Knopf, 
1955), p. 90. 
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We have a host of names for those who violate this 
expectation – apostate, back-stabber, betrayer, deserter, 
double-crosser, fink, impostor, snitch, stool pigeon, 
treasonist, turncoat – sometimes the names of the traitors 
themselves – Benedict Arnold, Judas, Quisling – and save 
for them the coldest parts of hell.5  However, to make a 
distinction, not every act of disloyalty involves betrayal 
or injustice.  Sometimes, as we noted above, we simply stop 
loving something and begin loving something else, as when 
we buy a new brand of automobile or decide to change 
textbook publishers.  How this distinction is drawn will be 
one of our topics in what follows.  In general, this 
dissertation proposes to investigate some of the conceptual 
linkages sketched above between our special relationships, 
affections, loyalty and justice.  We will specifically 
focus on the relationship between friendship and loyalty. 
Friendship 
Friendship has been an object of ethical reflection since 
the time of Plato.  Recent decades have seen a resurgence 
                     
5 Dante saves the frozen lake, Cocytus, at the center of the 
ninth circle, for traitors: those who falsified their 
special relations with others through acts of betrayal and 
violations of loyalty.  Satan, who betrayed God, is frozen 
in the center with Judas in his mouth.  See Dante’s 
Inferno, Canto 34. 
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of interest in the topic, partly due to renewed interest in 
virtue ethics.  
Aristotle wrote what is considered the classic treatment 
of the topic.  Other major thinkers, including St. Thomas 
Aquinas, Kant, and Søren Kierkegaard, have departed from 
him to varying degrees.  Some of the differences can be 
attributed to cultural and historical changes in the notion 
of friendship; other differences reflect genuine 
philosophical disputes.  For example, while Aristotle 
considers friendship the greatest external good, one 
integral to the attainment of happiness, Kierkegaard’s 
radical brand of Christianity leads him to challenge 
whether friendship (or any form of preferential love) can 
be ethically justified.  Kant argues that, in the strictest 
sense, while friendship is a perfect amalgam of morality 
and happiness, it is also ‘merely’ an ‘ideal,’ found 
nowhere on earth.  To take another example of departures 
from Aristotle, consider that Aristotle limits distrust to 
what he calls imperfect forms of friendship.6  Nearly 
everyone else disagrees.  Aquinas, Kant and Kierkegaard all 
stress our uncertainty regarding the benevolence, 
beneficence and loyalty we may expect from even the best of 
                     
6 Aristotle, EN 1157a20-25. 
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friends.7  They emphasize this uncertainty in part because 
overcoming it requires the exercise of trust and loyalty.  
Insofar as Aquinas holds that we cannot scrutinize the 
wills of others, for instance – thus inviting uncertainty 
regarding their present and future conduct – he argues that 
friendship requires the virtue of hope as a cause of 
friendly love, a hope which helps us to make virtuous 
presumptions about others’ wills.  Kierkegaard goes 
further, framing his key distinction between agapic and 
non-agapic love with a discussion of deception.8  If 
Aristotle is correct in thinking that friendship “is a 
virtue, or involves virtue,”9 and that “loving is the virtue 
of friends,”10 then addressing the epistemological, 
conceptual, and normative concerns these philosophers have 
regarding trust and loyalty between friends is needed to 
understand the central goal of the ethical life: the 
perfection of love. 
While there has been renewed philosophical interest in 
both friendship and loyalty in recent decades, there are 
                     
7 Even St. Augustine argues that Terence’s ‘evils of love’ 
(including “wrongs, suspicions, enmities, reconcilements, 
[and] war”) occur frequently “even in honorable 
friendships” (De Civitate Dei XIX, 5). 
8 Søren Kierkegaard, Works of Love, trans. and ed. Howard 
and Edna Hong (New Jersey: Princeton UP, 1995): chapter 1. 
9 Aristotle, EN, 1155a 1. 
10 EN, 1159a 35. 
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few studies that analyze their relation in depth.  This is 
puzzling.  It is widely acknowledged that loyalty is 
necessary for friendship: disloyalty destroys a friendship.  
However, we can be loyal to those who are not our friends, 
as the soldier is loyal to his country, and loyal towards 
things that are not alive, such as a brand name.  
Friendship entails loyalty, but loyalty is possible without 
friendship, and while injustice towards a friend entails 
that one is disloyal to them, not every act of disloyalty 
entails some injustice.  How exactly are the concepts 
related? 
One way into this topic is by way of the following 
argument.  Everyone agrees that 
1. Loyalty is a necessary condition of friendship. 
To this we can add a statement about the conceptual 
conditions surrounding loyalty: 
2. Loyalty requires beliefs about the value of the 
friend or the relationship which derive their 
justification from knowledge about (a) one’s own 
character and commitments, (b) the friend’s 
character and commitments, and (c) some relation 
between (a) and (b). 
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However, we’ll see that Aquinas, Kant and Kierkegaard all 
disagree with Aristotle in holding that 
3. There is no knowledge of (a) and (b). 
What follows is that 
4. Loyalty is never justified, and neither is 
friendship. 
Friendship and loyalty are justified only if the 
requirements (2) imposes on the relation are met. 
Clearly (4) flies in the face of common sense.  In order 
to reject it, however, we need to reject or amend one of 
the premises.  One way of reading premise (2) is clearly 
too strong, i.e., so as to make it require indubitability, 
although it is likely that what we need is simply probable 
evidence.  So to avoid this problem we can amend (2) to 
(2’), like this: 
2’.  Loyalty requires beliefs about the value of the 
friend or the relationship which derive their 
justification from knowledge (justified true beliefs) 
about (a) one’s own character and commitments, (b) the 
friend’s character and commitments, and (c) some 
shared properties between (a) and (b). 
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(2’) implicitly admits that there is an element of risk in 
loyalty.  If we had indubitable knowledge of the sort 
required by (2), this element of risk would be non-
existent. 
We can ask several questions about (2’).  First, although 
loyalty requires beliefs, it is primarily a kind of act or 
disposition to act.  So the first question we can ask is 
descriptive: 
• What sorts of acts are acts of loyalty? 
Insofar as loyalty also involves beliefs, the second sort 
of question we can ask is epistemological: 
• What conditions need to be satisfied for beliefs about 
(a), (b), and (c) to be justified? 
We need clear answers to these questions in order to 
correctly formulate an answer to normative questions about 
the nature and scope of the obligations to be loyal we 
acquire in virtue of being friends with another person.   
However, various thinkers answer the descriptive and 
epistemic questions in different ways and assign to the 
questions various levels of importance and priority. 
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• Aristotle seems to think that the descriptive question 
is prior to the epistemological question: friendship 
requires a life of shared virtuous activity.  The 
evidence required for knowledge of the character of 
two friends follows as a matter of course from their 
life together.  Given world enough and time, that is, 
one’s character is (necessarily?) revealed by one’s 
actions.  This argument can be bolstered using Stern-
Gillet’s interpretation of the Aristotelian conception 
of ‘self’ as an ‘achievement state’ rather than as an 
ontological term, as we’ll see in Chapter 2.11  Its 
core commitments are easily threatened, however, by 
something people do every day: lie in word and deed. 
• Aquinas, on the other hand, thinks the epistemological 
question is prior to the descriptive one: beliefs 
about the character of another are always dubitable, 
so friendship (and a forteriori loyalty) requires both 
hope and charitable presumption about the wills of 
others.  The problem for Aquinas is to determine how 
loyalty can be justified in advance of long 
acquaintance with another person’s character. 
                     
11 Susanne Stern-Gillet, Aristotle’s Philosophy of 
Friendship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1995): p. 28 ff. 
 13 
• Kant can be read as returning to Aristotle in one 
sense: what loyalty consists in is an a priori matter, 
and so the descriptive question is prior to the 
epistemic one.  However, Kant also argues that all de 
facto friendships are plagued by epistemic uncertainty 
regarding the wills of others.  In consequence he 
treats loyalty as an unenforceable ideal of virtue 
(rather than as an enforceable and determinable 
right). 
• Kierkegaard radicalizes Kant’s subjectivizing of our 
obligations of loyalty.  Ultimately, at least in the 
case of eros and philia, he rejects (2’) and keeps 
(2).  He argues that insofar as friendship and loyalty 
are unjustified yet desired, their justification must 
come from beyond desire, from agapic love.  
Kierkegaard’s agapic conception of loyalty is 
primarily a kind of action, one that may be associated 
with, but is not determined by, beliefs about the 
other person.  The beliefs themselves do no 
justificatory work. 
There is a clear pattern to this analysis. 
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• Aristotle argues that we can have good reasons, based 
on knowledge about the character of a friend, for 
friendship and loyalty. 
• Aquinas argues that, insofar as our beliefs about the 
character of another person are insufficient to ground 
friendship and loyalty, we need further beliefs and 
dispositions (hope and charitable presumption) to 
provide the warrant for friendship and loyalty. 
• Kant argues that friendship is an ideal, praiseworthy 
but unattainable due to uncertainty.  Loyalty is 
expected and lauded, but grounded in nothing outside 
of our own quest for perfection.  But our perfection 
involves the complete good and so the good of others. 
• Kierkegaard argues that, insofar as our beliefs about 
the character of the two friends are always 
insufficient, the only warrant for friendship and 
loyalty is a subject’s desire for friendship.  This 
warrant fails to ethically justify friendship. 
In sum, as epistemic certainty in our beliefs regarding the 
character of friends diminishes, the greater the role 
fidelity must play in friendship.  However, the perceived 
risk of deception in friendship grows as well.  The 
perceived value of fidelity grows in relation to the growth 
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of the risk (as Johannes de Silentio says, witness the 
fidelity of Abraham).12   
Another way to approach the relation between friendship 
and loyalty is through a brief comparison and contrast of 
the two concepts.  Clearly, for instance, 
1. Both friendship and loyalty involve care for the 
other for the sake of another.   
Care includes both passive and active components.  
Passively, we usually sympathize with our friends and those 
to whom we are loyal; we are moved to feel joy, shame, pity 
and pride by events affecting our friends or the objects of 
our loyalty.  Actively, we are disposed to act beneficently 
for what we perceive to be their good, even at some cost to 
ourselves.  Such actions are commonly thought to be 
supererogatory outside of special relations such as 
friendship, and their being required of us in virtue of our 
special relationships needs to be explained.   
Second, 
                     
12 Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling.  Trans. Howard and 
Edna Hong (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1993). 
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2. Both friendship and loyalty require ‘affiliational 
attachments,’ i.e., shared value commitments to 
something that is intrinsically valued. 
When both loyalty and friendship have, as their objects, a 
particular person or ‘thing,’ a failure to conform to a 
distinct set of values to which we have a deep commitment 
is a ground for discontinuing loyalty or terminating a 
friendship.  Hence, a shared set of value commitments seems 
to be a necessary condition for both friendship and 
loyalty.  Perhaps the sort of value commitments in question 
are what Bernard Williams has described as ‘identity-
conferring,’ which may also help explain Aristotle’s 
description of the friend as ‘another self’ – another 
person with a similar value identity.13    
Third, and finally, 
3. Both friendship and loyalty involve commitment to 
the special relationship over time. 
John Kleinig’s article on loyalty in the Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy characterizes it precisely in 
terms of the “stickiness” that loyalists display towards 
                     
13 See Bernard Williams, “Integrity,” in J.J.C. Smart and 
Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (New 
York: Cambridge, 1973): pp. 108–117. 
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the objects of their loyalty.  In fact, one major trait of 
loyalty is that “the loyal person acts for or stays with or 
remains committed to the object of loyalty even when it is 
likely to be disadvantageous or costly to the loyal person 
to do so.”14  Thus, Kleinig gives the following definition 
of loyalty:  
a practical disposition to persist in an intrinsically 
valued (though not necessarily valuable) associational 
attachment, where that involves a potentially costly 
commitment to secure or at least not to jeopardize the 
interests or well-being of the object of loyalty.15 
We will take this definition as ‘standard’ throughout this 
dissertation, and will return to assess it in the 
conclusion in light of our historical survey of the topic. 
However, there are also numerous and important ways in 
which friendship and loyalty differ.  One such difference 
is the fact that we can be loyal to non-living objects, 
such as brand names, sports teams and religious ideals, 
while friendship is confined to human beings who recognize 
and reciprocate each other’s friendship.  Which of these 
has the most value is a matter of some debate.  Dante, for 
instance, makes the betrayal of guests worse than the 
                     
14 Kleinig, John, "Loyalty", The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL 
= 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/loyalt
y/>.  
15 Ibid. 
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betrayal of one’s country, which itself is worse than the 
betrayal of one’s brother.16   Likewise, whereas friendship 
involves benevolence on the part of friends toward each 
other, we need not feel benevolent toward objects of 
loyalty.  If Kleinig’s definition of loyalty is correct, 
then I might be called a ‘loyal’ Starbuck customer because 
I find their location to be convenient even though I 
wouldn’t go out of my way to do them favors. 
Finally, while both loyalty and friendship involve 
evaluative attitudes about their objects, it is not clear 
whether these attitudes are natural attitudes (attitudes we 
‘grow up with’ or ‘find ourselves’ with, as towards family 
members), attitudes of response (attitudes which respond to 
some worthy state of affairs) or attitudes of bestowal 
(attitudes that confer value on their objects).  Nor is it 
clear how we come to have these attitudes.  The issue 
concerns the origin or basis of loyalty and friendship.  It 
seems clear that loyalty can be based on any of the three 
(some loyalties are natural, some involve a response to 
value, and some involve bestowal).  This may be the case in 
friendship as well, but not quite so clearly.  I, for one, 
would doubt that a friendship-of-bestowal (pity 
                     
16 See Inferno, Cantos 32 – 33. 
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friendship?) can count as a true friendship, which is not 
to say that it couldn’t become one.  Aristotle would prefer 
to call it a master-slave relation rather than a 
friendship.   
Outline of the Dissertation 
This dissertation will survey the thought of four major 
thinkers - Aristotle, Aquinas, Kant and Kierkegaard – on 
the relationship between friendship and loyalty.   
The first chapter, on Aristotle, will have two goals.  
The first goal is to introduce readers to Aristotle’s 
ethical philosophy, particularly as found in the 
Nicomachean Ethics.  In particular, the chapter will focus 
on the ability of functional analyses of human nature to 
generate normative claims about human action and the three 
possible motivations human beings can have for any given 
action, i.e., pleasure, advantage, and the noble.  
Aristotle’s distinction between the good for man and the 
apparent good will also be discussed.  It will be argued 
that these three strands of Aristotle’s thought are central 
to his account of friendship in Books 8 and 9.  The second 
goal of the chapter is to briefly outline Aristotle’s 
theory of friendship by focusing on its value as the 
“greatest external good” and its causes.  This latter 
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discussion especially has implications for Aristotle’s 
theory of special duties and loyalty, which are discussed 
in Nicomachean Ethics Books 8 and 9 and in corresponding 
passages in Eudemian Ethics and Magna Moralia.  EN Book 9 
discusses two causes of friendship.  The first is eunoia, 
or the recognition of excellence (EN 9.5).  The second is 
the person himself; friendship, Aristotle says, proceeds 
“from a man's relations to himself” (EN 9.4). That insight 
grounds Aristotle’s description of a friend as “another 
self.”  The practical implications of this teleological 
analysis are explored in the problem of “fallen friends” in 
Chapter 2. 
Aristotle treats eunoia as no more problematic than being 
able to recognize an excellent athlete (EN 9.4).  Thomas 
Aquinas, while agreeing with Aristotle’s theory of 
friendship in other respects, disagrees about this. This 
disagreement will be the focus of Chapter 3.  Aquinas 
argues that the present and future wills of other people 
are unknown to us, and thus that a successful friendship 
requires (a) a cognitive presumption about the goodness of 
our friend’s will (analogous to a presumption of innocence 
in the law), and (b) the virtue of hope. These views of 
Aquinas will be explored, and the results used to 
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investigate the concept of loyalty in Aquinas.  Loyalty, 
for Aquinas, requires a similar presumption about its 
object, even when this presumption entails some risk to the 
self. 
In his Metaphysics of Morals, Kant continues Aquinas’ 
investigation into the implications that uncertainty about 
other people’s wills has for our obligations as friends.  
After briefly discussing Kant’s general ethical theory and 
his distinction between the doctrine of right and the 
doctrine of virtue, his treatment of friendship is 
discussed.  His views of friendship are discussed in the 
context of his thoughts about the relation of justice 
(rights) and benevolence (care, or practical love).  I 
argue that Kant’s conception of friendship is a concrete 
instantiation of his concept of the summum bonum, first 
discussed in the Critique of Practical Reason.  His 
description of the summum bonum has ethical implications 
for the duties we owe to our friends.  This last point is 
especially important since, unlike Aristotle, Kant believes 
that all of our friends are fallen, as are we. 
In Works of Love, Kierkegaard challenges the theories of 
friendship found in Aristotle, Aquinas and Kant.  
Kierkegaard pursues three main lines of attack.  First, he 
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argues that friendship is grounded in emotion and 
sentiment, and for that reason it is (a) ethically 
questionable if not unjustifiable, and (b) incapable of 
contributing to human happiness in the way that even Kant 
attributed to it.  On this basis, and against Aristotle, 
Kierkegaard then argues that the excellence of love is 
expressed non-preferentially, that is, in forms of love 
that do not favor one person over another.  Like Aquinas, 
on the other hand, Kierkegaard argues that the love 
involved in friendship requires trust and hope, but he also 
argues that this trust is non-evidential and primarily 
practical rather than cognitive, a task rather than a 
belief.  Kierkegaard’s views are very much at odds with 
previous views about the causes, nature, and justification 
of friendship – that is, those found in Aristotle, Kant and 
Aquinas.  For that reason, we will spend some time 
evaluating his critique.  Finally, we will examine to two 
objections to the position that friendship and loyalty are 
genuine moral reasons in chapter 6, and use what we have 
learned from the historical survey to shed some light on 
them. 
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CHAPTER 1.  ARISTOTLE ON FRIENDSHIP: FROM 
APPLES TO ETHICS 
 
“Art partly completes what nature cannot bring to completion  
and partly imitates her.” – Physics, 199a 15-17 
 
“The man who is to be happy will therefore need virtuous friends.” – 
EN 9.9, 1170b 18 
 
1. Introduction 
Eris, angry because she has been excluded from the 
marriage festivities of Peleus and Thetis, throws her 
golden apple ‘To the Fairest’ among the celebrants.  The 
revelers do not agree to whom the apple rightfully belongs, 
and the goddesses Aphrodite, Athena and Hera each claim the 
prize as their own.  Young Paris is prevailed upon to judge 
the issue, each goddess promising him appropriate rewards – 
pleasure, honor or glory – if she is chosen.  Although 
comforted by Hermes, Paris is rightly frightened.  The 
golden apple represents a choice of lives, a question about 
what kind of good thing is most choiceworthy, what good 
will make life worth living.1  He chooses.   
                     
1 As Plato says in the Republic, 344e. 
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Thus begins, among other wars, Western ethics.2 
Aristotle offers us the apple in the first few pages of 
his Nicomachean Ethics.3  Slightly altering Homer’s list, 
Aristotle argues that the categories the goddesses 
represent – pleasure, utility, and the noble – exhaust the 
ways in which something can be good for us and thus exhaust 
the sorts of reasons for which we might choose anything at 
all.  Like Newton many centuries later, Aristotle saw that 
there are systematic relations between goods and the beings 
they attract – in Aristotle’s case, that there is a regular 
relation between objective goodness or excellence and our 
subjective idea of the good considered as a reason for 
doing whatever it is that we do.  The further observation 
that this relation is normative – that some of the reasons 
                     
2 The golden apple is ubiquitous in Greek thought. We can 
read it in Greek history, embodied in Homer’s Iliad, 
Thucydides’ Peloponnesian Wars, and Plato’s dialogues.  We 
find Plato speaking about it in his division of humanity in 
to the many sight-lovers, the few guardians, and the 
singular philosopher-kings.  Aristotle repeats Homer’s 
division of the three lives at the center of both the 
Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics, characteristically 
treating them both ontogenetically and phylogenetically, as 
possible goals as well as developmental stages, both of 
individuals and of entire societies.   
3 Compare the “three prominent lives” Aristotle canvasses in 
EN 1.5, 1095b17ff with his claim in EN 2.3, 1104b30-31, 
that there are “three objects of choice … the noble, the 
advantageous, [and] the pleasant …” All references to 
Aristotle are taken from translations in The Complete Works 
of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes, 2 vols. (Princeton: 
Princeton UP, 1984). 
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for which we seek good things are more or less well-suited 
to our flourishing – takes us from apples to ethics.4  In 
this chapter we will examine Aristotle’s views on one topic 
to which this distinction between the real and the apparent 
good is applied: friendship.  This will involve, first, 
examining the nature of friendship according to Aristotle, 
and second, examining the place and role of friendship in 
light of Aristotle’s larger ethical theory. 
2. Friendship, Art and Nature 
Friendship, for Aristotle, is a natural and a made thing, 
as are constitutions, virtue, poetry, and wisdom.5  It is 
natural to our kind of thing to be social. It is also 
natural for our characteristic excellences to be realized 
through deliberation and choice,6 and friendship “is an 
                     
4 Cf. Aristotle’s Politics, 7.13, 1331b 26-30: “There are 
two things in which all well-being consists: one of them is 
the choice of a right end and aim of action, and the other 
the discovery of the actions which contribute towards it; 
for the means and the end may agree or disagree.” 
5 As my former teacher, Gene Fendt, has pointed out in Love 
Song for the Life of the Mind: An Essay on the Purpose of 
Comedy (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America 
Press, 2007).  As a made thing, friendship has a further 
double source (as do virtue and wisdom), namely, partly we 
are made into friends (or virtuous or wise) by others, and 
partly we are made so by our own choices and acts. 
6 This idea forms the first property named in the defeniens 
of moral virtue at EN 2.6, 1106b 36: “Excellence, then, is 
a state concerned with choice …”. 
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excellence, or implies excellence”7 insofar as the 
reciprocal loving characteristic of friendship “requires 
decision, and decision comes from a state” of character.8  
Methodologically, this line of reasoning suggests that the 
teleic analysis appropriate for a tool or artifact – whose 
efficient, formal, and final causes are characteristically 
distinct from one another and extrinsic to the object – and 
the teleic analysis appropriate for a natural, living being 
– whose efficient, formal, and final causes are 
characteristically identical to one another and intrinsic 
to the being – are not mutually exclusive in the case of 
human beings.9  Before showing how Aristotle applies both 
sets of analyses to friendship, let’s consider what the 
applicability of both sorts of considerations imply about 
the nature of ethical reflection. 
Aristotle argues that artifactual analysis is both 
functional and normative.10  Just as we evaluate our 
                     
7 EN 8.1, 1154b 3 – 4. 
8 EN 8.5, 1157b 31. 
9 Aristotle distinguishes the four causes in Physics 2.3, 
and argues that “the form, the mover, that for the sake of 
which … often coincide; for the what and that for the sake 
of which are one, while the primary source of motion is the 
same in species as these” at Physics 2.7, 198a 25 – 27. 
10 Cf. EN 1.7, 1097b 24 – 27: “For just as a flute player, a 
sculptor, or any artist, and, in general, for all things 
that have a function or activity, the good and the ‘well’ 
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creations according to their ability to achieve our purpose 
in creating them – as when one discards a dull knife 
because it is unable to cut – so too can we evaluate 
whether the actions human beings choose for a purposed end 
are well or ill-suited for that end.  Imagine, then, that 
there is an ultimate end for the sake of which we do 
everything else.  If this end were shared by all human 
beings, then every human action could be evaluated 
according to its ability to achieve this ultimate end, and 
the features of actions that were regularly conducive to 
this would be prized.   
In a famous series of arguments, Aristotle argues that 
this is in fact the case.  We cannot intelligibly explain 
any human action without reference to the purpose it is 
intended to achieve.11  That purpose will be either final or 
a means to achieving some other purpose.  Yet the regress 
of explanatory reasons for action cannot be infinite: an 
explanation is either finite or else no explanation at all.  
We shop for ingredients for the cake for the party for the 
boy to make him happy because making our children joyful is 
part of what makes life worth living.  The worth of that 
                     
is thought to reside in the function, so would it seem to 
be for man, if he has a function.” 
11 NE 1.1, 1094a 1 – 17. 
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final goal, the ‘fine life’ that Aristotle calls 
eudaimonia, ‘passes on,’ so to speak, value to the means we 
choose to achieve it, and makes the grocery shopping 
choiceworthy.  (One feature of actions like this that 
regularly contributes to the achievement of eudaimonia is 
generosity, and for that reason we praise it as a virtue.)12  
Finally, argues Aristotle, precisely because everyone cites 
eudaimonia as the final explanans of their actions, and 
because everyone conceives of this explanans in the same 
way – as a final, self-sufficient, and complete good – 
conduciveness to eudaimonia (multiply instantiated in the 
virtues) provides us with a universal and necessary 
criterion for the evaluation of human actions.13 
On the other hand, the criteria by which we must judge 
these means-ends relations are neither our own creations 
(as Sartre holds) nor negotiable (as the Social Contract 
tradition argues); they are second-order principles 
respecting first-order functional descriptions of our 
natural kind of being.  If, as Aristotle writes, 
the function of man [is] a certain kind of life, and 
this [is] an activity or actions of the soul implying 
                     
12 “Eminence in respect to excellence being added to 
function” (EN 1.7, 1098a 11), Aristotle says, deserves 
praise by reference to eudaimonia (1101b 20 -1, 33 – 34). 
13 EN 1.7, 1097b 20. 
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a rational principle, and the function of a good man 
[is] the good and noble performance of these … [then] 
the human good turns out to be activity of the soul in 
conformity with excellence, and if there are more than 
one excellence, in conformity with the best and most 
complete.14 
If our nature were different, our characteristic 
excellences would be different.  If we were fish, our 
excellences would render us suitable for aquatic life.  
Since we are not fish, we do not think it a deficiency of 
our nature that we are born with lungs rather than gills.  
We do, however, think that the failure of a person to 
develop or exercise her rational capacities makes her 
unable to lead a fully flourishing, satisfying human life.  
Voluntary failures of this sort are blameworthy – insofar 
as a fully rational human being would do otherwise, so 
ought we – as are voluntary successes praiseworthy.  In 
summary, then, Aristotle argues that what a human life is 
and what it is for are determined by reference to our 
natural kind; how that life is realized is determined by 
the choices we make as individuals and the habits we 
develop as a result of those choices; and the value of our 
                     
14 EN 1.7, 1098a 12-17. 
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life is thus a relation between physis and phronesis, 
between nature and art.15   
In what follows, I will not explicitly defend the meta-
ethical claim that a functional description of human nature 
is able to ground an objective, normative evaluation of 
human life, important though this thesis is.  What will be 
investigated is the Aristotelian thesis that the activity 
of friendship, whose functional aims include social 
excellence, immunity from bad fortune, and the practice of 
noble (and noble-making) acts, can be subject to normative 
analysis grounded in these aims.  On the one hand, 
Aristotle argues, such aims are intrinsic or natural to 
friendship in virtue of our being embodied, rational and 
social beings.  On the other hand, he continues, we can 
engage in the activity of friendship – as we can any 
activity – for any or all of several reasons: because the 
activity gives us pleasure, because the consequences of the 
activity are advantageous to us, and/or because we find the 
                     
15 See EN 2.1, 1103a 23 – 25: “Neither by nature, then, nor 
contrary to nature do excellences arise in us; rather, we 
are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect 
by habit.”  I have given a very naturalistic account of 
what human excellence is in this paragraph; however, the 
particular content of the excellences, and their manner of 
instantiation, is very much determined relative to a 
culture for Aristotle.  Naturalistic analysis grounds, but 
does not exhaust the nature of, any particular human 
excellence. 
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activity itself kalon, that is, fine and noble.  
Friendship, of course, naturally possesses or aims at the 
realization of all of these ends (though not all in the 
same way).  Since we can decide on our final causes, 
however, we need not seek all of them all of the time: how 
we are friends is a product of deliberation and choice.  
And there’s the rub: though the reasons we have for being 
friends with someone will determine how we conduct the 
friendship, various patterns of conduct will be more or 
less well-suited to realizing the functional aims intrinsic 
to the activity itself.  It is thus that Aristotle can say 
that some friendships are better than – happier than – 
others. 
One consequence of the approach to ethics outlined above 
is that the activity of ethical thinking is itself subject 
to normative analysis grounded in functions natural to our 
kind of being.  That we form concepts of the good and 
benchmarks of right action is a natural outcome of 
practical reason’s interaction with the world and its 
social environment, and Aristotle considers that such 
activity is undoubtedly good for our kind of being.  Since 
this is so, and since our character influences what we 
think is good in the same way that physical training 
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influences how much Milo can lift,16 the normative and 
therefore practical conclusions we draw about who we should 
be and what we should do involve confessions in various 
voices: about our experience and cognitive capacities, on 
the one hand – ethics is not for the immature or naïve17 – 
and our abilities and habits, both natural and acquired, on 
the other.18  The performance of ethical reflection, as an 
expression of our form of life, is itself a valuable and 
evaluable enterprise.  It is the theoretical face of our 
natural, practical art.  Friends, pray we do it well. 
3. Aristotle’s Naturalistic Analysis of Friendship 
In Physics 2.3, Aristotle sets forth his famous doctrine 
of the four causes, four kinds of explanans we can give of 
any being.  To answer the ‘What is it?’ question is to cite 
the formal cause, which generally takes the form of a 
                     
16 EN 1.6, 1106b 3. 
17 EN 1.4, 1095a 2 – 11.  The “young” (Aristotle’s term) not 
only lack some quantity of experience of the “actions that 
occur in life,” but also the breadth and quality of 
cognitive ability required to see relations, analogies, and 
connections between concepts.  Some people, Aristotle 
suggests, are permanently young, so the term denotes a 
stage of intellectual maturity rather than one’s age. 
18 Ibid.  A person who pursues “each successive object as 
passion directs” lacks both an overarching conception of 
the good – with which any course, such as the Nicomachean 
Ethics, must begin with (cf. EN 1.5, 1095b 1 – 5) – and the 
ability to guide his behavior in light of such a 
conception, which is the telos of a course in ethics. 
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definition.  To answer the ‘What made it or brought it 
about?’ question is to cite the efficient or moving cause, 
and to answer the ‘Of what is it made?’ question is to cite 
the material cause.  To the question ‘Why is it?’ we is to 
cite the final cause, the telos.  In the case of artifacts, 
this is, in general, the purpose or purposes in the mind of 
the producer, while in the case of natural beings it is the 
end of a series of regular changes toward which the being 
develops, i.e., the healthy adult of a species.  Much more 
can be said about Aristotle’s doctrine, but here, as 
before, we will simply point out that he later adds that, 
in the case of the generation of natural beings, the 
efficient, formal and final causes are often identical: the 
adult tiger (formal cause), through his action of 
impregnating (efficient cause) a female tiger (who 
contributes the material cause), brings about the 
generation of a new being of the same kind, another tiger 
(final cause).19  In this section we will show that 
Aristotle discusses each of these causes in his analyses of 
friendship, and that the efficient, formal, and final 
causes of friendship are identical.  
                     
19 Physics 2.7, 198a 24 – 27; cf. Metaphysics 8.4, 1044a 32 
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Let’s begin our discussion of Aristotle’s naturalistic 
analysis of friendship by considering the following passage 
from the Politics: 
Now, that man is more of a political animal than bees 
or any other gregarious animal is evident.  Nature, as 
we often say, makes nothing in vain, and man is the 
only animal with the gift of speech.  And whereas mere 
voice is but an indication of pleasure or pain, and is 
therefore found in other animals (for their nature 
attains to the perception of pleasure and pain and the 
intimation of them to one another, and no further), 
the power of speech is intended to set forth the 
expedient and the inexpedient, and therefore likewise 
the just and the unjust.  And it is characteristic of 
man that he alone has any sense of good and evil, of 
just and unjust, and the like, and the association of 
living beings who have this sense makes a family and a 
state.20 
Aristotle thinks human beings are distinct from other 
animals that display social behavior in two ways.  First, 
human beings are able to conceive and distinguish reasons 
for acting that exceed those of pleasure and pain, namely, 
expediency and justice (or goodness in general).  If that 
were all that this passage claimed, it would merely be 
repeating the insight already noted in the Nicomachean 
Ethics that that there are “three objects of choice … the 
noble, the advantageous, [and] the pleasant …”.21  Second, 
however, unlike other animals that merely “indicate” their 
pleasure and pain to others, human speech “set[s] forth” 
                     
20 Politics 1.2, 1253a 7 – 18. 
21 EN 2.3, 1104b30-31. 
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expedient and good actions to others.  It communicates 
concepts over and above exclamations.   
The importance of the distinction is as follows.  The 
pleasure or pain that animal A experiences cannot be 
directly motivating for animal B; at most, A’s pleasure or 
pain is indirectly responsible for B’s action – that is, 
insofar as B is able to imagine B’s experiencing a pleasure 
similar to (but numerically distinct from) the pleasure A 
feels.  In contrast, to say that human beings can ‘set 
forth’ motives for others to consider is to say that, in 
the case of goodness in particular, the numerically 
identical realization that some x is valuable is able to 
directly motivate numerically distinct persons.  While it 
is impossible to conceive of a pleasure that is not 
someone’s pleasure, we can conceive of some non-relative 
property of goodness that is a real feature of an object 
itself.  Just as I can point out to you Rilke’s ‘Archaic 
Torso of Apollo,’ which exists independently of either of 
us, I can also point out the valuable features of the poem 
that you can perceive with me and which make Rilke worth 
reading.  Such features are objective and publicly 
accessible, and the same features of the poem can be 
independently and directly motivating for each of us. 
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It is this ‘perceiving with’ “and the association of 
living beings who have this sense [that] make a family and 
a state,” that is, a distinctly human society.  As he next 
writes: “the state is by nature clearly prior to the family 
and the individual, since the whole is of necessity prior 
to the part.”22  To use Aristotle’s own analogy, a hand is a 
hand really, and not merely homonymously, only when it is 
able to realize its characteristic functions as an integral 
part of the larger human system, a living body.  An 
amputated hand is no more a hand than a blind eye is an eye 
(i.e., it is so in name only).23  Similarly, he implies, a 
human being realizes her nature as a rational being – one 
who is able to deliberate and choose among reasons for 
action that exceed those of pleasure and pain – because she 
is born into in a linguistic community, and language 
informs her rationality.24  There is a sense in which it is 
true that we become both human and social when we learn a 
language; one who is “unable to live [participate] in 
                     
22 Politics, 1.2, 1253a 19. 
23 The eye analogy is Aristotle’s own, at De Anima 2.1, 412a 
17 – 20. 
24 To be precise, it is through the efficient cause of 
language that the first actuality of rationality – the 
capacity to consider goodness as a motivating reason-for-
action – and the second actuality of rationality – its 
exercise – comes into being.  Aristotle distinguishes the 
two levels of actuality at De Anima 2.1, 412a 22 – 26. 
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society” isn’t human except homonymously, but instead is 
“either a beast or a god.”25  It follows, then, that an 
essential property of humanity is the ability to conceive 
of goodness per se, and with others.  I take it that this 
is in part what Aristotle means when he writes that 
“justice is the bond of men in states,”26 where by ‘justice’ 
he seems to mean not fairness of exchange, but “excellence 
entire.”27 
Eunoia: The Efficient Cause of Friendship 
The stage is now set for a naturalistic analysis of 
friendship.  Just as we can recognize excellences in 
things, so too can we recognize excellences in others.  
This recognition, which “[originates] friendship in the way 
that pleasure coming through sight originates erotic 
passion,” Aristotle calls ευνοια.28  Following a seminal 
article by Peter Hadreas, we can interpret eunoia as an 
allogenic “recognition of another’s worthiness,” an 
intellectual response to some feature of a person that we 
                     
25 Politics, 1.2, 1253a 29. 
26 Politics, 1.2, 1253a 37. 
27 EN, 5.1, 1130a 10. 
28 EN, 9.5 1167a 4-5, Hadreas’ translation (citation below). 
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find valuable.29  Insofar as “desire is consequent on 
opinion rather than opinion on desire” – insofar as we can 
only desire a good that we first cognize – eunoia is both 
the condition for the possibility and the efficient cause 
of the affection we may feel for another person.30 
The Formal Cause of Friendship: A Definition 
By itself, eunoia is not friendship, else we would have 
to call my affectionless recognition across time and space 
that Jimmy Hendrix was a great guitar player, friendship.  
Yet that’s absurd, since Jimmy doesn’t (and can’t) know or 
love me in return.  If we reflect on such facts, says 
Aristotle, we can determine a set of necessary conditions 
for friendship.  The fact that neither Jimmy nor my coffee 
can recognize or reciprocate my love eliminates them as 
possible objects of my friendly regard.  As Aristotle says, 
“it would surely be ridiculous to wish wine well; if one 
                     
29 Peter Hadreas, “Ευνοια: Aristotle on the Beginning of 
Friendship,” Ancient Philosophy, 15 (2), 1995: 393-401.  
This is Hadreas’ preferred rendering (p. 398). 
30 It need not be the case that the excellence we recognize 
in another is virtue: Aristotle’s own example is of a 
spectator recognizing the skill, a techne, of an athlete  
(at EN 9.5, 1166b 35, and again at 1167a 19-20).  In fact, 
Aristotle will distinguish the kinds of friendship 
precisely according to the various ways we conceive of the 
goodness of others. 
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wishes anything for it, it is that it may keep.”31  Yet it 
is not merely the fact that neither Jimmy nor my coffee are 
alive that excludes them from being my friends, for it is 
quite possible for me to love living persons from afar, as 
it were, without this constituting friendship.  To my 
chagrin, though I appreciate Jon Heder’s ‘skills’ in the 
movie Napoleon Dynamite, Jon Heder is not my friend.  Nor 
would Jon Heder be my friend if he someday read this 
dissertation and appreciated my philosophical skills, any 
more than Shakespeare’s Beatrice and Benedick would be 
lovers if they never saw through their verbal banter to the 
affection that lay beneath it in Much Ado About Nothing.  
Affection must be both mutual and mutually known if it is 
to count as philia.  To return to Aristotle: 
… eunoia when it is reciprocal [is] friendship.  Or 
must we add ‘when it is recognized’?  For many people 
have eunoia to those whom they have not seen but judge 
to be good or useful; and one of these might return 
this feeling.  These people seem to bear eunoia to 
each other; but how could one call them friends when 
they do not know their mutual feelings?32 
It seems, then, that friendship is limited to those living 
beings – for all we know, only humans – who are able to 
recognize and love some excellence in each other and who 
are able to know of each other’s love.  When these 
                     
31 EN 8.2, 1155b 30-1. 
32 EN 8.2, 1155b 33 – 1156a 3. 
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conditions are reciprocated, Aristotle says, we have the 
beginnings of a formal definition of friendship.  He 
formulates the concept this way: a human relationship is a 
friendship only if 
1. Each person recognizes some excellence in the other 
person; 
2. Each person wishes well (some good) to the other 
person, for their own sake, in respect to that 
excellence recognized in (1); and 
3. Both (1) and (2) are reciprocally known.33 
(1) and (3) have already been discussed.  (2) means that 
the good I wish for a friend must be based on, and because 
of, the excellence in virtue of which I love him.  For 
example, if the excellence that attracts me to a person is 
his dancing skill, I wish him to retain these skills 
because they are good for him to possess. 
To these internal conditions of friendship Aristotle adds 
two external conditions which, taken with the internal 
conditions, are jointly sufficient for friendship: 
                     
33 EN 8.2, 1156a 3 – 5: “To be friends, then, they must be 
mutually recognized as bearing eunoia and wishing well to 
each other for one of the aforesaid reasons,” e.g., 
pleasure, advantage, or the good. 
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4. The relationship has developed over a sufficient 
period of time. 
5. The people have become familiar (been found lovable 
and trustworthy) to each other.34 
Aristotle explains the addition of the latter set of 
conditions by arguing that “those who quickly show the 
marks of friendship to each other wish to be friends, but 
are not friends unless they are both loveable and know the 
fact; for a wish for friendship may arise quickly, but 
friendship does not.”35  In other words, (4) and (5) specify 
the ‘solidity’ or ‘depth,’ of the satisfaction of (1) – 
(3). Without such conditions, as Aesop’s man who sold his 
winter coat too early found out, a swallow would a summer 
make,36 and we would be absurdly committed to calling new 
bar-buddies and compatible freshman roommates friends.  The 
acquisition of knowledge, Aristotle argues elsewhere, 
                     
34 EN 8.3, 1156b 26-30.  Fundamentally, the conditions 
differ insofar as the external conditions are antecedent 
causal conditions which, if lacking, make forming a new 
friendship impossible, or make the continuation of a 
friendship extremely difficult, whereas the internal 
conditions concern the nature of the relation, or natural 
kind. 
35 EN 8.3, 1156b 30-2. 
36 Cited by Aristotle, EN 1.7, 1098a 17-19: “One swallow 
does not make a summer, nor does one day; and so too one 
day, or a short time, does not make a man blessed and 
happy.” 
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requires not merely experience of the other’s excellent 
qualities but also an understanding of the causes – in this 
case, the character – of the other person.  Such knowledge 
of necessity develops over time.  Hence a non-negligible 
period of time spent together in shared activities is 
requisite for trust to develop and the other’s lovability 
to be confirmed.37 
The Final Cause of Friendship 
Aristotle opens and closes the EN’s books on friendship 
with the assertion that friendship is both necessary and 
noble.  Necessary for what, and how is it noble?  While 
books 2 – 7 of the EN are dedicated to the internal 
necessary conditions of eudaimonia – the possession of the 
moral virtues and phronesis – books 8 and 9 present 
friendship not merely as one external good among others, 
but as an activity whose particular aims are themselves 
                     
37 Cf. Metaphysics 1.1, 981a 27-9: “For men of experience 
know that the thing is so, but do not know why, while the 
others [wise persons of knowledge and understanding] know 
the ‘why’ and the cause.”  Though this passage discusses 
the nature of theoretical knowledge, it also provides a 
suitable description of the knowledge of others required 
for friendship, namely, that such-and-such is lovable 
because he is virtuous.  Without this knowledge the level 
of trust we give our friends would be unfounded.  The 
practical knowledge of how to make such judgments 
(including what facts about people are relevant to the 
judgment that a person is loveable, and which are not) is a 
function of our intellectual maturity and moral character. 
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constitutive and enabling of the good life as such.  
Friendship is Aristotle’s primary external condition for 
happiness, and thus follows its necessity and nobility, for 
happiness is noble.38  This can be seem more clearly if we 
investigate the connection between friendship and 
eudaimonia. 
Eudemonia, Aristotle argues, is a kind of activity, and 
this activity is the actualization of the capacity human 
beings have to reason:  
If happiness is activity [rather than a state or a 
passion], it is reasonable that it should be in 
accordance with the highest excellence; and this will 
be that of the highest thing in us. … That this 
activity is contemplative we have already said.39 
Aristotle gives us several analogies in book 1 of the 
Nicomachean Ethics to help us understand his argument.  
Just as a person is most properly said to be a harpist 
while she is playing, and an organic body is most properly 
said to be a body when it is living, so too is a human 
being most properly said to be a human when exercising her 
rational faculty: what makes something a member of natural 
kind x is its displaying – the actuality of – capacities of 
a certain sort.  This way of individuating natural kinds is 
                     
38 It is one among the external goods needed for happiness.  
Cf. Kant, GW 1, for whom happiness is good but not noble. 
39 EN 10.7, 1177a 13 – 17. 
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now known as Aristotle’s Functional account of natural 
kinds: 
• Functional Determination Thesis: “An individual a is a 
member of a kind K just in case a manifests the 
capacities essential to members of K.”40 
This thesis includes or excludes something as a member of a 
species based on that thing’s ability to exemplify 
characteristic activities of a specific sort.  In other 
words, the what-it-is-to-be human is identified by our 
rational activities just as the what-it-is-to-be a knife is 
identified by cutting. Since Aristotle further identifies a 
thing’s function with its telos, he can treat the 
characteristic activity or function, the nature, and the 
end of a natural kind as identical: eudaimonia is the 
excellence of that sort of rational activity by which we 
identify human beings as such as well as that end towards 
which human beings naturally direct their actions.  Insofar 
as Aristotle argues both in EN 1.7 and later in EN 10.7 
that the human function is rational activity or activity 
involving reason, engaging in rational activity well is not 
                     
40 Christopher Sheilds, Classical Philosophy: A Contemporary 
Introduction (New York: Routledge, 2003): p. 139.  Shields 
refers us to Meteorologica 390a 10 – 15; Generation of 
Animals 734b 24 – 31; and Politics 1253a 19 – 25. 
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what makes a person happy as a result or consequence, but 
is constitutive as such of human happiness – just as 
playing well is what makes someone a good harpist.41 
These three descriptions of happiness – as, under 
different formalities, at once our activity, our being, and 
our end – are treated as identical throughout EN 9.9.  In 
the ‘self-awareness’ argument, for instance, Aristotle 
argues that 
for human beings [life] is defined by the capacity for 
perception and understanding.  Every capacity refers 
to an activity, and a thing is present [i.e., exists] 
to its full extent in its activity.  Hence living to 
its full extent would seem to be perceiving or 
understanding. … and living is choiceworthy, for a 
good person most of all, since being is good and 
pleasant for him … therefore just as his own being is 
choiceworthy for him, his friend’s being is 
choiceworthy for him in the same or similar way. 
“Being,” defined by its activity, can be “choiceworthy,” or 
the object of an action, only if our being becomes more 
actual the better it exhibits – is excellent at – its 
characteristic activity.  We should not make the mistake of 
thinking that, for Aristotle, existence determines essence, 
                     
41 Cf. EN 10.7 1179a 28 – 33: “[The intellect] would seem, 
too, to be each man himself, since it is the authoritative 
and better part of him.  It would be strange, then, if he 
were to choose not the life of himself but that of 
something else. … for man, therefore, the life according to 
intellect is best and pleasantest, since intellect more 
than anything else is man. This life therefore is also the 
happiest.” 
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as Sartre thinks, but it should be clear that our manner of 
existence (a) realizes our essence and that (b) our manner 
of existing both is (1) an object of our choice and has (2) 
a normative end.  Some ways of living will fail to realize 
the level of excellence or virtue of which the human 
essence makes possible for human beings.  Therefore ethics 
is about a “choice of lives” as Plato says at Republic: 
that is what it means to say, as we did at the beginning, 
that virtue is both a natural and a made thing. 
Let us return our attention to friendship.  Aristotle 
completes EN 9.9 by writing that, 
whatever existence [being] means for each class of 
men, whatever [end] it is for whose sake they value 
life, in that [activity] they wish to occupy 
themselves with their friends.42 
Once again, the sort of activity we make our end is 
constitutive of our accidental being, and we become persons 
defined accidentally by the lives we lead, that is, by our 
characters.  People disagree about what activities are 
constitutive of the best life, and Aristotle thinks some 
get it wrong.  Yet whatever we think eudaimonia consists 
                     
42 EN 1172a 1 – 3.  That these (being, end, activity) are 
treated as identical here might be explained by reference 
to Aristotle’s ability to conceive one and the same 
activity, under different descriptions, either as a 
potentiality of a being or as a first or second actuality 
of that being, as he does with life at DA 2.1. 
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in, insofar as it is an activity rather than a possession 
(like a quarter in the pocket), friendship enables it.43  
Thus, Aristotle argues that a friend is (1) instrumentally 
good insofar as he (a) facilitates eudaimonia by providing 
opportunities for exercising the virtues and by providing 
support in misfortune,44 (b) renders the rational activity 
of which we’re capable more continuous,45 and is (2) 
intrinsically good insofar as the friend (c) makes that 
which is most desired for its goodness – a life exhibiting 
virtue – both more pleasant in itself and more 
choiceworthy, “just as the musician enjoys fine melodies 
and is pained by bad ones.”46  To use another Aristotelian 
analogy, a friend is a microcosm of human community to you, 
mirroring in his being the contributions the family, 
village and polis make to human life in general, as 
discussed in Politics 1.2: to live, to flourish, and to 
flourish finely. 
                     
43 EN 9.9, 1169b 29 – 32: “For we said at the beginning that 
happiness is a kind of activity; and clearly activity comes 
into being, and does not belong [to someone all the time], 
as a possession does.” 
44 EN 9.11, 1171a 22 – 23. 
45 EN 1170a 5 – 8. 
46 EN 1170a 10 – 11; cf. the same point again at 1170b 8 – 
19.  These three theses about the value of friendship in EN 
9.9 both echo and modify the ways in which friendship is 
said to be good in EN 8.1. 
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That the final cause of friendship is to enable us to 
achieve eudaimonia can be confirmed in four ways.  First, 
Aristotle says in EN 9.4, the marks by which friendship is 
defined are also found in “the good man’s relation to 
himself,” and the good man alone is happy.47  Second, this 
view accords with Aristotle’s assertion in EN 10.7 that 
while the wise man’s contemplation of truth is the most 
self-sufficient of all human activities, he “can perhaps 
[contemplate truth] better if he has fellow-workers.”48  
Third, in both EN 9.9 and in a corresponding passage of the 
Magna Moralia, Aristotle argues that the self-consciousness 
or self-knowledge required for happiness is (perhaps only) 
achievable through the activity of friendship.49  Finally, 
mirroring both the self-consciousness argument of EN 9.9 
and the assertion in EN 10.7 that contemplation is 
happiness, Aristotle asserts that the blessed person needs, 
as a condition of that happiness, “to be conscious of his 
                     
47 EN 9.4, 1166a 1 – 29. 
48 EN 10.7, 1177a 34. 
49 EN 9.9, 1169b 29 – 1170a 3; cf. Magna Moralia 2.15.  John 
Cooper, in “Friendship and the Good in Aristotle” (The 
Philosophical Review, vol. 86 (3), 1977: pp. 290 – 315) has 
argued that the argument in EN is unsound, while the  
argument in Magna Moralia is probably sound.  I think he’s 
right.  Nevertheless, the thrust of each argument is the 
same: perfect friendships are necessary for eudaimonia 
insofar as the good person must know that she is good and 
perfect friendships enable that knowledge. 
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friend as well, and this will be realized in their living 
together and sharing in discussion and thought; for this is 
what living together would seem to mean in the case of man, 
and not, as in the case of cattle, feeding in the same 
place.”50 
Friendship most facilitates, makes most continuous, makes 
most pleasant, and makes most choiceworthy the activity of 
human excellence; about this Aristotle is most unambiguous.  
It even replaces justice.51  For in friendships between 
those who are good, whose characteristic activities most 
involve the sharing of thought rather than the exchange of 
material goods, the exchange is such that one gains without 
taking and gives without losing.  Those who share wisdom, 
Aristotle implies, are lovers in the strictest sense of the 
term.  They are, of course, philosophers. 
This completes our naturalistic analysis of friendship.  
Two points remain.  The first is simply that we can confirm 
that the above analysis is indeed a naturalistic analysis.  
As in the generation of any natural being, the final, 
formal and efficient causes of friendship are identical.  
                     
50 EN 9.9, 1170b 10 – 13. 
51 “When men are friends they have no need of justice, while 
when they are just they need friendship as well, and the 
truest form of justice is thought to be a friendly quality” 
(EN 8.1, 1154b 26 – 28. 
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In a friendship, a person’s excellence, as an unmoved mover 
or final cause, actualizes eunoia (efficient cause), as 
beauty does desire, and gives rise to something of the same 
(formal) kind: “another self,” an excellent person.  For 
“from each other [friends] take the mould of the 
characteristics they approve.”52  Second, however, we can 
decide on our ends, including the ends of friendship, even 
to the extent of confusing the result of the activity with 
its aim.  Hence Aristotle must also discuss derivative 
forms of friendship – relationships that share the form, 
but not the natural end, of the activity – and the ways in 
which such relationships enable happiness, though 
deficiently, and deviate from justice.  To this discussion 
we now turn. 
4. Aristotle’s Normative Analysis of Friendship 
One of Aristotle’s stated goals in EN 8.1-4 is to 
determine “whether there is one species of friendship or 
more than one.”53  While clearly asserting that there are 
                     
52 EN 9.12, 1172a 13 – 14. 
53 EN 1155b 11 – 12.  This is no small matter, since 
“depending on how this question is answered, one gets a 
very different view of the character of the three forms of 
friendship Aristotle distinguishes,” as Michael Pakaluk 
argues in Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics Books VIII and IX, 
Translation with a Commentary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1998), p. 62.  Other writers who have addressed this 
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three forms of friendship, Aristotle nevertheless concludes 
that the term ‘friendship’ is said of the three in a 
somewhat equivocal manner.  One kind is called friendship 
“in the proper sense” and “without qualification,” while 
the other two are called friendships “by similarity” to or 
“through a resemblance” to the first, and are thus called 
friendships “incidentally” rather than without 
qualification.54  Complicating the matter is the fact that 
although Aristotle says that, in accord with common usage, 
the term ‘friendship’ applies to all three kinds of 
relations,55 he also states that friendships of two sorts 
are “less truly [friendships]” in comparison with “the 
truest friendship,” which is friendship founded on and 
between “the good.”56  This is important.  As I hope to make 
clear in this section, Aristotle’s distinction between the 
three kinds of friendship is not merely of taxonomic 
importance, but also has normative consequences insofar as 
                     
problem in some detail include Lorraine Smith Pangle, 
Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2003) and Suzanne Stern-Gillet, Aristotle’s 
Philosophy of Friendship (New York: State University of New 
York Press, 1995), in addition to the authors cited below. 
54 EN 1157a 30 – 1157b 4. 
55 “Men apply the names of friends even to those whose 
motive is utility … and to those who love each other for 
the sake of pleasure … Therefore we too ought perhaps to 
call such people friends” (EN 1157a 26 – 9). 
56 EN 8.3, 1157a 14 and 1157b 25, respectively. 
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the difference between the kinds of friendship imply 
functional differences in the ability of each kind of 
friendship to realize the telos of friendship as such. 
The Problem 
To repeat: Aristotle defines friendship as: 
1. Each person recognizes some excellence in the other 
person; 
2. Each person wishes well (some good) to the other 
person, for their own sake, in respect to that 
excellence recognized in (1); and 
3. Both (1) and (2) are reciprocally known. 
4. The relationship has developed over a sufficient 
period of time. 
5. The friends have become familiar (been found lovable 
and trustworthy) to each other. 
After advancing a truncated version of the above definition 
in EN 8.2, in 8.3 Aristotle distinguishes three ways in 
which persons might be friends based on the ways in which a 
thing can be loved: 
Now since these causes [of love, i.e., the good, the 
pleasant and the useful (1155b 16 – 17)] differ in 
species, so do the types of loving and types of 
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friendship.  Hence friendship has three species, 
corresponding to the three objects of love.  For each 
object of love has a corresponding type of mutual 
loving, combined with awareness of it, and those who 
love each other wish goods to each other in so far as 
they love each other.57 
Essentially, Aristotle is pointing out that good – the 
‘excellence’ referred to in (1) – is multivocalic, or said 
in many ways, and that these ways individuate the various 
forms philia can take.  Since there are three ways in which 
we can understand the good, there are three corresponding 
forms of friendship.  These have come to be known as 
‘perfect friendship,’ or friendships of the good, ‘pleasure 
friendship,’ and ‘utility friendship.’  However, Aristotle 
goes on to further explain these kinds of friendship, and 
this complicates the interpretation of the relation between 
the three forms of friendship. 
There are three primary ways of interpreting Aristotle’s 
definition of friendship.  Following Pakaluk, we can 
distinguish between strict definition, in which the 
defeniens “indicates characteristics that occur in the same 
way in the things that fall within its scope,” and 
schematic definition, in which the defeniens “indicates 
characteristics that are widely variable across the things 
that fall under its scope,” and this “perhaps because it 
                     
57 EN 8.3, 1156a 6 – 9. 
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indicates few uniformities in the definiendia.”58  It’s also 
possible that the three forms are called ‘friendship’ via a 
pros hen equivocation, which occurs when a term has 
different senses and all of these senses are dependent on a 
single, central sense of the term.  I will explain and 
criticize the first two interpretations before advocating 
the third.59 
Strict and Schematic Interpretations of Aristotle’s 
Definition of Friendship 
 
Those who argue that the definition is a strict one 
assert that the well-wishing in (2) is in every kind of 
friendship for the sake of the beloved, and is therefore 
disinterested, although such well-wishing is expressed in 
different ways in the various kinds of friendships.  Hence, 
the proponent of a “strict interpretation” of Aristotle 
will argue that, for any friendship between Adam and Eve on 
the grounds of some good P (where P denotes goodness 
simpliciter, usefulness or pleasantness), 
• Strict Interpretation: Adam loves Eve for the sake of 
Eve because Eve has P. 
                     
58 Pakaluk, p. 61. 
59 See the section entitled, “Friendship and Pros Hen 
Equivocation” below for discussion of this third 
alternative. 
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On the strict interpretation, this formula is true of all 
three kinds of friendships.  John Cooper is a proponent of 
this position.  He holds that Adam loves Eve for the sake 
of Eve “in consequence of recognizing [her] as someone” who 
bears P “independently of consideration of their [Adam’s] 
own welfare or pleasure.”60  In other words, the function of 
P in the formula is to set a limit on the ground in virtue 
of which a person is loved: “in wishing someone well, for 
his own sake, because he is pleasant or advantageous, one’s 
first commitment is to his retention of the property of 
pleasantness or advantageousness, and any good one wishes 
him to have, for his own sake, must be compatible with the 
retention of that special property under which, as his 
friend, one wishes him well in the first place.”61 
Given the widespread acceptance of this interpretation, 
it’s worth taking a moment to examine the primary argument 
for it.  Cooper favors the strict interpretation because we 
would otherwise be committed to the thesis that pleasure 
and utility-friendships are wholly self-centered and, 
correlatively, that only perfect friends can have 
                     
60 John Cooper, “Aristotle on Friendship,” in Essays on 
Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. Rorty (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1980), p. 311. 
61 Cooper 1980, p. 313. 
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friendships that are not wholly self-centered.62  This view 
is too “harsh” and “depressing” – by which Cooper seems to 
mean too elitist – and so he suggests an alternative 
account:63 
6. The efficient cause of friendship is the type of 
property one conceives the other to have, and not 
their actual properties: e.g., the friend understood 
qua pleasant, advantageous, or virtuous. 
7. The other person need not be conceived as a perfect 
instance of this type to be conceived as an instance 
of this type: “the friend need not be thought to be 
pleasant or advantageous in every way or every 
context, but only in some, in order for the 
friendship to exist.” 
8. Therefore, “what gives a friendship its character as 
a friendship of a particular kind is the state of 
mind of the partners – their intentions toward and 
their conceptions of one another,” and “this may 
perfectly well – indeed, typically will – involve a 
very limited and partial view of him as” an instance 
                     
62 Cooper 1980, p. 305. 
63 Cooper 1980, p. 305.  All quotations in the following 
reconstruction are taken from pp. 306-7. 
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of a type, at least in the ‘deficient’ kinds of 
friendship. 
Let’s call (8) the partial properties view, namely, that a 
“partial view” of someone (in the manner spelled out in 
(7)) as an instance of a type of friendship is sufficient 
for someone’s being an instance of that type of friend.  
Cooper goes on: 
9. The partial properties view can be extended to 
virtue-friendships. 
10. Therefore, while some (probably rare) friendships 
may involve the recognition of complete and perfect 
virtue (e.g., friendship among “moral heroes”), most 
virtue friendships probably involve the recognition 
of some isolated and imperfect good qualities. 
The remainder of Cooper’s article primarily involves 
support for (9) on the grounds of analogy and textual 
extrapolation.  However, (9) cannot be correct.  
Aristotle’s ‘Unity of Virtues’ thesis of EN 6.12-13 holds 
that practical wisdom is necessary and sufficient for moral 
virtue.64  This entails, Aristotle argues, the impossibility 
                     
64 In EN 6.12, Aristotle argues that insofar as all 
reasoning, including practical reasoning, involves as a  
“starting point” that such-and-such is to be valued, “and 
this is not evident except to the good man,” that “it is 
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of recognizing excellences which are recognized as and 
known to be “limited in their goodness and/or conjoined 
with other not so good, or even positively bad personal 
characteristics,” as Cooper describe partial properties.65   
Further, there’s an important difference between pleasure 
and virtue: whereas pleasure is a natural but non-necessary 
and non-exclusive effect of excellence, virtue is not a 
detachable effect of good character.  Rather, virtue is 
constitutive of good character.  For Aristotle, there is no 
‘partial’ view of Adam’s virtue apart from the complete 
constitution of his character.  “It is impossible,” 
Aristotle says, “to be practically wise without being 
good.”66  So there can be no Aristotelian analogy between 
                     
impossible to be practically wise without being good” 
(1144a31 – 37).  For this reason, he argues in 6.13 that it 
is impossible “that the excellences exist in separation 
from each other” (1144b 32 – 33): if practical wisdom (the 
‘starting point’ of 6.12) is a necessary and sufficient 
condition for moral virtue, than given one moral virtue, 
one has practical wisdom, and if one has practical wisdom, 
then one has all of the moral virtues.  And thus, as 
Aristotle puts the point at 1144b 35 – 1145a 3, “This 
[separation of excellences] is possible in respect of the 
natural excellences [such as being brawny but not 
handsome], but not in respect of those in respect of which 
a man is called without qualification good; for with the 
presence of the one quality, practical wisdom, will be 
given all the excellences.” 
65 Cooper 1980, p. 307. 
66 EN 6.12, 1144a 36. 
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pleasurable properties and virtue, and thus Cooper’s 
interpretation will not do. 
Alternately, those who think that Aristotle’s view of 
friendship is schematic argue that the well-wishing in (2) 
is for the sake of the beloved only in friendships based on 
the good, while the well-wishing is for the sake of 
pleasantness or utility in the other two forms of 
friendship.  Hence, the proponent of a schematic 
interpretation holds that the following holds for the three 
forms of friendship, 
• Schematic Interpretation: Adam values P and loves Eve 
as a provider of P for the sake of P, 
while importantly noting that in the case of perfect 
friendships, P is identical to, or an essential property 
of, Eve.  Michael Pakaluk takes this view, and argues that, 
in pleasure and utility friendships, we cannot say that 
“the love of each friend correlates with the other human 
being, since there are instances of the former which are 
not for the latter – obviously, when the man who is loved 
is a bad man and known by the lover to be so.”67  The 
contrast of deficient loves with perfect friendship becomes 
clearest when “Aristotle provides us with a description of 
                     
67 Pakaluk, pp. 69 – 70. 
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love for another where the correlative is precisely 
stipulated as being the man …”68  Pakaluk appears to base 
his argument on solid textual grounds: Aristotle says that 
“those who love each other for their utility do not love 
each other for themselves but in virtue of some good which 
they get from each other,” and “so too with those who love 
each other for the sake of pleasure …”69   
Nevertheless, there are two problems with Pakaluk’s 
account.  First, it makes friends fungible.  This makes 
Aristotle’s remarks about the special duties of friendship 
incoherent.  It cannot be in terms of Eve’s being a 
provider of P that I gain (or lose?) the friend-based 
obligations toward her or display any of the ‘marks of 
friendship’ towards her.  If my commitment is to pleasure 
or utility, and the ‘friend’ were only a provider of P and 
had no value except as a provider of P, then he would a 
mere means to P, and I would have no duties to him as such 
– just as I have no duties to my car.  Second, this account 
at worst makes the fact that it is the person herself that 
is loved in perfect friendship completely accidental to the 
relationship, which is counterintuitive.  The object of my 
affection is Eve, not the formality under which I find her 
                     
68 Pakaluk, pp. 69 – 70. 
69 EN 8.3, 1156a 10 – 12. 
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loveable; hence this account confuses our motives for 
loving and the object of our love.70  At best Pakaluk’s 
account admits that the person is the object of love in 
perfect friendships as a logical possibility, whereas 
Aristotle seems to think that this feature of perfect 
friendship is essential, and an important reason why 
perfect friendships are more valuable than other kinds of 
friendship. 
Friendship and Pros Hen Equivocation 
Happily, the strict/schematic distinction does not 
exhaust the possible interpretations of the relations 
between the three kinds of friendship.  Aristotle himself 
suggests that the three kinds are related via pros hen 
equivocation in Eudemian Ethics 7.2. 
It is impossible for all to come under one definition.  
The remaining alternative, therefore, is that in one 
sense only the primary kind [is friendship], in 
another sense, all are, neither homonymously, i.e., 
having a chance relation to each other, but having a 
relation to one thing.71 
Until recently many scholars rejected the Eudemian account 
of the relation between the three kinds of friendship as 
                     
70 As Aristotle points out at EN 8.3, 1156a 17 – 19: “Hence 
these [lower] friendships as well [as the friends] are 
coincidental, since the beloved is loved not in so far he 
is who he is, but in so far as he provides some good or 
pleasure.” 
71 EE 7.2, 1236b 23 – 36. 
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either identical to or sufficient for the relation between 
the three kinds of friendship Aristotle describes as 
‘resemblance’ in the EN.72 Julie Ward, however, has recently 
argued that it is possible to account for the relation 
among the three kinds of friendship in terms of a pros hen 
equivocation if we pay careful attention to the numerous 
ways in which terms can be so related.73 
Without going into the fine details of Ward’s argument, 
her account of Aristotle’s doctrine of pros hen 
equivocation is the following.  In the Categories, 
Aristotle argues that things are named univocally if they 
share both a name and a definition, while things are named 
equivocally if they share a name but not a definition.  
                     
72 So says Julie Ward,“Focal Reference in Aristotle’s 
Account of Philia,” Apeiron 28 (1995): pp. 183-205.  Ward 
points in particular to G.E.L. Owen, “Logic and Metaphysics 
in Some Earlier Works of Aristotle,” reprinted in Logic, 
Science and Dialectic (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1986), pp. 180-
99. Following Owen in doubting the sufficiency of a pros 
hen interpretation of the forms of friendship are W.W. 
Fortenbaugh, “Aristotle’s Analysis of Friendship: Function 
and Analogy, Resemblance, and Focal Meaning,” Phronesis 20 
(1975): pp. 51-62; A.D.M. Walker, “Aristotle’s Account of 
Friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics,” Phronesis 24 (1979), 
pp. 180-96; and A.W. Price, Love and Friendship in 
Aristotle and Plato (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989). 
73 Ward’s primary thesis is that, by following Owen, 
scholars have artificially limited themselves to one 
conception of focal reference (pros hen equivocation) on 
the basis of which they reject its application to the EN 
account of friendship, although others are available and 
more appropriate. 
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Conceptually straddling this distinction is the idea of 
pros hen equivocation, in which the ‘meanings’ of a set of 
terms may be different while bearing ‘reference’ to or 
being derived from some one thing which is ontologically or 
logically prior to them – prior in being or prior in 
definition, respectively.74  Aristotle’s most famous use of 
the ontological version of pros hen equivocation occurs in 
the Metaphysics’ assertion that “being is spoken of in many 
ways, but with relation to one thing and a certain nature, 
and not homonymously.”75  He goes on to assert that non-
substantial existents are called ‘existents’ insofar as 
their existence is dependent on the ontologically prior-in-
being substance, as modifications, relations, qualities, 
destructions or privations of substance.76  Hence, substance 
is not only logically prior to its accidents (since there 
is no accident that is not an accident of some substance), 
but is also a more perfect instance of ‘existent.’  As 
Aristotle says, substance is being in an unqualified or 
absolute sense rather than in a qualified sense. 
                     
74 Cat. 1, 1a 1-12.  I borrow terms ‘meaning’ and 
‘reference’ from Aquinas, who uses them to describe pros 
hen equivocation in his commentaries on the EN and the Met.  
This list of the kinds of priorities isn’t exhaustive; cf. 
Cat. 12, 14a 27 – 14b 24, and Met. 5.11, 1018b – 14. 
75 Metaphysics 4.2, 1003a 33 – 4. 
76 Metaphysics 4.2, 1003b 5 – 10. 
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It is also possible for a term to be logically prior to 
another without the things denoted by the terms standing in 
a relation of ontological dependence.  For example, 
Aristotle often points to the fact that we can call, say, 
the practical knowledge or art of the doctor, her diagnosis 
of a patient, and a scalpel all ‘medical,’ and that saying 
this of each thing gives us important information about the 
kind of thing we are dealing with.  The scalpel is a knife 
used by a medical doctor, while the doctor’s diagnosis 
proceeds from the practice of her medical art.  Of course, 
we do not call anyone who wields a scalpel a doctor, nor 
everyone who gives a diagnosis of sickness.  Rather, 
we speak of a medical mind, and body, and instrument, 
and operation, but [we apply the term] properly to 
that which is primary.  The primary is that of which 
the definition exists in all, for example, a medical 
instrument is that which a medical man would use, but 
the definition of the instrument is not in the 
definition of the medical man.77 
The definition of medical doctor need not appear explicitly 
in the definition of her tools or activities; what is 
important is that these uses of ‘medical’ are posterior to 
the primary use of the term as said of doctors.78 
                     
77 EE 7.2, 1236a 19 – 22. 
78 Cf. Metaphysics 4.2, 1003b 1 – 3. 
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The kinds of friendship appear to be related in the 
logical sense of pros hen equivocation just discussed.  
Ward gives three reasons for thinking this. The first is 
that both the Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics distinguish 
between what is good absolutely or without qualification 
and what is good relatively or with qualification.79  For 
example, what is good for a healthy body is good 
absolutely, while surgery is good only for the sick; 
likewise, what is pleasant to the good adult person is what 
is good without qualification, while what is pleasant to 
children, animals and the vicious is only good with 
qualification.80  In a more general sense, as Ward suggests, 
In adverting to the fully functioning thing that fs to 
determine what will count as a standard for f, he 
[Aristotle] shows that he has a normative sense of 
what is good or pleasant … [What is ‘absolutely good’ 
implicitly refers] to what is good in relation to the 
standard for each category.81 
What is absolutely good for something, then, is good 
relative to that thing’s natural kind.   
Second, although Aristotle says that the good considered 
both with and without qualification can be a reason for 
                     
79 EE 1235b 31 – 2; the healthy vs. sick example is found at 
1235b 33 – 5.  The same distinction is made at EN 7.12, 
1152b 26 – 27. 
80 Cf. EN 3.4, 1113a 31 – 34 and 7.13, 1153a 31 – 32. 
81 Ward, p. 187. 
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friendship,82 he also argues that, properly speaking, 
pleasure and advantage are called good relative to and 
posterior to what we call good in the primary sense of 
excellence of function.  Clearly, what is useful is useful 
as a means to some other good and is posterior to good in 
precisely that sense.83  Pleasure, as Aristotle tells us in 
EN 7.12 – 13, is a natural accompaniment or epiphenomenon 
of unimpeded natural activity.84  Hence, pleasure cannot be 
the primary sense of the good insofar as it is a normal 
effect of natural functioning, and it is the functioning 
which provides the standard of goodness for a natural kind. 
Finally, Aristotle tells us in numerous places that the 
good is what moves us as an object of desire,85 and Met. 
1072a27 and 1072b1-4 tell us that this is a form of final 
causality: the object of love moves without being moved.  
Furthermore, to say of something that it is ‘loveable’ is 
to predicate of it an intentional, dispositional property, 
since to say of something that it is ‘loveable’ is not 
merely to state a relation between a lover, Adam, and some 
                     
82 EE 1236a 11 – 12; EN 8.2, 1155b 21 – 22. 
83 EN 8.2, 1155b 21 – 21. 
84 EN 7.12, 1153a 14 – 15; 7.13, 1153b 8 – 12.  The 
explanation of this lies in the fact that “every excellence 
both brings into good condition the thing of which it is 
the excellence and makes the work of that thing be done 
well” (EN 2.6, 1106a 15 – 16). 
85 See, for example, EE 1236a11-12, as well as EN 2.4. 
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property P, but rather to say of Eve that Adam is disposed 
to conceive of her as P and to be moved by her in respect 
to P.86  
It follows, then, that the kinds of friendship differ – 
and are focally related – by the way in which they conceive 
as good the person they are moved by.  In perfect 
friendships, a friend is moved by the friend conceived and 
loved qua good, or as good absolutely, while in the 
derivative forms of friendship, a friend is moved by the 
friend conceived and loved with qualification, that is, qua 
pleasant or qua useful.  In every case it is a friend – a 
person who mutually recognizes and reciprocates our 
affection – who so moves us, even while the cases are 
individuated by their ends.  Hence, Ward correctly argues, 
“the secondary definitions [of friendship] rely on the 
primary definition but add further specifications as to 
what kind of good the specific friendship is directed.”  In 
short, the situation is this: 
                     
86 As Pakaluk argues, p. 59, commenting on EN 1155b 25 – 6: 
“The distinction between being apparently and actually good 
or pleasant ‘will make no difference,’ since something that 
is actually loveable to someone, but does not appear to him 
to be so, cannot be loved by him at all, and anything that 
appears to be loveable is loved only as appearing to him to 
be actually loveable.” 
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• Perfect friendship =  “mutual and recognized affection 
for the sake of the unqualified good.” 
• Pleasure friendship = “mutual and recognized affection 
for the sake of the pleasant qua good.” 
• Utility Friendship = “mutual and recognized affection 
for the sake of the useful qua good.”87 
In every case of friendship, then, it is the conception 
of the good (either with or without qualification) that is 
recognized and is the object of choice, although only in 
perfect friendship does the good absolutely and the good 
for us match up.  Each person in a perfect friendship, 
then, 
is both good without qualification and to his friend, 
for the good are both good without qualification and 
useful to each other.  So too they are pleasant; for 
the good are pleasant both without qualification and 
to each other, since to each his own activities and 
those of others like them are pleasurable, and the 
actions of the good are the same or alike.88 
The three kinds of friendship are not related as species to 
genus, as Cooper seems to think; nor is the definition of 
friendship simply schematic in the way that Pakaluk thinks 
                     
87 Ward, p. 198 (definitions) and p. 199 (previous 
quotation). 
88 EN 7.3, 1156b 12 – 17. 
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it is.89  Rather, it is in consequence of the differing but 
focally related aetiology (causes) of the kinds of 
friendship that the extrinsic conditions of friendship 
(such as the amount of time spent together, in shared 
activities) will differ in degree, and likewise the 
symptomology (marks) of friendship differ across the 
kinds.90 
That brings us full circle to the normative analysis of 
friendship.  The deficient forms of friendship manifest 
themselves as less perfect enablers of eudaimonia.  They 
are less pleasurable, less just, less beneficent, shorter 
in duration, more prone to slander, less self-sufficient 
and more prone to the variations of fortune.91  Such 
friendships are not unqualified goods in all circumstances, 
as are perfect friendships.92  But if we recognize that 
                     
89 Pakaluk, p. 61.  Pakaluk wrongly thinks that in 
friendship “characteristics … are widely variable across 
the things that fall under its scope” (p. 61). 
90 Aquinas recognized this point: “the good as such, the 
pleasurable, and the useful … do not differ in kind as 
three equal species of a genus but are classified by 
priority and posterity,” and thus “since acts are 
diversified according to the difference of objects, the 
types of love will differ in kind according to these 
three.”  Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 
trans. C.I. Litzinger (Notre Dame: Dumb Ox Books, 1993): 
§1563 and ff. 
91 Indeed, such differences seem to be a main theme of EN 
8.4 – 6 and book 9. 
92 EN 9.11, 1171b 28. 
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friendships of the good involve persons who are good, and 
who in virtue of their goodness enable one another’s good, 
the opposite must also be true: those who are bad tend to 
seek those who are bad, and by associating with the bad 
facilitate their own viciousness.  Aristotle himself draws 
such a contrast: 
The friendship of bad men turns out to be an evil 
thing (for because of their instability they unite in 
bad pursuits, and besides they become evil by becoming 
like each other), while the friendship of good men is 
good, being augmented by their companionship; and they 
are thought to become better too by their activities 
and by improving each other; for from each other they 
take the mould of the characteristics they approve.93 
Insofar as the good and the pleasant have the 
characteristic of ends, it is probably the case that most 
persons who err in friendship do so by overvaluing the 
importance of pleasure in their relationships.  As a 
consequence, such people many times begin to treat 
themselves and their friends unjustly – like things that 
exist only to provide pleasure, as Kant would say.  As 
Aristotle says, “perhaps they should look out for friends 
who, being pleasant, are also good, and good for them too; 
                     
93 EN 9.12, 1172a 7 – 14. 
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for so they will have all the characteristics that friends 
should have.”94   
5. Conclusion 
In this chapter we have argued that Aristotle provides 
both a natural and normative analysis of friendship.  As a 
natural phenomenon, human friendship has as its telos the 
enabling of eudaimonia for beings who are essentially 
social, rational, and embodied beings.  Normatively, 
however, we can set for ourselves purposes for friendship 
that approximate this natural end more or less well, and 
are thus more or less well suited to realizing the 
functional aims of friendship itself.  Every particular 
friendship – like every particular person – is, at 
different levels of analysis, both a natural and a made or 
purposed thing. 
This thesis informs the philosophical tradition that 
follows, and our tracing of that tradition in this 
dissertation.  Each of the philosophers we will survey 
thinks that friendship forms a natural kind, and that the 
features of this natural kind are relevant to our moral 
appraisal of particular friendships as we find them 
                     
94 EN 8.7, 1158a 26 – 28. 
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instantiated in the world – even as they differ from 
Aristotle as to what these features are and how they are 
relevant to moral philosophy.  Thinkers who hold that human 
relationships are merely or completely artefactual we thus 
set aside as outside the scope of this study.95 
However, insofar as our study will focus not merely on 
friendship, but also on its relationship to loyalty, we 
will next investigate Aristotle’s thoughts on duties of 
friendship and loyalty in the Nicomachean Ethics before 
turning our attention to Aquinas, Kant, and Kierkegaard. 
                     
95 20th century instances thinkers in this latter tradition 
would include Jean-Paul Sartre, Michael Foucault, and Luce 
Irigaray. 
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CHAPTER 2.  ARISTOTLE ON LOYALTY: RESCUING 
FALLEN FRIENDS 
 
“One who is just …  puts himself in order, is his own friend, and 
harmonizes the three parts of himself like three limiting notes in a 
musical scale – high, lows, and middle.” 
– Plato, Republic IV (443d) 
Précis 
In the previous chapter we discussed Aristotle’s theory 
of friendship by focusing on its nature and its value.  In 
this chapter we will address the practical implications 
Aristotle’s teleological accounts of friendship and the 
self have for a casuitical question: what are the limits of 
our obligations of loyalty and beneficence towards friends 
who have fallen from virtue?  Particular attention will be 
paid to the ways in which Aristotle can avoid a purely 
contractualist answer to these questions. 
Section one will locate the concept of loyalty in 
Aristotle’s theory of virtue.  Section two will show why 
Aristotle’s remarks about duties to fallen friends both 
follow from the causal explanation of friendship discussed 
in chapter one, and how this explanation makes his remarks 
morally problematic.  In the remaining sections of this 
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chapter I will compare the ways in which Aristotle says our 
obligations of justice and care differ towards former 
friends.  I will also argue for an explanation of this 
difference by interpreting Aristotle’s notion of the self 
as a normative, final cause of human excellence.  I will 
end the chapter by summarizing Aristotle’s contributions to 
the philosophy of loyalty, as well as outline some problems 
with his account. 
1. Aristotle and Loyalty 
In the Introduction, it was noted that the standard model 
of loyalty holds that loyalty is “a practical disposition 
to persist in an intrinsically valued … associational 
attachment,” where this attachment involves intimacy, care 
and willingness to take risks to secure the interests or 
well-being of the object of loyalty.1  The objects of 
loyalty fall into paradigmatically natural and conventional 
kinds, such as friends, families, countries and 
professions, though these do not exhaust the classes of 
objects loyalties fall under. 
                     
1 See John Kleinig, “Loyalty,” Stanford Encylopedia of 
Philosophy, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/loyalty>.  
Accessed 11/18/08. 
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Because he treats friendship as a necessary condition of 
eudaimonia, loyalty to friends clearly meets Aristotle’s 
conditions for virtue understood as “a state of character 
concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean 
relative to us, this being determined by a rational 
principle, and by that principle by which the man of 
practical wisdom would determine it.”2  The standard model 
of loyalty, however, blends what David O’Connor calls the 
aetiologial and symptomological levels of a virtue.3  
(Aetiological reflection on a virtue involves analysis of 
the underlying state of the appetite or emotion associated 
with the virtue; symptomological analysis of a virtue 
involves reflection on the typical kinds of acts that issue 
from this underlying state of character.)  If we confine 
our analysis of loyalty to the kind of loyalty we owe to 
friends, loyalty aetiologically involves historically 
rooted and particular care of those to whom we stand in a 
special relation. 
That loyalty involves care – active beneficence and 
benevolence directed towards a particular person – can be 
                     
2 EN 2.6, 1107a 2; 1144b 24. 
3 This distinction was first used by David O’Connor, 
“Aetiology of Justice,” in Essays on the Foundations of 
Political Science, eds. Lord and O’Connor (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1991): pp. 136 – 164. 
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clearly seen in Aristotle’s description of the marks of 
friendship.  In EN 9.4, he argues that “the defining 
features of friendship that are found in friendships to 
one’s neighbors would seem to be derived from features of 
friendship toward oneself,” and paradigmatically so in “the 
decent person’s relation to himself.”4  There are five such 
features: 
1. Jones wishes and does goods or apparent goods to 
Smith for Smith’s sake. 
2. Jones wishes for Smith to exist and to live, for 
Smith’s own sake. 
3. Jones spends time with Smith. 
4. Jones makes the same choices as Smith. 
5. Jones shares in Smith’s distress and enjoyment. 
Marks (1), (2), and (5) clearly involve an identification 
of Smith’s interests with Jones’s at the level of Jones’s 
affections, while items (1), (3), and (4) describe the 
typical actions Jones engages in as a result of his love 
for Smith.  Jones’s treatment of Smith’s interests as his 
own transcends the purely negative ethical requirement that 
                     
4 EN 9.4, 1166a 1 – 3; 10 – 11. 
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we refrain from actions whose immediate goal harms some 
basic human good, i.e., what modern ethicists would all the 
duty of respect:  Jones feels and does for Smith what he 
feels and does for no stranger, and neither this omission 
nor his preferential feelings and doings for Smith imply 
any injustice toward strangers.  Friendship and loyalty 
thus clearly involve a positive obligation of care, which 
requires us to consider the effects of our actions on the 
interests of those to whom we stand in affective relations 
and the pursuit of what is good for those interests. 
Symptomologically, then, loyalty typically involves, 
minimally, the “maintenance of the [friendly] 
relationship,” and maximally involves actions intended to 
further the interests your friend.5 
Loyalty also nicely fits Aristotle’s claim that a virtue 
lies between two extremes, an excess and a deficiency.  At 
the aetiological level, a deficiency of loyalty is weakness 
of attachment, homelessness, a constantly shifting pattern 
of devotion and care.  At the symptomological level, a 
deficiency in loyalty may express itself either in failures 
to meet one’s obligations of care or in actions which 
                     
5 The distinction between the “minimal” and “maximal” 
demands of loyalty is George Fletcher’s in Loyalty: An 
Essay on the Morality of Relationships (New York: Oxford 
UP, 1993), pp. 8 – 9. 
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attack your friend’s interests.  The former class of 
actions involve neglect; the latter class involves 
betrayal. At the aetiological level, an excess of loyalty 
is unreflective and uncritical idolatry of your friend – 
what, at the political level is expressed by the phrase ‘my 
country, right or wrong’ – and at the symptomological level 
is typified by what we might call ‘fanaticism.’  
Although loyalty is not the “beginning of political life, 
a life in which interaction with others becomes the primary 
means of solving problems,” as Fletcher says, it is a 
necessary condition of that life.6  Reciprocal care is the 
primary mark of the relation between the natural ruler and 
the naturally ruled that Aristotle describes in Politics 
1.2, and it is the extension of this reciprocity from the 
family to the stranger that makes possible the transition 
from the familial to the civic life and from a life of mere 
sufficiency to a life of leisure.  It is this transition 
that makes a good life (as opposed to mere life) possible, 
as Aristotle argues in Politics 1.3 and again in 7.14.  No 
human being can be stateless, unattached, without 
loyalties, and remain human, Aristotle implies: to be truly 
alienated – like Camus’ character Meursault in L’Etranger – 
                     
6 Fletcher, p. 5. 
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is to be either a beast or a god.7  Only one of these 
options is possible for man. 
2. A Textual Puzzle 
Given that the genus of loyalty is a disposition to 
persevere in obligations of care to those to whom we stand 
in a special relation, an obvious place to investigate 
Aristotle’s notion of loyalty is in Nicomachean Ethics 8.13 
– 9.3, where he discusses the circumstances in which one 
should persevere in a failing or failed relationship.  
Aristotle here argues that philia generates obligations to 
work for your friend’s good even in spite of his loss of 
whatever feature he possessed that was the basis of the 
friendship.   
Just as we think we must do kindnesses for friends 
more than for strangers, so also we should accord 
something to past friends because of the former 
friendship, whenever it is not excessive vice that 
causes the dissolution.8 
This sentence ends a chapter in which Aristotle attempts to 
draw a fine line between a duty to ‘rescue’ the character 
of a friend gone bad and the permissibility of dissolving 
the relationship altogether.  However, explaining and 
justifying the line he draws is problematic. 
                     
7 Politics, 1.2, 1253a 25 – 30. 
8 EN 9.3, 1165b 34 – 36. 
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Because loyalty arises out of our contingent affections 
and judgments – including eunoia – it is difficult to speak 
of persisting obligations of loyalty, i.e., to persist in 
care when love has died.  As George Fletcher writes, 
The way to see this is to think about disloyalty and 
betrayal.  Betrayal is the stronger term, and it 
implies something more than an absence of loyalty or a 
shift in loyalties. … Humans engage in such shifts 
when they divorce and remarry or emigrate and acquire 
the nationality of an adopted country.  Betrayal, 
however, is one of the basic sins of our civilization. 
… The difference between a shift in loyalty and 
betrayal inheres in a simple fact.  Betrayal occurs 
only when one breaches an obligation of loyalty.  A 
shift in loyalty represents not a breach but the 
extinction of the duty toward one object and its 
revival toward someone else.9 
Here, then, is the difficulty.  On the one hand, it seems 
profoundly unproblematic that we have present obligations 
because of past relationships. If we can be presently 
guilty of past wrongs, or presently under a debt of 
gratitude because of someone’s previous generosity, there 
should be no problem in thinking that the fact that someone 
once meant something special to you can ground a present 
obligation of loyalty.  On the other hand, insofar as 
Aristotle’s account of friendship and care depend on a 
causal account of affection, he is willing to say that our 
obligations of loyalty can be extinguished by our friend’s 
                     
9 Fletcher, p. 9 – 10. 
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losing the property that caused our affection for him. 
Certainly, Aristotle admits, former friends who are now 
unloved (or unlovable) may demand that we be just with them 
in virtue of debts we accrued in the former relationship.10  
A woman may justly demand that her former spouse pay child 
support because he is the father of their children, just as 
you may justly demand that I pay you today because I 
borrowed money from you yesterday.  But that is quite a 
different demand – and a differently justified demand – 
than the demand for preferential care.   
When Aristotle raises the problem of our obligations to 
continue preferential care to those we no longer love, he 
engages in a strange dialectic with himself: 
But if we accept the friend as a good person, and then 
he becomes vicious, and seems so, should we still love 
him?  Surely we cannot …11 
But if one friend stayed the same and the other became 
more decent and far excelled his friend in virtue, 
should the better person still treat the other as a 
friend?  Surely he cannot.12 
Apparently, the normative question as to whether we ought 
to love and care for former friends has a purely 
descriptive answer: we cannot be obligated to perform 
                     
10 Aristotle, EN 8.9, 1160a 1 – 8. 
11 EN 9.3, 1165b 13. 
12 EN 9.3, 1165b 23 – 25. 
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impossible actions.  It is in this context that Aristotle’s 
remark that “so also we should accord something to past 
friends because of the former friendship, whenever it is 
not excessive vice that causes the dissolution,” becomes 
difficult to explain – even if, at the level of common 
sense morality, it seems correct. 
Let’s approach the problem from a slightly different 
direction.  Very clearly, pleasure and utility friendships 
do not last any longer than the exchange they involve; as 
Aristotle repeatedly says of such relationships, it is of 
their nature to be transient.13  This does not imply that 
there are no obligations of loyalty involved in these 
friendships while they last, for we have clear notions 
sexual and commercial betrayal even against those with whom 
we are involved only at the level of hedonic or economic 
exchange, and loyalty is a necessary condition for that 
possibility.  However, Aristotle suggests, the limits of 
such loyalties are identical with the limits of the 
relationship – the terms of the exchange.14 
It is also going to be the case that in perfect 
friendships (of virtue or character) that the limits of 
                     
13 EN 8.3, 1156a 19 – 20. 
14 EN 9.3, 1165b 2 – 4. 
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loyalty are identical with the limits of the relationship, 
but it is precisely because such friends exchange character 
that their loyalty is to something more lasting – and 
“virtue is a lasting thing.”15 Indeed, Aristotle allows for 
the permissible dissolution of such friendships only in the 
case of mistaken identity – when the relationship is 
annulled, so to speak, on the grounds that it was never a 
real character friendship – or when the character of one of 
the friends changes so drastically as to cease to be 
exchangeable.  This can happen in two ways. In one of these 
cases the friend so outstrips the other in virtue that the 
ending of the relationship is not so much an extinction of 
love as a dissolution, a growing apart, concomitant with a 
lessening of care and its obligations.  In the other case, 
however, your friend falls into vice, and here Aristotle 
retains the obligation of loyalty to the point of 
irredeemability, as cited above. 
Any explanation of Aristotle’s remarks must ground itself 
on two facts: that loyalty is generated by our affection 
for the object of friendly love – an ‘intrinsically valued 
associational attachment,’ in the words of the standard 
model - and that Aristotle’s explanation of the affective 
                     
15 EN 8.3, 1156b 12. 
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generation of such obligations is strictly causal.  As 
Aquinas will later point out, the difference between desire 
and love is that love is an affection, a passive response 
to some excellence (in this case, eunoia), while desire is 
the active seeking to possess some good for one’s own – 
what Aquinas calls concupiscience.  On this model, an 
object’s loss of the good that arouses your affection means 
the cessation of the affection, and the loss of the 
affection means the loss of the relationship and one’s 
loyalty – precisely as Aristotle describes in the cases of 
dissolved friendships of pleasure and utility.  One cannot 
care for what one does not love, just as one cannot see in 
the absence of light (Aristotle’s metaphor for eunoia in EN 
9.5); and this is perfectly consistent with the fact that 
we may simultaneously retain our obligations of justice to 
former friends since these are either contractual or 
general, non-contractual obligations rather than elicited 
and particular.  However, it is precisely this lightswitch 
aspect of Aristotle’s treatment of affection and loyalty 
that make his remarks about our obligations to care for the 
virtue of a fallen friend problematic. 
In the remaining parts of this chapter I will compare the 
ways in which Aristotle says our obligations of justice and 
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our obligations of care differ towards former friends.  I 
will also argue for an explanation of this difference that 
makes recourse to Aristotle’s notion of the self as a 
normative, final cause of human excellence.   
3. Friendship, Loyalty, and Justice 
Aristotle states that questions regarding the conduct of 
people toward their friends “appears to be the same as 
asking how they are to conduct their lives justly.”16  He 
means this quite literally, it turns out.  All friendships 
involve an exchange of goods, i.e., the conferral and 
reception of benefits, and such exchanges fall under the 
heading of justice in EN Book Five. Because his discussion 
of the reasons disputes occur among friends and the 
conditions under which we may legitimately dissolve a 
friendship presuppose his discussion of justice, a brief 
review Aristotle’s classification of the kinds of justice 
is needed before the grounds of the dissolution of 
friendship can be discussed. 
Aristotle on Justice 
Aristotle divides justice into two kinds, general and 
particular, and argues that there are two kinds of 
                     
16 EN 8.12, 1162a 31 – 2. 
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particular justice, distributive and rectificatory (though 
he also discusses a kind of justice governing purely 
economic transactions called justice in exchange).  He also 
considers political justice a form of special justice.17  By 
general justice Aristotle simply means “complete virtue to 
the highest degree,” that is, virtue itself.18 (This is in 
keeping with Plato’s use of the term in the Republic.)  
Special justice, on the other hand, specifically relates to 
fairness with other people.   
Distributive justice concerns the distribution of goods 
in proportional fairness.  Because justice deals with 
proportions, Aristotle argues that it involves an “equality 
of ratios and requires at least four terms”: two persons, A 
and B, and two goods, C and D.19  Its end is fairness. 
Rectificatory justice concerns making right an injury 
rather than the establishment of proper proportions in some 
exchange.  Aristotle treats rectificatory justice as a 
zero-sum game in which one person’s loss is another’s gain 
(though he has reservations about the exactness of his 
                     
17 Today we would standardly call these distributive and 
rectificatory justice, and justice of acquisition, 
respectively. 
18 EN 5.1, 1129b 31. 
19 EN 5.3, 1131a 33 – 1131b 9. 
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terminology here).  Considering a case of an attacker who 
wounds his victim, he says that 
we speak of profit … even if that is not the proper 
word in some cases; and we speak of loss for the 
victim who suffers the wound.  At any rate, when what 
was suffered has been measured, one part is called the 
victim’s loss, and the other the [offender’s] profit.  
Hence the equal is intermediate between more and less.  
Profit and loss are more and less in contrary ways, 
since more good and less evil is profit, and the 
contrary is loss.  The intermediate area between 
[profit and loss], we have found, is the equal, which 
we say is just.  Hence the just in rectification is 
the intermediate between loss and profit.20 
Justice in exchange, finally, is primarily concerned with 
establishing proportional reciprocity in the economic 
sphere in which products are exchanged.  Like the others, 
its end is fairness.  If cobblers, carpenters, doctors and 
farmers are to fairly exchange their goods, they need a 
common measure of their products, and this common measure 
is a conventional stand-in for products we call 
‘currency.’21  A just exchange would specify, in coin, the 
fair amount of shoes for houses. 
Aristotle clearly connects his theory of friendship to 
his theory of justice in EN 8.13: 
There are three types of friendship, as we said at the 
beginning, and within each type some friendships rest 
                     
20 EN 5.4, 1132a 12 – 19. 
21 Cf. EN 5.5, 1132b 20 – 1133b 29. 
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on equality, while others are in accord with 
superiority.  For equally good people can be friends, 
but also a better and a worse person; and the same is 
true of friends for pleasure or utility, since they 
may be either equal or unequal in their benefits.  
Hence equals must equalize in loving and in the other 
things, because of their equality; and unequals must 
make the return that is proportionate to the types of 
superiority.22 
Each of the kinds of ‘disputes’ among friends concerns some 
unjust distribution of benefits that has taken place and a 
demand for rectification. The disputes Aristotle initially 
discusses are limited to friendships of pleasure and 
utility, and to friendships in which the friends have 
dissimilar aims (for example, one aims at pleasure, one at 
utility). Perfect friendships, as we remarked in chapter 
one, would seem to be immune to such disputes. Unlike the 
zero-sum games of the other kinds of exchange, the exchange 
of virtue involves no loss on the part of the giver.  
Furthermore, Aristotle adds, since the partners in a 
perfect friendship are by definition just, “in friendships 
in accord with virtue, there are no accusations … [for] the 
decision of the benefactor would seem to be the measure.”23  
This is not the case with the other forms of friendship. In 
them, an unequal exchange is either (1) “a public service” 
– in effect, charity – and thus “not [an act of] 
                     
22 EN 8.13, 1162a 35 – 1162b 4. 
23 EN 8.13, 1163a 22 – 23. 
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friendship, [since] the benefits from the friendship do not 
accord with the worth of the actions,” or else (2) slavery, 
in which a good is forced from a person.24  Both (1) and (2) 
ground a demand for rectification, either by gratitude or 
by the restoration of the good lost against one’s will. 
The Limits of Friendship 
In EN 9.3, Aristotle discusses the conditions under which 
all three kinds of friendship may be dissolved and the ways 
in which our obligations towards our friends change as a 
result. He begins with a simple case: 
With friends for utility or pleasure perhaps there is 
nothing absurd in dissolving the friendship whenever 
they are no longer pleasant or useful.  For they were 
friends of pleasure or utility; and if these give out, 
it is reasonable not to love.25 
Aristotle is arguing that a friend’s loss of that in virtue 
of which we found him desirable removes our motivation, our 
reasons for the friendship.  This is a purely causal model 
of appetition in which x’s continued possession of p 
functions as a cause of y’s affection.  It is in this 
context that Aristotle’s analogy of lovability to the 
                     
24 EN 8.14, 1163a 29 – 30. 
25 EN 9.3, 1165b 2 – 5. 
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visible in EN 9.5 is pertinent: just as we do not see when 
the lights go out, so too do we cease loving when someone 
loses their lovable properties.26   
But there is more to it than this.  The person at t2 no 
longer has the kind of good to give us that we found 
desirable at t1, so the terms of the exchange have changed, 
and hence the ‘ratios’ required by distributive justice 
have shifted as well.  As Aristotle argues, 
Friends quarrel when they get results different from 
those they want; for when someone does not get what he 
aims at, it is like getting nothing. … For each person 
sets his mind on what he finds he requires, and this 
will be his aim when he gives what he gives.27 
Friendships of pleasure or utility may dissolve, then, 
because in the absence of the good in virtue of which we 
originally loved the friend we no longer feel affection for 
him. Since eunoia is a necessary condition of friendship, 
this relationship lacks a cause requisite for friendship.  
There is also a consideration of justice.  The proportion 
of exchange relative to worth involved in the friendship 
has ceased to be the same proportion at t2 as at t1 because 
one of the goods has lost the worth it had when the 
exchange was deemed valuable.  Any obligations that remain 
                     
26 EN 9.5, 1167a 4 – 5. 
27 EN 9.1, 1164a 14 – 22. 
 91 
in the aftermath of these relationships are obligations of 
rectificatory justice, the casuitical treatment of which 
occupies EN 8.13 – 9.3; no obligations of care or loyalty 
are mentioned. 
However, not all cases of a person’s becoming unlovable 
are as simple as flipping the attraction switch off.  Just 
as some cases of seeing are non-veridical, so too are some 
cases of friendship not really friendships. These are the 
cases Aristotle concerns himself with in EN 9.3. “As we 
said in the beginning,” he writes, “friends are most at 
odds when they are not friends in the way they think they 
are.”28  He discusses four such cases of false-friendship: 
[1] if we mistakenly suppose we are loved for our 
character, when our friend is doing nothing to suggest 
this, we must hold ourselves responsible.  But [2] if 
we are deceived by his pretense, we are justified in 
accusing him …29  
But [3] if we accept the friend as a good person, and 
then he becomes vicious, and seems so, should we still 
love him?  Surely we cannot …30 
But [4] if one friend stayed the same and the other 
became more decent and far excelled his friend in 
virtue, should the better person still treat the other 
as a friend?  Surely he cannot.31 
                     
28 EN 9.3, 1165b 7 – 8. 
29 EN 9.3, 1165b 9 – 12. 
30 EN 9.3, 1165b 13. 
31 EN 9.3, 1165b 23 – 25. 
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The four cases are systematically related: a friendship 
will become or be shown to have been a false friendship if 
(a) someone’s reasons for loving change, as in the first 
two cases, or (b) one friend’s character changes, as in the 
latter two cases.  Of course, (a) is related to (b): in 
both kinds of changes, what changes is either the actual or 
apparent character of one friend or the other, and in 
consequence our motivation to be friends with that person 
ceases to obtain, as does the initial distribution of goods 
in the relationship. 
In case (1), we are deceived by ourselves – that he loved 
us, for such-and-such reasons, when there is no evidence 
that this is so.  We are thus not justified in accusing him 
of wrongdoing, though we may be justified in blaming 
ourselves for the mistake.  In case (2), we are deceived by 
the other – that he loved us, for such-and-such reasons, 
when he acted as if he did.  We are justified in accusing 
him of wrongdoing.  In both cases, the friendship of 
character never existed as such, for the recognition of the 
other as lovable on the basis of virtue was not mutual.  We 
have discovered that the actual relation differed from the 
apparent relation, and like a merchant who has accepted a 
forged coin, we were deceived in the exchange.  In both 
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cases the deception is unjust in the distributive sense of 
that term – supposing one can be unjust to oneself.32 
In cases (3) and (4), on the other hand, we are not 
initially deceived about the character of the other person 
– we truly believe that he loves us – but the character of 
one of the friends has changed for the better or for the 
worse.  Here, the actual relation changes over time, 
including the kind of particular justice involved.   
In the third case, Aristotle argues, our friendship 
generates obligations to “rescue” the character of the 
friend gone bad – a case of rectificatory justice – for “if 
someone can be set right, we should try harder to rescue 
his character than his property.”33 However, if we change 
for the better while our friend remains the same, “as we 
find in friendships beginning in childhood,” we can no 
longer maintain the friendship insofar as we no longer 
share the same vision of the good; we “neither approve of 
the same things nor find the same things enjoyable or 
                     
32 While Aristotle admits that the notion of injustice to 
oneself is prima facie ridiculous - one cannot steal one’s 
own belongings or commit adultery with one’s own wife – he 
resolves this difficulty by arguing that the notion of both 
friendship and injustice towards oneself can be made 
intelligible by saying that “someone is two or more parts.”  
See EN 9.4 1166a 36 and 5.11, 1138b 7 – 8. 
33 EN 9.3, 1165b 19 – 20. 
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painful,” and thus cannot share in each other’s pleasures 
or pains or desire to share a life together.34  Insofar as 
distributive justice depends on the proportionate equality 
in an exchange based on relevant differences, and 
“distribution that accords with worth equalizes and 
preserves a friendship,” this fourth case has become “a 
public service, not a friendship.”35   
Nevertheless, Aristotle says of the fourth case, the 
better friend “must keep some memory of the familiarity 
they had.  Just as we think we must do kindnesses for 
friends more than for strangers, so also should we accord 
something to past friends because of the former friendship 
…”36  Although it vulgarizes the relationship, it would be 
easy to explain this remark in terms of an economic 
analogy, as Aristotle suggests in EN 9.1: 
Indeed this is how it appears in buying and selling.  
And in some cities there are actually laws prohibiting 
legal actions in voluntary bargains, on the assumption 
that if we have trusted someone we must dissolve the 
community with him on the same terms on which we 
formed it.  The law does this because it supposes that 
it is more just for the recipient to fix repayment 
than for the giver to fix it … the return is made in 
the amount fixed by the initial recipient.  
Presumably, however, the price must not be what it 
                     
34 EN 9.3, 1165b 26, 27 – 31. 
35 EN 8.14, 1163b 12 – 14; 1163a 29. 
36 EN 9.3, 1165b 33 – 35. 
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appears to be worth when he has got it, but the price 
he put on it before he got it.37 
However, this economic analogy for friendship – in part 
because it vulgarizes friendship by reducing the friend to 
a fungible good – requires careful scrutiny.  Clearly, 
Aristotle thinks that friendship generates obligations of 
particular justice between friends, some of which may only 
require action in consequence of a change in the real or 
apparent character of one of the friends in the ways 
mentioned above.  If our friend’s character has been stolen 
from him, we should try to rectify the theft, while if our 
character has changed, distributive justice requires us to 
adjust the exchange of goods in a manner that’s fair to all 
concerned.  That may mean cancelling the contract in cases 
in which the transaction was voluntary (so to speak), or 
dissolving he relationship when this can be done without 
violating a requirement of natural justice.38   
                     
37 EN 9.1, 1164b 12 -  22. 
38 Aristotle denies (EN 8.14, 1163b 20 – 25), for instance, 
that a son can disown his father – just as a debtor cannot 
cancel his debt without returning what he owes, and that’s 
impossible in this case – though a father, like a creditor, 
can disown his son by remitting the son’s debt.  No father 
would do this, Aristotle thinks, except to a son “who was 
far gone in vice,” since the son is ‘another self’ of the 
father in several senses - biological, social, and ethical.  
Cf. EN 10.9, 1180b 5, and Elizabeth Belifore, “Family 
Friendships in Aristotle’s Ethics,” Ancient Philosophy 21 
(1) 2001: pp. 113 – 33. 
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Insofar as loyalty involves honoring our special 
obligations to care for others, it would seem that 
Aristotle is partly identifying this obligation with a 
counterfactual extension of our usual obligations of 
particular justice in special relationships: since I always 
have an obligation to seek the well-being of my friend, 
this same friendship requires that if my friend were to 
become vicious, I would be obligated to rescue his 
character.  Aristotle is confident that we don’t have 
similar obligations to fallen friends of pleasure or 
utility:  we may, without blame, simply take our ‘business’ 
elsewhere.  An obvious question to ask at this point is why 
we retain obligations of loyalty in the case of a failed 
character friendship but not in the case of failed 
friendships of pleasure or utility, given that the cause of 
the dissolution of the friendship in both cases is the loss 
of the real or apparent good in virtue of which we gained 
eunoia for our friend. 
The answer to this question, I’ll argue below, lies in 
Aristotle’s grounding of friendship in self-love, 
specifically in the fact that the vicious person’s relation 
to himself mirrors the conditions under which friendships 
change or dissolve. 
 97 
4. Aristotle’s Normative Self 
In several places in EN 9, Aristotle seems to identify 
the self with practical reason in opposition to the other 
parts of the soul and in opposition to our desires in 
particular.  His own metaphor in these passages pays more 
than lip service to Plato’s city-soul analogy in Republic 
IV, the many-headed beast of Republic IX, and Plato’s 
analogy of the soul with a charioteer in Phaedrus.39 
[The virtuous person] seems to be a self-lover.  At 
any rate, he awards himself what is finest and best of 
all, and gratifies the most controlling part of 
himself, obeying it in everything.  And just as a city 
and every other composite system seems to be above all 
its most controlling part, the same is true of a human 
being; hence someone loves himself most if he likes 
and gratifies this part.  Similarly, someone is called 
continent or incontinent because his understanding is 
or is not the master, on the assumption that this is 
what each person is.  Moreover, his own voluntary 
actions seem above all to be those involving reason.  
Clearly then, this, or this above all, is what each 
person is, and the decent person likes this most of 
all.40 
Closely following Plato’s argument in Republic IV, 
Aristotle distinguishes four parts of the soul in EN 1.13 – 
two non-rational parts, the vegetative and the desiderative 
parts, and two rational parts, practical and theoretical 
reason – on the grounds that we can observe psychological 
                     
39 Cf. Plato’s Republic IV, 588 – 589; Phaedrus 247b ff. 
40 EN 9.8, 1168b 29 – 1169a 3. 
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“impulses in contrary directions” and therefore different 
faculties at work.41  Here too Aristotle uses political 
metaphors, describing the appetitive part of the soul as 
having the capability for listening to, obeying, and being 
persuaded by reason.42 
However, to interpret these passages as suggesting that 
the Aristotelian self is an ontologically distinct part of 
the soul, separate from our appetitive parts, is to 
seriously misinterpret the import of these passages.  As he 
argues in the famous ‘proper function’ argument of EN 1.7 
(again echoing Plato),43 the human function – that in which 
our identity as a natural kind consists – is an “activity 
of the soul in accord with reason or requiring reason,” 
that is, “a certain kind of life.”44  As we learn in EN 2, 
the virtuous life involves habitually feeling and acting as 
reason directs (feeling as the virtuous person feels and as 
her reason directs).45  In the books on friendship we find a 
fuller picture of such a life as seen from the inside.  The 
                     
41 EN 1.13, 1102b 22; cf. Plato’s Republic IV, where 
Socrates argues that one (unitary) faculty “will not be 
willing to do or undergo opposites in the same part of 
itself, in relation to the same thing, at the same time” 
(436c). 
42 EN 1.13, 1102b 30 – 35. 
43 Plato, Republic 1, 353c – 354a. 
44 EN 1.7, 1098a 6 – 7, 13. 
45 EN 2.6, 1107a 3. 
 99 
five marks of friendship involve boulesis, or rational 
desire, the mark of which is homonia, agreement about the 
principles of right action: 
This sort of concord [concerned with advantage and 
what affects life as a whole] is found in decent 
people.  For they are in concord with themselves and 
with each other, since they are practically of the 
same mind; for their wishes are stable, not flowing 
back and forth like a tidal strait.  They wish for 
what is just and advantageous, and also seek it in 
common.46 
Homonia is absent in base persons and attenuated in the 
incontinent, for 
Base people … cannot be in concord, except to a slight 
degree, just as they can be friends only to a slight 
degree; for they seek to overreach in benefits to 
themselves [e.g., are unjust].47 
Aristotle draws two fundamental contrasts in these 
passages.  The first he has made throughout the Ethics: the 
virtuous person both chooses and enjoys virtuous action, 
since he is not only able to choose the correct action in 
the appropriate circumstances – the contintent person can 
do that – but takes pleasure in such actions as well.  It 
is precisely this feature of the virtuous person, 
constituting his homonoia or concord between the ‘parts’ of 
his soul, that the base person lacks.  He attempts to 
                     
46 EN 9.6, 1167b 5 – 9. 
47 EN 9.6, 1167b 10 – 12. 
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choose with multiple, conflicting parts of his soul at 
once.  Second, Aristotle explicitly uses the language of 
justice to describe the relationship of each kind of person 
to himself: the virtuous person is just to himself, while 
the base person is unjust (‘overreaching’). 
As a result of these and similar passages, Susanne Stern-
Gillet has argued that we cannot understand the 
Aristotelian notion of ‘self’ descriptively, as a Cartesian 
does, but must understand it as a normative concept, or as 
she calls it, as an “achievement word.”  The Aristotelian 
notion of ‘self,’ she argues, 
denotes a state of equilibrium between the various 
parts of the soul and constitutes an ideal towards 
which we should strive but which we may not reach.  
According to such a conception akratic and vicious 
people are not ‘selves’; not only do their passions 
and appetites pull in different directions, but they 
rebel against and weaken the part that ought to direct 
them. Thus to the extent that Aristotelian selfhood is 
an evaluative, commendatory notion, it differs 
significantly from modern, purely descriptive 
conceptions of selfhood.48 
In other words, virtue is an objective requirement for 
living the best life for beings of our kind, and persons 
approach full selfhood as they become virtuous, i.e., 
insofar as they not only recognize these requirements but 
                     
48 Susanne Stern-Gillet, Aristotle’s Philosophy of 
Friendship (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1995): p. 28. 
 101 
are also motivated by and take pleasure in them.49 Failure 
to do so, Aristotle suggests, is a kind of injustice to 
one’s self. He specifies that justice and injustice to 
oneself is in the same class of justice that governs 
“masters or households,” 
For in these discussions the part of the soul that has 
reason is distinguished from the nonrational part.  
People look at these and it seems to them that there 
is injustice to oneself, because in these parts it is 
possible to suffer something against one’s own 
desires.50 
In the books on friendship, Aristotle argues that the 
phenomenology of this injustice to oneself is both forward 
and backward-looking.  Because he is vicious, the base 
person’s “soul is in conflict,” and he “remember[s] many 
disagreeable actions, and anticipate[s] others in the 
future,” whence he seeks to forget himself in the company 
of others.51  Each part of the vicious person’s soul “pulls 
in a different direction, as though they were tearing him 
apart,” so that 
                     
49 The distinction between virtue as an objective obligation 
necessary for the best life and as a subjective 
internalization of this requirement is Stephen Grant’s in 
“Towards an Aristotelian Sense of Obligation,” Ethical 
Perspectives: Journal of the European Ethics Network 14 (2) 
2007: pp. 159 – 174. 
50 EN 5.11, 1138b 6 – 9. 
51 EN 9.4, 1166b 16 – 21. 
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even if he cannot be distressed and pleased at the 
same time, still he is soon distressed because he was 
pleased, and wishes these things had not become 
pleasant to him; for base people are full of regret.  
Hence the base person appears not to have a friendly 
attitude even towards himself, because he has nothing 
loveable about him.52 
In light of this, Aristotle concludes, “If this state is 
utterly miserable, everyone should earnestly shun vice and 
try to be decent; for that is how someone will have a 
friendly relation to himself and will become a friend to 
another.”53 
Solving the Explanatory Problem 
In light of the above, we can explain why a friend whose 
friend has lost his virtue retains obligations of loyalty 
while friends in failed friendships of pleasure and utility 
do not (though they do retain obligations of justice). 
In addition to notions of material, formal, and efficient 
causality, Aristotle also has in his explanatory repertoire 
the notion of a final cause, a goal or fulfillment, which 
moves us from the future (so to speak).  When Aristotle 
                     
52 EN 9.3, 1166b 22 – 25.  For a textual problem regarding 
the regret of the base person and Aristotle’s previous 
remarks about the akratic man, see Terence Irwin, “Vice and 
Reason,” The Journal of Ethics 5 (2001); George Pakaluk, 
Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics Books VIII and IX, 
Translation with a Commentary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1998), esp. p. 177; and Gillet (1995). 
53 EN 9.3, 26 – 29. 
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speaks of friends ‘living together’ and ‘engaging in common 
pursuits,’ he surely has in mind the friends’ future goals, 
the objects of their mutual striving.  What telologically 
unites the lower friendships is the promise of lower future 
goods – pleasure and utility.  These are ‘lower’ in part 
because there comes a point in time when these either 
obtain or fail to obtain.  In character friendships, on the 
other hand, the good to be achieved by the relationship is 
(a) the good of the other and (b) the obtaining of the 
other’s help in achieving one’s own good character.  This 
normative end is not one that simply obtains or fails to 
while we yet live.  Rather, this end is part and parcel of 
Aristotle’s conception of what a human life is, a continual 
becoming or falling away from the full actualization of our 
nature.  If it is the case in character friendship that our 
mutual goal is the upbuilding of character, our friend’s 
loss of integrity (through the acquisition of vice) does 
not flip the ‘off’ switch on our affections precisely 
because the goal for our friend that we have loved is a 
possible one that is always already ahead of us.  My 
friend’s character calls to me from a future that ought to 
be, and I am a loyal friend insofar as I act in the 
interests of that self that ought to be. 
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Suppose, as Stern-Gillet suggests, that the Aristotelian 
‘self’ is indeed normative, and a teleological or 
‘achievement-defined’ being at that.  Insofar as the moral 
and intellectual virtues are necessary for the achievement 
of the best life for human beings, and the achievement of 
these virtues is the achievement of an integrated ‘self,’ 
Aristotle’s ‘self’ is nothing other than the objective 
requirement of morality on our lives in the form of a 
person.  As both Kant and Aristotle recognize, the demand 
of morality – that we achieve this integrated self in order 
to live the best and most just kind of life – can be 
expressed to the vicious person as an assertoric 
imperative: “earnestly shun vice and try to be decent,” 
since every member of our kind by nature seeks eudaimonia 
and vice makes its achievement impossible.54  Furthermore, 
on Aristotle’s model of friendship to oneself, this demand 
is nothing less than the demand of our kind of being for 
rectificatory justice,55 the same demand that ‘other selves’ 
                     
54 Kant would differ only in the justification of the 
imperative, not in its content. 
55 Kant would agree.  The second formulation of the 
Categorical Imperative has the consequence that by treating 
your own humanity as a mere means you commit injustice 
towards yourself; we have a perfect duty to avoid this.  In 
Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, Kant argues 
that the moral law demands both punishment and a 
‘revolution of the will’ in such cases: a demand both for 
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we are friends with would place on us were they to lose 
their virtue.  The difference between the two demands – 
exhortative and rectifactory – is that, in the case of an 
unalterable loss of virtue, there is no one left to listen, 
and we can dissolve the friendship without blame: “the 
friend who dissolves the friendship seems to be doing 
nothing absurd … for he was not the friend of a person of 
this sort; hence, if the friend has altered, and he cannot 
save him, he leaves him.”56  The base person cannot dissolve 
his friendship with his self.  Insofar as he is vicious, he 
is, in a perfect inversion of friendship, forced to live 
with his worst enemy. 
Just so far as we regard the self of another person as 
our own self (as we do completely in a perfect friendship), 
that person’s self functions as a diachronic final cause of 
our obligations of care – loyalty – to our friend.  If our 
friend begins to lose his virtue – to become an enemy to 
himself – we find ourselves at the right time and place, in 
the right relationship, and in the right circumstances to 
                     
rectificatory justice and an obligation to rescue the 
proper relation between the Wille and the Willkür.  See my 
“Grace and the New Man: Conscious Humiliation and the 
Revolution of Disposition in Kant’s Religion,” American 
Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 81 (3) 2007. 
56 EN 9.3, 1165b 22 – 24.  Kant thinks this is impossible.  
See previous footnote. 
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exercise the virtue of loyalty: to persevere in acts 
exemplifying the particular justice of rectification, even 
at some risk to ourselves (as if facing a thief), for our 
friend’s sake.  If this is impossible, there is no blame in 
dissolving the friendship, for such a person has become an 
enemy to every ‘self,’ to the demands of morality itself, 
and is no longer ‘another self,’ our friend.57  He has 
become Aristotle’s beast, Locke’s Tyger, Kant’s demon.58 
To summarize: in every kind of friendship there is a good 
that moves affection and generates loyalty across time; in 
the lower friendships this is an external good that, at 
some time, can cease to be possible to achieve through the 
friendship.  ‘Lovers’ can grow ugly and business 
arrangements can go bad.  Such circumstances bring about, 
or are sufficient for, the cessation of the relationship: 
my friend’s help in achieving such goods ceases to be 
attractive because it ceases to be help.  This is not the 
case with the internal good of virtue: it rarely – except 
in extreme cases - ceases to be a real possibility, and so 
my friend’s character continues to place me under 
                     
57 Kant calls this possibility demonic. 
58 Aristotle, Politics 1.2; Locke, Second Treatise of 
Government, §11; Kant, Religion Within the Bounds of Reason 
Alone, trans. Theodore Greene and Hoyt Hudson (New York: 
Harper, 1960): p. 30. 
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obligation to act in his interest.  It is not the memory of 
the former friendship that generates the obligation of 
loyalty, for the cause of my loyalty does not lie in the 
past.  Rather, as a final cause, on object of our mutual 
striving, it always lies just beyond the horizon of the 
present.  Of course, as in all instances of the obligations 
love (care) generates, there is a history to the fact that 
this cause acts on me now.  Yet for Aristotle, unlike 
obligations of justice, while that history explains, it 
does not justify my ongoing loyalty to friends whom I love 
for their own sake, for their selves. 
5. Conclusion 
Let us return, for a moment, to Aristotle’s statement 
that, in case (1), in which we have been deceived about the 
character of our friend by the friend, we are justified in 
blaming our friend.  Aristotle’s metaphor for the kind of 
blameworthiness involved here is instructive.  He says that 
we are “even more justified [in accusing him of wrongdoing] 
than in accusing debasers of the currency, to the extent 
that his evildoing debases something more precious.”59  The 
acceptability of a coin as a medium of exchange depends on 
the mutual belief of buyers and sellers that the coin 
                     
59 EN 9.3, 1165b 12. 
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represents what they believe it represents (real credit). 
Forged monies undercut this belief, for forged monies 
represent no credit at all.  Hence, the debasing of a 
currency through the influx of forged monies undercuts the 
trust of each party in the particular coin, and in the 
reliability of coins in general.  Insofar as this trust is 
a necessary condition of economic exchange, a sufficient 
influx of forged monies into a system of exchange can 
undercut the system itself.  So too in the case of 
friendship: a series of dissembling relationships may 
undercut a person’s ability to engage in real friendships 
in the future.  The loss, in this case, is greater insofar 
as friendship is the greatest external good in the ways 
discussed in chapter one.   
Even more exactly, considered as a final cause of 
friendship, the character of my friend resembles a future 
contingent, and loyalty demands that we act on its basis in 
the present (unlike a promise or a contract, whose cause 
lies in the past and whose performance may lie in the 
future).  Loyalty can therefore be misplaced when its 
object fails to come to be in the way we expect, as in the 
case of the famous loyal German patriot, Colonel Claus von 
Stauffenberg, who was ‘betrayed’ by National Socialism and 
 109 
who, in the name of loyalty to Germany, attempted to 
assassinate Hitler in 1944.  The existence of loyalty 
depends on (a) beliefs about the reliable actualization of 
possible future goods, and (b) hope that they will obtain. 
Loyalty’s value as a virtue, on the other hand, will be 
closely tied to (a) the real (rather than expected) value 
of those hoped-for goods, and (b) the strength of the 
evidence upon which one hopes and trusts that they will 
obtain in the way expected. 
The possibility of this future loss – what the standard 
model of loyalty we began with referred to as ‘risk’ – 
raises several ethical problems.  Clearly, there must be 
some evidential relation between a person’s action and her 
character: this relation, which we can form true or false 
beliefs about, is one condition for the possibility of both 
loyalty and friendship to others and their forfeiture.  But 
this evidential relation, which Aristotle largely treats as 
unproblematic, can die the death of a thousand small cuts.  
As Aquinas and Kierkegaard point out, people lie.  We will 
examine their thoughts on this problem in chapters three 
and five.  In chapter four we will examine the extent to 
which Immanuel Kant agrees with Aristotle that a friend is 
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the moral law personified, and that friends have perfect 
duties to perfect one another in virtue. 
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CHAPTER 3.  AQUINAS ON LOYALTY: LOVE, TRUST, 
PRESUMPTION AND HOPE 
 
“Among good people [there] is trust, 
the belief that he would never do injustice [to a friend], 
and all the other things expected in a true friendship.” 
St. Thomas Aquinas, Eth. 8.4 [1592] 
 
"I protest, in the sincerity of love and honest kindness."  
— Iago, Othello 2.3.327 
 
Introduction 
This chapter has two aims: to explicate Aquinas’ theory 
of friendship and loyalty and to emphasize the way in which 
Aquinas stands as a mediator between ancient and 
contemporary theories of loyalty.  In order to do this, I 
will discuss Aquinas’s theory of action before discussing 
his theory of friendship.  This is necessary because the 
conjunction of these theories creates two problems.  The 
first problem is that the possibility of deception 
threatens the feasibility of loyalty and friendship.  The 
second problem is that Aquinas’s initial justification of 
loyalty renders it prone to the variability of natural 
affections. 
 112 
1. Aquinas’s Theory of Action 
Although all action is for the sake of some good, 
according Aquinas, this good has a double aspect.  The 
intended good has a material aspect – the specific object 
aimed at – as well as a formal aspect – some feature of the 
object for the sake of which the object is intended.  If 
you ask what I intend to eat, for instance, I can simply 
say ‘cake.’  That answer specifies the material end of my 
action.  If you ask me why I intend to eat cake, I can 
respond with any number of reasons: because it’s sweet and 
tasty; because it’s expected at a birthday party; because 
Marie Antoinette told me to.  Answers such as these specify 
the formality under which I desire to eat cake.     
To eat cake or not to eat cake?  It is possible for us to 
ask this question, Aquinas claims, for two reasons.  On the 
side of the object, no object is perfectly good save God, 
and thus no object can perfectly capture our love.  (We 
would be unable not to love a perfect good perfectly known, 
however.)  But since what we encounter in the world are 
less than perfect objects, we are able weigh the various 
formalities under which we apprehend, say, cake, and 
(re)direct our attention to an aspect that best suits our 
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more ultimate ends.1  On the side of the subject, the 
formality under which I apprehend cake as good may have two 
effects – immediate and remote – on our passions.  Most 
immediately, an object brings about a change in my 
appetites so as to make them complacent, i.e., to value it.  
This change is an affective passion Aquinas calls ‘love.’  
More remotely, my appetites can move toward a loved object 
as an end of action.  This movement is called ‘desire.’2  
Aquinas uses the objective explanation to ground human 
freedom in a world of objective value; the subjective 
explanation traces the limits of human action around the 
lovable – we can only seek what we in fact love – for love 
is both logically and temporally prior to desire.   
Insofar as “the end is the good desired and loved by each 
one,” it follows that “every agent, whatever it be, does 
every action from love of some kind.”3  Thus, as Paul Wadell 
writes, 
Aquinas has a love-centered ethic.  Our actions are 
empowered by love because they are born from our 
desire for something good.  Desire is love at work … 
Morality begins in love, works through desire, and is 
                     
1 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (hereafter ST) I-II, 
literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican 
Province  (London: Burns, 1947): q. 13, a6, c; see also ST 
Ia, q. 105, a. 4, c. 
2 ST I-II, q. 26, a. 2, c. 
3 ST I-II, q. 28, a. 6, c. 
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completed in joy.  Obviously, then, the passions and 
affections are integral to Thomas’s account of the 
moral life.4 
Yet this is only part of the truth, for as I have suggested 
above, Aquinas’ conception of human activity includes both 
subjective and objective aspects that together determine 
that activity.  On the side of the subject, Aquinas writes 
that 
[In] every agent who is acting through his will in 
view of an end, two conditions are required in his 
attitude toward the end before he acts for it, namely, 
knowledge of the end and the inclination to reach it … 
But to make this intention possible, two conditions 
are again necessary, namely, that the end is 
attainable; and that it is good, because we only 
strive after what is good.5 
Corresponding to these three subjective conditions – 
knowledge, feasibility (thought possible), and desire - are 
                     
4 Paul Wadell, The Primacy of Love: An Introduction to the 
Ethics of Thomas Aquinas (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1992): 
p. 3. 
5 Aquinas, 3 Sent. d. 23, q. 1, a. 5 (Sancti Thomae 
Aquinatis Doctoris angelici ordinis predicatorum Opera 
omnia ad fidem optimarum editionum accurate recognita, 
Parmae typis Petri Fiaccadori, 25 vols., 1852-1873, vol. 
VII; Reprint: New York, Musurgia, 1948-1950, vol.  VII-1); 
this argument is repeated again at ad. 5: “If anyone is to 
start acting in view of some end, he must first know that 
end, and secondly desire it.  But because the will can 
desire possible and impossible objects, and because no one 
really strives after what is not attainable for him even 
though he may desire it, for these reasons it is necessary 
for the will, if it is to begin to act, that it should tend 
toward its object as to something possible.”  I am grateful 
to Dr. Stephen Loughlin for his help with this translation 
and reference. 
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three objective conditions: the object is a real object, it 
is possible for the agent to achieve, and it is good for 
the agent.  These are necessary insofar as Aquinas believes 
that the world always acts on us first – or, to use his 
Aristotelian terminology, the world ‘impresses’ itself on 
us first.6 
 Love and desire thus constitute but one of three 
conditions which are jointly sufficient for the occurrence 
of an action.  Action requires 
1. that the object be apprehended or known as good; 
2. that the object be thought to be a possibly 
attainable object of human activity; 
(1) and (2) imply 
3. that the object be loved and desired. 
                     
6 Cf. ST I-II, q. 26 a. 2 c: “For the appetitive movement is 
circular, as stated in De Anima iii.10; because the 
appetible object moves the appetite, introducing itself, as 
it were, into its intention; while the appetite moves 
towards the realization of the appetible object, so that 
the movement ends where it began.”  Throughout I will use 
the translation by Fathers of the English Dominican 
Province,(London: Burns Oates and Washbourne, 1922). 
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These conditions are connected in intricate ways.  Like 
Aristotle,7 Aquinas insists that (1) precedes (3).  Once 
known, the apparent goodness of an object arouses our love 
for it in one of two ways, either disinterestedly (for the 
object’s own sake), or interestedly (for the sake of 
something else).  The former Aquinas calls the love of 
friendship, and the latter he calls the love of 
concupiscience.8  Some things, like cake, cannot be loved 
with the love of friendship, for their goodness is purely 
instrumental to the satisfaction of some other end we 
desire.  Other beings deserve to be loved with the love of 
friendship because of their intrinsic goodness.  Loving 
instrumental goods with the love of friendship and loving 
goods with intrinsic worth merely for the uses we can put 
them to are sins.  The former includes vices like greed; 
the latter includes many unjust or uncaring actions.  There 
is a third possibility: lacking love for good things 
altogether.  This unnamed vice is unnamed because it is 
impossible; to suffer it would require being dead to all 
that is good, and that would be impossible, or very nearly 
so, for a human being.  It would be a sickness unto death.  
                     
7 Cf. Aristotle, Met. 12.7, 1072a 30: “Desire is consequent 
on opinion rather than opinion on desire; for the thinking 
is the starting-point.” 
8 ST I-II, q. 26, a. 4, ad. 1. 
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This topic will taken up again in the next section when 
Aquinas’ treatment of friendship is discussed. 
About the relation between (2) and (3), Aquinas writes: 
First then, the good produces in the faculty an 
inclination towards it, a sense of affinity with it, a 
sense that the good and itself are naturally fitted 
for each other; this is the emotion called love.  The 
corresponding contrary, when it is some evil to the 
agent, is hatred.  Second, if the good is not yet 
possessed, it sets up in the faculty a motion towards 
attaining this good which it has come to love.  This 
is desire; the opposite is aversion or disgust.  
Third, once the good is possessed, the faculty finds 
repose in its possession.  This is pleasure or joy; 
the opposite is sadness or grief.9 
An object affects us as an end of action in one or more 
ways, depending on whether the object is good or bad for 
us; Aquinas calls these responses the set of six ‘affective 
emotions.’  Reading from left to right, the affective 
emotions aroused by an object acting on us proceed in the 
following order: 
Object Passion Activity Possession 
Some good Love Desire Joy/Pleasure 
Some evil Hatred Aversion Sorrow/Pain 
 
It is in relation to these affective emotions that (2) 
becomes important.  The world often pushes back against our 
                     
9 ST I-II, q. 23, a. 4 c. 
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desires and so frustrates some of our purposes.  The 
achievement of some goods becomes difficult; possibilities 
get closed off.  If this objective push against desire 
pushes too hard, it kills it. 
Desire is not, however, without help.  Aquinas discusses 
a second group of emotions called the ‘irascible’ or 
‘spirited’ emotions whose function is to strengthen the 
affective emotions in difficult circumstances. 
There are times when the soul finds that the 
acquisition of some good or the avoidance of some evil 
is possible only with difficulty, or even by fighting; 
it is beyond our ready power and control.  … The 
emotions of the affective appetite are therefore those 
which bear upon sense-good or sense-evil pure and 
simple: joy and sorrow, love and hatred, and the like.  
The emotions of the spirited appetite, on the other 
hand, are those which bear upon the sense-good or 
sense-evil as arduous, i.e., insofar as it is 
difficult to attain or avoid: courage, fear, hope and 
the like.10 
There are three irascible pairs of emotions that support 
the three pairs of affective emotions.11 
Material 
Object 
Formal Object Irascible Passions 
Good not yet 
possessed 
Hope or Despair  
Future 
Arduous End Evil not yet 
befallen 
Courage or Fear 
                     
10 ST I-II, q. 23, a. 1 c. 
11 ST I-II, q. 23, a. 4 c. 
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Good already 
possessed 
Null set (an achieved good 
is no longer difficult) 
 
Present 
Arduous End Evil already 
befallen 
Anger (no contrary) 
 
Hope, courage and anger buttress the desire for a difficult 
good, while despair and fear undermine it.  Each of the 
irascible emotions presupposes an affective emotion, either 
love or hatred, and each is incompatible with joy (although 
not with sorrow).  When the arduous good is the object of a 
morally obligatory action – such as the education of one’s 
children – the lack of love sufficient to motivate the 
action includes the sin of sloth, and the lack of hope the 
sin of despair (in addition to whatever other wrongdoing 
one may be blamed for vis-a-vis neglect). 
2. Aquinas on Friendship 
What, then, of the good that is friendship?  Suppose I 
love Smith and desire that he be my friend.  For Aristotle, 
who lacked Aquinas’ distinction between the love of 
friendship and the love of concupiscence, my friendship for 
Smith could have one of two exclusive motivations.  I could 
either, 
1. Love Smith for Smith’s sake in virtue of some good 
he possesses, or  
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2. Love some good for myself and Smith in virtue of his 
ability to provide it.  
The first formulation intends Smith as an end in himself, 
as an object loved for his own sake; the second formulation 
intends Smith as a means to some other good.  Aquinas 
argues that these loves are not mutually exclusive, for 
the movement of love has a twofold tendency: toward 
the good which a man wishes to someone (to himself or 
to another) and towards that to which he wishes some 
good.  Accordingly, man has love of concupiscence 
towards the good that he wishes to another, and love 
of friendship towards him to whom he wishes good.12 
On Aquinas’ account, the material object of friendship is 
always the friend himself, the person “to whom our 
friendship is given,” while the formal object of friendship 
is that feature of the friend that motivates our love for 
him (which may include his being useful, delightful, or 
virtuous) and in accord with which we “love those good 
things which we desire for our friend.”13 
Against Aristotle, then, Aquinas claims that friends can 
be loved for their usefulness and for their own sake.  In 
other words, Aquinas argues that I can 
                     
12 ST I-II, q. 26, a. 4, c. 
13 ST II-II, q. 25, a. 3, c 
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1. Love Smith for Smith’s sake in virtue of some good 
feature he possesses and  
2. Love some good for myself, and also love Smith in 
virtue of his ability to provide it.  
Far from being exclusive motivations, Aquinas thinks that 
both (1) and (2) are necessary features of true friendly 
love.   
This is so for two reasons.  First, he says, all 
friendships necessarily involve three features: 
first benevolence, which consists in this, that 
someone wills the other person good and his evil wills 
not; second, concord, that consists in this, that 
friends will and reject the same things; and third, 
beneficence, which consists in this, that someone does 
good deeds for the person he loves and does not harm 
him.14 
Love (affection) plus benevolence is to “love someone so as 
to wish good to him,” for his own sake, and beneficence is 
the practical exemplification of benevolence.15  
Nevertheless, 
[mere] well-wishing [does not] suffice for friendship, 
for a certain mutual love is requisite, since 
friendship is between friend and friend: and this 
                     
14 Commntarium super Epistolam ad Romanos (In Rom.) 12.3 ad 
v. 15 – 17 [9 – 17] [996]; cf. ST II-II, q. 23 a. 1 c. and 
q. 80 a. un. ad 2. 
15 ST II-II, q. 23 a. 1 c. 
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well-wishing is founded on some kind of 
communication,16 
where by ‘communication’ Aquinas means a special relation 
by blood, country or choice.17  Insofar as all friendship 
involves mutual beneficence – a return of love – all 
friendship includes as a part of its formal object the 
notion of a friend as a giver of good things.  That is, it 
is a part of the friend’s being good that he is good to me 
and acts in my interests.  A friend thus delights me and is 
useful to me, but it need not be the case that I love my 
friend for the sake of the goods he promises and delivers.  
To love a friend for his own sake is to love him for all 
that is his, including his interest in my own good, even 
while considering his good greater than (more motivating 
than) my share of that good in enjoying it.  My own good is 
a connatural concomitant of true friendship, for “the same 
virtuous habit inclines us to love and desire the beloved 
                     
16 ST II-II, q. 23 a. 1 c. 
17 “The different species of friendship are differentiated … 
secondly, in respect of the different kinds of communion on 
which friendships are based; thus there is one species of 
friendship between kinsmen, and another between fellow 
citizens or fellow travelers …” (ST II-II, q. 23, a. 5 c.).  
Robert Johann expresses this well when he writes that 
“[friendship] is conceived as adding to the one-sided love 
of benevolence a certain society of lover and beloved in 
their love” in The Meaning of Love (Glen Rock, NJ: Paulist 
Press, 1966): p. 46-47.  Paul Wadell, following Aristotle, 
rightly calls this society a “miniature community” (p. 69). 
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good, and to rejoice in it.”18  Of course, we may love a 
person merely for the good they can give us, but such love, 
because it is not for the sake of the person, does not 
qualify as true friendship. 
Not everyone is convinced by this line of argument.  As 
Paul De Letter has argued, there are two ways in which 
Aristotle’s claim that in perfect friendship we love the 
friend ‘for his own sake’ has been interpreted: 
1. Traditional (Augustinian-Thomistic) Interpretation: 
Not in order to acquire something other than the 
friend. 
2. Modern (Scotistic-Suarezian) Interpretation: Not in 
order to acquire something for oneself.19 
                     
18 ST II-II, q. 28 a. 4. 
19 Paul De Letter, “Hope and Charity in St. Thomas,” 
Thomist; A Speculative Quarterly Review, 13 (1950), p. 241: 
“The traditional phrase which states that in charity God is 
loved for His own sake (propter seipsum) can be and 
actually has been understood in two different ways: so as 
to mean, not for the sake of something else (non propter 
aliud), in the sense that nothing else than [the friend] is 
sought or intended in charity, though the possession of 
[the friend as a source of good for oneself] is actually 
desired and obtained in charity, or so as to exclude from 
charity all self-regard on man’s part who has to abstract 
from his own good, even from the possession of [the friend] 
and the enjoyment found therein.”  
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The first interpretation weakly requires that the desire 
for our own good not motivate the friendship; the presence 
of desire for good from friends is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition of concupiscence.  On the other hand, 
(2) holds that the presence of desire fatally taints human 
relationships; self-interest is a sufficient condition of 
use.  Aquinas clearly rejects (2) in favor of (1).  On the 
one hand, he holds that to have merely self-interested 
motivations for a relationship is antithetical to the 
nature of friendship: 
Although to every one, that is loveable which is good 
for him, yet there is no need for the loveable object 
to be loved for the very reason that it is good for 
him, and be directed back to him as its end, since 
friendship also does not twist back to itself the good 
it wishes another.20 
Yet on the other hand, he holds that our friendly love of 
others need not be ascetic: 
True friendship wishes [i.e., desires] the sight of 
the friend and finds joy in mutual conversation [and 
other goods] … It does not, however, make of the 
pleasure it derives from seeing and enjoying the 
friend the end of the friendship.21 
As we will see in a later chapter, this difference in 
interpreting Aristotle’s phrase, ‘for his own sake,’ will 
                     
20 III, Sent. d. 29, a. 3, ad 2. 
21 III, Sent. d. 27, q. 2, a. 1, ad. 11.  For a more nuanced 
treatment of this distinction, see especially ST II-II, q. 
27, a. 8. 
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mark one of the fundamental differences between Søren 
Kierkegaard and Aquinas, since Kierkegaard, following Kant 
(and, DeLetter argues, Scotus), requires that disinterested 
love abstract itself from all considerations of one’s own 
good. 
3. Two Problems 
Having briefly treated Aquinas’ theories of action and 
friendship, we can begin to consider two problems generated 
by their conjunction.  These problems mark a historical and 
conceptual transition in philosophical worries about the 
nature of friendship and loyalty, and, together with Kant 
and Kierkegaard, give us a set of problems still under 
discussion in contemporary work on friendship and loyalty.22 
What the problems are can be shown by a simple argument.  
One premise underlying Aquinas’ action theory is: 
1. An object’s being known is logically and temporally 
prior to a person’s ability to desire it as a 
feasible good. 
What follows from this is: 
                     
22 For example, see Neera Kapur Badhwar, “Introduction: The 
Nature and Significance of Friendship,” in Friendship: A 
Philosophical Reader, ed. Badhwar (New York: Cornell: 
1993): p. 1 – 38. 
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2. Therefore, we cannot love what we do not know; and 
the greater the uncertainty surrounding our 
knowledge of the reality of some good, the less 
feasible (i.e., more arduous or risky) action for 
the sake of that good appears to us. 
To this we can add the following premise, which Aquinas 
explicitly holds: 
3. We have limited epistemic insight into the wills of 
others (i.e., regarding what they shall do), 
including those we would call friends.23 
This entails that, 
4. Uncertainty regarding our friend’s will negatively 
impacts the feasibility of friendship. 
In response to this problem, Aquinas argues that friendship 
requires (a) that the irascible passion of hope support our 
desire for this arduous good.  Daniel Schwartz has shown 
that in addition Aquinas requires (b) that we make use of a 
rule of presumption – which I will argue Aquinas treats 
                     
23 Schwartz (p. 94) cites ST I q. 94, a. 3 c. to support 
this: “Those things which cannot be known by merely human 
effort, and which are not necessary for the direction of 
human life, were not known by the first man; such as the 
thoughts of men, future contingent events, and some 
individual facts, as for instance the number of pebbles in 
a stream; and the like.” 
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under the heading of ‘trust’ – in order to lend practical, 
‘as if’ certainty to acts of friendship.  However, 
precisely because this makes friendship dependent on hope 
and trust, friendship and loyalty between friends are 
vulnerable to two threats.  Friendship will fail if (1) 
trust is lost or (2) hope becomes unreasonable.   
Kierkegaard, as we’ll see later, explicitly designs his 
theory of friendship as a response to these two threats.  
In recent philosophy, these ‘failures’ reappear as two 
problems.  First, since the reasonableness of trust depends 
on the character of the person whom one is trusting, it is 
impossible to determine the value of trust independently of 
the goodness of the one trusted.  Likewise, there is some 
debate about the coherence of talk about loyalty’s value 
independent of the value of the object of the loyalty.24  
Second, following Kant, it is sometimes denied that loyalty 
can be a source (or an expression) of real obligations 
insofar as its rootedness in contingent, historically-
rooted affections make it naturally prone to variability 
and thus exclude it from candidacy as a genuine moral 
obligation (which Kant limits to the categorically 
necessary). 
                     
24 See R.E. Ewin, “Loyalty and Virtues,” Philosophical 
Quarterly, 42 (169): pp. 403-119. 
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First, however, Aquinas. 
4. Hope, Trust, Loyalty and Presumption 
Daniel Schwartz has pointed out that insofar as what is 
desired in friendship is the good of the other as a friend, 
Aquinas’ idea of friendship requires that friends need to 
will two things under the formality of friendship: 
1. Some common goal (that produces concord); 
2. To love the friend (i.e., dilectio, a love elicited 
by the will for the friend).25 
It follows, Schwartz continues, that we hope for two things 
in friendship: 
1. “that the common goal be accomplished,” and 
2. “that the friend’s feelings, affections, and 
intentions, which sustain the relationship, [will] 
continue in the future.”26 
In true friendship, (1) would essentially consist in the 
mutual construction and re-enforcement of good character, 
though this might be expressed through any number of common 
projects.  These common projects are what Aristotle calls a 
                     
25 Daniel Schwartz, Aquinas on Friendship (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2007): p. 107. 
26 Ibid. 
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‘shared life.’  As should be clear from chapter two, (2) 
expresses an expectation of the loyalty of a friend.  
Insofar as friendship involves benevolence and beneficence 
on our friend’s part, we expect that a friend who loves us 
for our own sake will care for our interests and be loyal 
to us in meeting his obligations to do so.  Care and 
loyalty, in other words, name the virtues that a friend 
exercises in providing for our interests, and are 
connatural concomitants (i.e., natural accompaniments) of 
friendship.  Not everyone we call our friend meets his or 
her obligation of loyalty and care, and so our hopes in 
this regard can be disappointed.  This possibility renders 
the achievement of true friendship less than certain, and 
insofar as we see this as a real possibility, the prospect 
of entering into a friendly relationship with x fails to 
motivate us. 
Schwartz explains this practical problem as follows: 
Friendship is one of the varieties of social 
relations, the reality of which depends on certain 
operations of the will.  Assessing friendship’s 
reality requires knowledge of certain facts about the 
other person’s feelings, intentions, beliefs.  Yet 
this cannot be known with certainty.  Since friendship 
is a good, and it allows us to achieve other goods, 
uncertainty translates into risk.27 
                     
27 Schwartz, p. 95. 
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Aquinas grounds our uncertainty regarding the wills of 
others in two ways: 
those things which cannot be known by merely human 
effort, and which are not necessary for the direction 
of human life, were not known by the first man; such 
as the thoughts of men, future contingent events, and 
some individual facts, as for instance the number of 
pebbles in a stream, and the like.28 
In other words, our uncertainty regarding the wills of 
others is a result of (a) our lacking epistemic access to 
the thoughts of others, and (b) our inability to gain 
certain knowledge of future singular contingents, including 
what others shall will.  Insofar as friendship requires 
concord, a ‘union of wills,’ it follows that if the present 
and future intentions of others were completely opaque to 
us, friendship would not be a possible end of human action.  
As we will see in a later chapter, Kierkegaard largely 
accepts the antecedent but rejects the consequent of that 
statement; Aquinas (along with most other philosophers, 
including skeptics like Hume),29 simply thinks the 
                     
28 ST I q. 94 a. 3 c.  See also Super Evangelium S. Ionnis, 
ed. P. Raphaelis Cai, O.P. (Rome: Marietti, 1952): Super 
Ioan. 2, lect. 3, no. 422: “For a human being, even if he 
knows others, nevertheless is not able to have certain 
knowledge about them, because he only sees those things 
which are apparent; and therefore for him work[s] provide 
the means of proof of others.” 
29 In his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume 
argues that there is a constant conjunction of mental acts 
and concrete actions, and that this conjunction affords us 
 131 
antecedent is false: “works provide the means of proof of 
[others’ wills and beliefs].” 
Hope and Trust 
Insofar as we expect care and loyalty from our friends 
and we have no certainty that they will show this, argues 
Aquinas, acts of friendship on our part require hope in 
order for friendship to be a feasible good, since it is 
precisely this irascible passion’s job to enable us to 
desire an arduous good. 
Hope is caused by love of the good we would like to 
achieve for ourselves, and thus has self-interest as its 
ground.  Aquinas discusses four conditions for an end’s 
being an object of hope; these conditions constitute a set 
of formalities under which the object is desired.  When we 
hope we apprehend an object: 
1. As good; 
2. As lying in the future; 
3. As arduous (difficult to achieve); and 
                     
(as well as any constant conjunction does) an inference 
from acts to intentions.  The inference is reliable, he 
argues, as evidenced by the fact that we detect (a) 
fictions and (b) lunacy (8.1.20) using it, and (c) we would 
be incapable of social intercourse if the inference were a 
poor one (8.1.8-9, 17). 
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4. As possible (i.e., as lying within our capacity and 
power to achieve, as feasible).30 
If (1) were lacking we could not desire the object, while 
if the object obtained in the present or were easily 
obtainable it would not make sense to speak of hope rather 
than enjoyment or mere striving.  Aquinas further argues 
that hope affects what appears feasible in (4) insofar as 
hope extends the scope of what is possible through reliance 
on the abilities of others.31  When we hope in friendship, 
in other words, we hope that x be made possible to us by 
means of y’s assistance.  Hope thus helps to enable action 
by enabling desire to pursue some good rather than merely 
to wish for it.32 
                     
30 See Schwartz p. 109; these conditions are given by 
Aquinas at ST I-II, q. 40 a. 1c. 
31 Aristotle writes that “What is possible is what we could 
achieve through our agency [including what our friends 
could achieve for us]; for what our friends achieve is, in 
a way, achieved through our agency, since the origin is in 
us” (EN 1112b 27 – 28).  Aquinas quotes this passage at ST 
II-II q. 17 a. 1c.   
32 “Hope of its very nature is a help to action by making it 
more intense; and this for two reasons.  First, by reason 
of its object, which is a good, difficult but possible.  
For the thought of its being difficult arouses our 
attention; while the thought that it is possible is not a 
drag on our effort.  Hence it follows that by reason of 
hope man is intent on his action.  Secondly, on account of 
its effect.  Because hope, as stated above, causes 
pleasure; which is a help of action as stated above.” ST I-
II, q. 40 a. 8c. 
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However, this is where uncertainty regarding the present 
and future will of a friend undercuts the possibility of 
friendship, for the very hope on the basis of which we 
pursue friendship’s common goal is itself made feasible by 
the continued care and loyalty of the friend.  The hope 
that is a cause of friendship, then, requires reliance on 
the continued loyalty of our friend, and this reliance is 
reasonable only insofar as the friend is a legitimate 
object of trust. 
Trust – an “assured reliance on someone” – also has four 
conditions discussed in various places by Aquinas.33  In 
order to trust someone, a person must: 
1. believe that he or she is an object of the other 
person’s concern; 
2. believe that the other person is just; 
3. believe that the person is competent; 
4. feel appropriately familiar with the person. 
One reason we do not trust strangers is that our interests 
are not their responsibility; mere willingness to help on 
                     
33 See Marie George, “Aquinas on the Nature of Trust,” The 
Thomist 70 (2006): 103 – 23, for a full list of these 
citations.  I rely heavily on George in the rest of this 
paragraph. 
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the part of a stranger does little to enhance our 
confidence in them.34  Hence (1) limits trust to those who 
have obligations of justice or care to us, for we expect 
those who stand in special relation to us – family members, 
friends and promisers, for example – to make our interests 
their own more than those to whom we are not so related.  
As for (2), it holds that we are only warranted trusting 
those who (in general) are just because it is reasonable to 
think that only a just person can be relied on to honor 
their obligations.  Likewise, it is unreasonable to expect 
help from those who cannot be of some service to us, e.g., 
infants and the mentally disabled.  Condition (3) thus 
limits trust to those who have some real ability to help 
us.  Condition (4) is a psychological rather than a 
conceptual condition; it points out that we are not likely 
                     
34 As I’ll argue below, to say that we do not trust someone 
does not entail that we suspect them of evil.  We have 
reasonable expectations that strangers will accurately tell 
us what time it is, or what direction the baseball stadium 
is, because (a) we assume they are ‘minimally decent’ 
Samaritans and (b) have no cause to wish us harm.  On 
Aquinas’ account, these expectations – what we might today 
call ‘social trust’ or ‘decency’ – do not rise to the level 
of trust, formally speaking.  One might defend this by 
pointing out that a Hobbesian game-theorist will expect 
cooperation from competitors who have reached a Nash-
equilibrium in the total absence of Aquinas’ conditions (1) 
– (4). 
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to trust – in the strong sense of actually asking and 
relying on for help – those we are uncomfortable with. 
Let us return to our problem.  Insofar as the wills of 
others are somewhat opaque to us, we have less than certain 
knowledge that our friends will act as friends ought – with 
care and loyalty – now or in the future.  As our certainty 
decreases, so does the feasibility of the friendship, that 
is, that friendship with x is a relation we can choose to 
engage in.  (And because of the tight connection between 
friendship and the good life, this uncertainty in the 
speculative realm translates into unavoidable risk in the 
practical realm.)  Insofar as all friendships are plagued 
by the inscrutability of the other’s will, friendship 
requires two states in addition to love in order to 
overcome this uncertainty: (a) hope that the common goal of 
the friendship will be realized with the assistance of the 
friend, and (b) trust that the friend will be loyal – e.g., 
keep up his end of the friendship by meeting his 
obligations of care (i.e., performing, at minimum, (a)).  
However, trust has its own conditions of satisfaction, 
among which are that we believe ourselves to be the real 
concern of a truly just and capable person.  Thus it is the 
character of the friend – which is presumably exhibited by 
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his actions – that is the object of our uncertainty.  
Because it is the character of the friend that we love for 
his own sake, the revelation of some well-concealed 
viciousness or betrayal is tantamount to discovering you 
have ‘loved’ a stranger, and part of the pain in this 
peripeteia is learning that your trust was misplaced, 
sometimes to the point of harm.  Witness ‘honest’ Iago. 
The Role of Presumption in Friendship 
Uncertainty, of course, is distinct from distrust; to 
think that our lack of knowledge concerning the intentions 
of our friends translated into a need to distrust them 
would be a kind of practical argumentum ad ignorantum.35   
However, Aquinas argues, good intent can, and should be, 
presumed.  Aquinas argues in several places that we should, 
as a practical rule, presume the good intentions of others 
when we must act in ignorance of their actual intentions.  
The idea of a rule of presumption is a legal idea which “is 
not so much concerned with ascertaining the facts as with 
proceeding on them … [for] Presumption rules belong to the 
                     
35 Here I disagree with George, who writes that “to the 
extent that trust is not perfect, mistrust is present” (p. 
107, fn. 12). 
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realm of praxis, not theory.”36  Aquinas states his version 
of the rule thus: 
Good is to be presumed of everyone unless the contrary 
appears, provided this does not threaten injury to 
another: because, in that case, one ought to be 
careful not to believe everyone readily, according to 
1 John 4:1: "Believe not every spirit.”37 
This rule – ‘de quolibet praesumendum est bonum, nisi 
probetur contrarium,’ or ‘good is to be presumed of 
everyone unless the contrary is proved’ – is grounded in 
the Natural Law: 
He who interprets doubtful matters for the best, may 
happen to be deceived more often than not; yet it is 
better to err frequently through thinking well of a 
wicked man, than to err less frequently through having 
an evil opinion of a good man, because in the latter 
case an injury [iniuria] is inflicted, but not in the 
former.38 
The argument Aquinas is defending in this passage relies on 
the premise that human beings are affected, for good or 
ill, by our judgments about them.  This is not the case 
with, say, rocks.  People deserve honor or contempt on the 
basis of their character, while rocks do not.  Hence an 
                     
36 Edna Ullmann-Margalit, “On Presumption,” Journal of 
Philosophy, 80 (1983): pp. 144 – 45.  Schwartz quotes 
Ullmann-Margalit approvingly; compare Joseph Cascarelli, 
“Presumption of Innocence and Natural Law: Machiavelli and 
Aquinas,” American Journal of Jurisprudence, 41 (1996): pp. 
229 – 270. 
37 ST II-II, q. 70 a. 3 ad. 2. 
38 ST II-II, q. 60, a. 4, ad. 1. 
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unsubstantiated ‘evil’ judgment against a good man deprives 
him of honor that is his by right.39  The rule of 
presumption Aquinas defends is therefore not based on 
maximizing expected utility – we may ‘happen to be deceived 
more often than not’ as a result of its use – but instead 
preserves the rights of the innocent against arbitrary 
abuse.40 
As such, Aquinas’ rule of presumption requires that 
Othello think well of Iago – though not to Desdemona’s 
detriment, or that the limit on thinking well of Iago is 
tha tone must also think well of Desdemona.  For Aquinas’ 
rule is not without conditions.  Two circumstances can 
override Aquinas’ rule of presumption, and either is a 
sufficient condition for overriding trust: 
• Exception 1: Sufficient contrary evidence (e.g., some 
preponderance of evidence that we are not an object of 
the other person’s concern, or that they are not just, 
or that they are not competent); or 
                     
39 ‘Iniuria,’ as Schwartz argues, “connotes not just harm 
but harm connected to the violation of a right (‘ius’)” (p. 
101). 
40 As Schwartz also points out, insofar as Aquinas holds 
that the intellect can be moved through an act of choice 
(cf. ST II-II, q. 1 a. 4c), “to believe [in the goodness of 
another] can be meritorious (ST II-II, q. 2 a. 9c)” (p. 
104). 
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• Exception 2: Circumstances in which following the rule 
threatens harm to another. 
To take one famous case of (E2), Socrates argues that it 
would be unjust to return a loaned weapon to an enraged 
friend; Aquinas’ rule of presumption is overridden here by 
the probable harm the friend intends to another with the 
weapon.41  As for (E1), both Aquinas and Aristotle comment 
that, “it is hard to trust anyone speaking against someone 
whom we ourselves have found reliable for a long time.”42 
Though we would seem to have ventured far afield of 
loyalty at this point, the importance of interpretations of 
(E1) and (E2) can be bought out as follows.  Aquinas has 
argued for a tight connection between the feasibility of 
friendship and the reasonable reliance we place on care and 
loyalty from our friends.  The less reasonable this 
reliance is, the higher the risk friendship threatens and 
the greater the chance that we will not feel we have 
obligations of care and loyalty.  As Aquinas has argued, 
one formality under which we love a friend as a friend is 
in the expectation of mutual benevolence and beneficence.  
Where our expectation in this regard is low – for whatever 
                     
41 Plato, Republic 331c. 
42 Eth. VIII. 4 [1592]. 
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reason – the less reason we have for thinking the 
relationship which makes demands of care and loyalty on us 
is real.  That is simply the influence the ‘objective pole’ 
of Aquinas’ theory of action has on human motivation.  To 
use an example, the connection between the feasibility of a 
friendship and reasonable reliance on the friend, which we 
have been discussing under the name of trust to this point, 
is an essential target of the criminal interrogator, who 
seeks to break a bond of loyalty by introducing doubts 
regarding the trustworthiness of the criminal’s beloved 
friend, group, or whatever, oftentimes by attacking (E1) 
(“they’ve abandoned you”) or (E2) (“they will abandon 
you”). 
Incidentally, Kierkegaard (or at least one of his 
pseudonymns, Johannes de Silentio) seems to think that only 
(E1) can override loyalty – some actual, not merely 
threatened harm – and thus that (E2) should not count as an 
exception at all.  If this was correct, it would be a 
reason for conceptualizing the nature and limits of loyalty 
in ways contrary to Aquinas, ways which would, say, on a 
strong interpretation of (E1), make possible something like 
a transcendental suspension of the ethical when God 
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commands you to sacrifice your son on Mt. Moriah.43  For 
anything less than actual harm would fail to override 
Aquinas’ rule of presumption, and anything less than 
otherwise total loyalty in the absence of actual harm would 
combine unjustified distrust with possible betrayal and 
despair.44  If we think (E2) is required in addition to (E1) 
on the other hand, then we must think that Silentio’s 
conception of loyalty dangerously blurs the line between 
the supererogatory, the foolish, blamable negligence and 
fanaticism, i.e., that Abraham is a foolish fanatic. 
6. Aquinas’ Debts and Legacy 
Let us once again take stock.  We have been slowly 
developing two problems surrounding loyalty in Aristotle 
and Aquinas. 
First, both Arisotle and Aquinas recognize that the 
possibility of deception threatens the feasibility of 
loyalty and friendship.  Aristotle deals with this problem 
in EN 9.3, but does not address it other than to say that 
it promises more woe to us than a devaluing of currency.  
                     
43 See Søren Kierkegaard, “Problemata 1,” in Fear and 
Trembling.  Trans. Howard and Edna Hong (Princeton: 
Princeton UP, 1993): p. 55 ff. 
44 Perhaps, indeed, this is how we should interpret the 
“Soundings” with which Kierkegaard opens Fear and 
Trembling. 
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Aquinas does address the problem, and attempts to find both 
epistemic and affective aids – a rule of presumption and 
hope, respectively – to stabilize loyalty and friendship. 
Second, because care and loyalty are for a particular 
person, they are justified in a different way than 
obligations of justice are justified.  The latter are owed 
to every person regardless of accident or circumstance, all 
things being equal, unless we expressly or implicitly 
contract otherwise, as we do in promising or creating 
children.  Because loyalty and friendship are grounded on a 
contingent, affective response to some feature of a 
particular person, they are vulnerable to that contingency. 
In the previous chapter, I argued that Aristotle accepts 
the variability of loyalty in the lower kinds of 
friendship, but can ground loyalty on something more stable 
in the case of perfect friendship: the other’s ‘self.’ 
Aquinas’ solution to the problem is similar, though his 
solution requires theological premises.  Briefly it is as 
follows.  First, after arguing the theological virtue of 
charity is a kind of friendship, Aquinas argues that 
friendship can  
[extend] to someone in respect of another, as, when a 
man has friendship for a certain person, for his sake 
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he loves all belonging to him, be they children, 
servants, or connected with him in any way.  Indeed, 
so much do we love our friends, that for their sake we 
love all who belong to them, even if they hurt us or 
hate us; so that, in this way, the friendship of 
charity extends even to our enemies, whom we love out 
of charity in relation to God, to Whom the friendship 
of charity is chiefly directed.45 
In response to the objection that this requires us to love 
all persons equally, he responds that 
this is unreasonable.  For the affection of charity, 
which is an inclination of grace, is not less orderly 
than the natural appetite, which is the inclination of 
nature, for both inclinations flow from Divine wisdom. 
… Consequently the inclination of grace which is the 
effect of charity must needs be proportionate to those 
actions which have to be performed outwardly, so that, 
to wit, the affection of our charity be more intense 
towards those to whom we ought to behave with greater 
kindness.46 
He clarifies this last sentence by arguing that “love can 
be unequal in two ways,” either in respect to “the good we 
wish our friend,” or by “its action being more intense.”  
In the first respect we should love everyone equally 
insofar as “we wish them all one same generic good, namely 
everlasting happiness.”47  In the second respect we need not 
love everyone equally, for as he goes on to explain, 
although we can be equally benevolent to everyone, we 
cannot be equally beneficent.  However, he adds, given that 
                     
45 ST II-II, q. 23, a. 1, ad. 2. 
46 ST II-II, q. 26, a. 6, c. 
47 Ibid., ad. 1, here and below. 
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our ability to be beneficent is finite, we ought to be more 
beneficent to those who are holy more than those who are 
not.48  Beneficence, then – the active care we have for the  
interests of others – is like honor, for “love regards good 
in general, whereas honor regards the honored person’s own 
good, for it is given to a person in recognition of his own 
virtue.”49 
Aquinas has argued that, 
1. We owe benevolence to others because they are 
creatures of God (whom we love with the love of 
friendship); 
2. We ought to love more those to whom ‘natural appetite’ 
inclines us (i.e., love our families and others close 
to us more than strangers); and  
3. We must discriminate in our beneficence on the basis 
of desert. 
If loyalty involves an obligation of beneficence to a 
particular person, then Aquinas has argued that we should 
be equally benevolent but, because of differences in 
loyalty, differently beneficent to different people.  On 
                     
48 ST II-II, q. 26, a. 6, ad. 2. 
49 ST II-II, q. 25, a. 1, ad. 2. 
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the other hand, Aquinas wants to limit the proper objects 
of our beneficence to those who deserve it according to 
some principle of justice.  (1) – (3) form a consistent set 
– they entail that my special duties of beneficence (a) are 
directed toward people to whom I stand special relations, 
and (b) are directed unequally to people within that set 
based on desert.   In all cases, however, what grounds my 
benevolence to anyone is not the person, but a property 
they cannot lose – being a child of God – and I am to 
direct my beneficence to them at minimum to the extent that 
I wish them eternal salvation and am ‘loyal’ to them – 
i.e., act in their interests – in that one regard.  This 
solution to the ‘variability’ problem, then, mirrors 
Aristotle’s insofar as it specifies a normative, final 
cause that grounds my historically-acquired care regardless 
of circumstance.  One difference, however, is that for 
Aristotle this final cause is located in a concrete person, 
whereas for Aquinas it is Transcendent in the person of 
God. 
Lurking in the background of this solution is a third 
problem.  If we wish to ground love and loyalty so as to 
make them immune from variability, Aquinas hints, we must 
do so on impartial principles, such as justice.  It follows 
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from this that everyone, in some minimal sense, has an 
equally legitimate claim to our care.  Many contemporary 
thinkers find this deeply objectionable.  This is because 
of their understanding of care and loyalty as rooted in 
contingent affections and historical circumstance: it 
simply makes no sense to talk of a loyalty we have to 
everyone.
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CHAPTER 4.  KANT AND FRIENDSHIP 
 
1. Background 
Imagine your neighbor, Pat, wants to borrow a wrench to 
tighten a lugnut on the tire of the black van in his 
driveway.  You’re a bit intimidated by the muscular Pat, 
especially since it’s obvious that Pat thinks you’re a bit 
of a wimp.  Still, though you don’t owe Pat the time of 
day, and though he doesn’t have any rights over your 
wrench, you might choose to be beneficent by lending Pat 
your wrench.  For his part, Pat can respect you by not 
taking your wrench from you in painful or threatening ways.  
No one, of course, would say that the two of you need to 
love each other, or even take pleasure in each other’s 
company, in order to be civil to one another.  However, 
many have said that the above scenario contains the whole 
of Kant’s thinking about your ethical relationship with 
Pat, i.e., that Kant believes human relationships can be 
completely and adequately captured in the language of 
duties, rights, and the occasional beneficent act.  That’s 
not right, nor is it a complete picture of his ethics. 
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So let’s up the ante.  Imagine that while handing your 
wrench over to Pat you smirk at the fact that he’s too poor 
to afford his own wrenches.  Peering over his shoulder as 
he cranks the lugnut (to make sure your wrench doesn’t get 
‘misplaced’), you give low, disapproving whistles to no one 
in particular regarding the sorry state of his hubcaps.  
Did they come from K-Mart or from a salvage yard?  After 
seeing you off his driveway, Pat decides that the next time 
he needs a wrench he’ll simply ask someone else. 
What would a Kantian say about this scenario?  One 
possibility is to treat such cases as involving multiple 
maxims, each evaluable according to some version of the 
Categorical Imperative.  Can we universalize a smirking 
maxim?   Do low, disapproving whistles treat Pat as an end 
in himself?  Prima facie, however, it’s not clear that 
Kant’s Categorical Imperative would prohibit such actions, 
obtuse as they are, unless the maxims being evaluated had 
Pat’s hurt feelings as their intended object.  The reason 
the Categorical Imperative has little to say here is 
because the ethical problem in this situation isn’t that 
you’ve violated one of Pat’s rights – arguably, no one has 
a right that you be polite to them, or that you like them – 
or that you’ve failed to be beneficent.  He did use your 
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wrench, after all.  No, the problem is that you’re rude; 
you have failed to show Pat the respect he deserves, to 
make him feel his worth.  Whatever violent means by which 
Pat remedies this defect in your personality, Kant remedies 
it as a problem in a section of the Metaphysics of Morals 
called The Doctrine of Virtue. 
2. Kant’s Two Ethical Theories 
The great insight of Kant’s ‘Copernican Revolution’ is 
that, if and when the world appears to us, it does so by 
conforming to the already-existing structures of our 
understanding that Kant calls the ‘categories.’1  Reason, 
Kant argues, imposes its law-like principles onto the 
world, and by making the world appear to us in a systematic 
fashion, makes science possible.  This does not entail that 
there is any world we know, but only that any world we can 
know will appear to us under the categories.  The same 
                     
1 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (hereafter CPR), trans. and 
ed. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998): B xvi.  
Translations of Kant’s practical works are taken from 
Practical Philosophy, trans. and ed. Mary Gregor 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996).  I’ll refer to Kant’s 
works in this volume using the following abbreviations: 
—Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: GW 
—Metaphysics of Morals: MM 
—Critique of Practical Reason: KpV 
I will also use Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere 
Reason, trans. George di Giovanni, in Immanuel Kant: 
Religion and Rational Theology, Allen Wood (ed.) 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996). 
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relation between the world and reason is true in Kant’s 
ethics: practical reason dictates that any action that’s a 
moral action will conform to the formal criteria of the 
Categorical Imperative.  Everything else will fail to be 
intelligible as a moral action.  Just as the categories 
dictate the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
something’s being a possible object of our cognitive 
experience without entailing that we in fact experience 
anything, so too does the Categorical Imperative dictate 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for a maxim’s being 
permissible to act from.  The maxim must be universal in 
scope, necessary in modality, and communicable among 
rational beings. 
In contrast to this emphasis of the Groundwork and the 
Critique of Practical Reason on the ‘formal’ conceptual 
conditions and entailments of the moral law, in the 
Metaphysics of Morals Kant argues that we can identify 
particular ‘material ends’ of morality, i.e., ends we ought 
in fact to will.2  Kant derives such ends from the fact that 
we are existent and embodied rational beings: our continued 
and fulfilled existence entails needs for physical, social, 
                     
2 Kant draws the formal vs. material distinction at MM, AK 
6: 380 in reference to his division between an ethics of 
rights and an ethics of ends. 
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political, mental, and relational goods, goods that beings 
without bodies or a desire for happiness need not will at 
all except (tellingly) in relation to us.3  A close reader 
of the Groundwork will not find this surprising when he 
remembers that, immediately after claiming that the good 
will is the only thing that possesses absolute worth, Kant 
defends the claim with a reductio.  The reductio is 
premised on the idea that the “natural constitution of an 
organized being” is “constituted purposefully for life,” 
and practical reason has a “vocation” to produce a good 
will.  Both of these claims presume that our being, both 
natural and moral, is teleologically ordered.4  Borrowing 
the language of the second Categorical Imperative, Kant 
argues in the Metaphysics of Morals that we have a 
negative, perfect duty not to act contrary to our well-
being, and a positive, imperfect duty to perfect ourselves.5   
There are, then, two constraints Kant places on 
permissible action: 
• Formal: That the maxim on which an agent acts can be 
made into a universal moral law for all rational 
                     
3 Else, for example, God could in good conscience leave Job 
to starve at every turn. 
4 This reductio covers AK 4: 395 – 96. 
5 MM, AK 6: 419.  Kant defends the use of teleological 
language in the Critique of Judgment. 
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beings, and that the law can be willed to some 
extent; 
• Material: That the agent “regards himself and every 
other human being as his end,”6 
that is, considers the well-being of every human being qua 
finite rational being when choosing the ends he’ll pursue.  
For example, Kant would argue that it is my duty to 
consider how Pat’s sense of self-worth is affected by 
lending him my wrenches in such a way as to make him feel 
inferior or indebted, rather than, for example, offering an 
exchange of, say, bodyguard duty in exchange for access to 
my tools for a day.7  These and similar duties of virtue - 
kindness, gratitude, sympathy, on the positive side, and 
the avoidance of arrogance, spitefulness, and mockery on 
the negative – primarily involve a person’s relation to 
himself as a moral subject (even when his actions 
secondarily involve others as objects), and so cannot, 
strictly speaking, be captured in the language of 
enforceable claim-rights, unless your humanity has rights 
against you.8  And even if that idea makes sense, such 
                     
6 MM, AK 6: 410. 
7 See MM, AK 6: 470 – 71. 
8 Kant thinks this is exactly what is going on (MM, AK 6: 
417 - 418).  Several contemporary thinkers believe this is 
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rights would be unenforceable.9  Hence these duties are 
called duties of virtue rather than duties of justice or 
right. 
However, it’s hard to be the perfectly cosmopolitan 
benefactor of all when so many people in the world don’t 
deserve good treatment.  Consider the following passage 
from Kant’s moral catechism: 
• “Teacher: Now, if it were up to you to dispose of 
all happiness (possible in the world), would you 
keep it all for yourself or would you share it with 
your fellow human beings? 
• “Pupil: I would share it with others and make them 
feel happy and satisfied too. 
• “Teacher: Now that proves that you have a good 
enough heart; but let us see whether you have a good 
head to go with it.  – Would you really give a lazy 
fellow soft cushions so that he could pass his life 
away in sweet idleness?  Or would you see to it that 
a drunkard is never short of wine and whatever else 
he needs to get drunk? … 
• “Pupil: No, I would not.”10 
I agree with the pupil: the bum and the drunk don’t deserve 
my beneficence.  Or more exactly, to speak like Kant, they 
aren’t worthy of the happiness my beneficence would help 
                     
absurd; see, for example, H.L.A. Hart, “Are There Any 
Natural Rights?” Philosophical Review (64) 1955: 175-82.  
On the other hand, I think Aristotle had a similar idea, 
which I explicated in chapter two as the relation between 
one’s empirical and teleological self. 
9 Well … ask that arms-dealer Cephalus how well he sleeps at 
night. 
10 MM, AK 6: 480 – 81. 
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bring about.  Any impartial rational spectator would think 
the same.11  Yet … et tu quoque? 
• “Teacher: But as for yourself, would you at least 
have no scruples about first providing yourself with 
everything that you could count in your happiness? 
• “Pupil: I would have none. 
• “Teacher: But doesn’t it occur to you to ask, again, 
whether you are yourself worthy of happiness?”12 
Like every great teacher of ethics, Kant sees that ethical 
arguments ultimately have an ad hominem component. 
But to the quick.  The first point I wish to make is 
that, as Kant (and other Natural Law jurists?) recognize, 
our nature as embodied rational beings comes attached with 
ends we ought to pursue.  Consider, for example, Kant’s 
argument that we can determine a priori of embodied 
rational beings that their ultimate end, the summum bonum, 
is a synthesis of moral and non-moral interests.  While the 
‘purpose’ of practical reason is the production of the good 
will, this cannot be the complete good of an embodied 
                     
11 As Kant remarks in the first paragraph of the Groundwork, 
AK 4: 393: “… an impartial rational spectator can take no 
delight in seeing the uninterrupted prosperity of a being 
graced with no feature of a pure and good will, so that a 
good will seems to constitute the indispensible condition 
even of worthiness to be happy.” 
12 MM, AK 6: 481. 
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rational being on whom nature places other demands.13  Our 
highest good must be synthetic, a combination of moral and 
non-moral goods.  Kant argues in the second Critique that 
the formal principle of this end is moral – the absolute 
conformity of the will to the moral law – which gives 
unconditioned (moral) worth to the complete good.  Its 
material principle is happiness – the complete satisfaction 
of all of the ends of desire – and this principle gives 
natural (conditioned) worth to the complete good.  Since 
possession of a good will is a necessary condition of 
worthiness to be happy, deserved happiness is happiness got 
in exact proportion to virtue. 
The second point is that, as Kant concludes in the second 
Critique, finite and rational beings have (1) a perfect 
duty to will to be worthy of happiness and (2) an imperfect 
duty to seek happiness (but only in proportion to our moral 
worth) – and that these constitute ends we are obligated to 
pursue rather than formal conditions for the possibility of 
moral action.  Considered as a synthetic unity, these ends 
together constitute the object of freedom for finite and 
rational creatures, the “complete” good, or summum bonum, 
                     
13 Kant argues this already in the Groundwork at AK 4: 396, 
foreshadowing the antinomy of practical reason in the 
second Critique. 
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that which we are always already willing when we are 
willing morally.14  As Kant puts it, 
there is only one obligation of virtue, whereas there 
are many duties of virtue; for there are indeed many 
objects that it is also our duty to have as ends, but 
there is only one virtuous disposition, the subjective 
determining ground to fulfill one’s duty …15 
That “one obligation of virtue” is the perfect duty to 
perfect oneself as a moral agent, to be the person 
perfectly motivated by the idea of duty.16  Whether there 
are any perfectly virtuous agents in the ‘subjective 
determining ground’ of their will is a question Kant 
doesn’t take up until the Religion Within the Limits of 
Reason Alone.  We will take it up shortly in response to a 
problem created by the next point. 
That point is that the ad hominem contained in Kant’s 
moral catechism only works if we are indeed justified in 
denying beneficence to those unworthy of it.  We might 
never know this about another human being, and so never 
acquire reasons to deny our beneficence to others, but a 
                     
14 See Kant’s discussion of the Antinomy of Practical Reason 
in the KpV, AK 5: 107 – 119. 
15 MM, AK 6: 410. 
16 This is consistent with Kant’s assertion in the 
Groundwork that reason’s “unconditional purpose” to produce 
the good will can “limit” and reduce the “conditional 
purpose” of happiness “below zero” as it seeks to attain 
that purpose, AK 4: 396. 
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conscientious Kantian will always check, first, that others 
are (so far as can be known) worthy of our beneficence, and 
second, that we present ourselves to others as worthy of 
their beneficence.  Kant will interpret these two 
principles not merely as moral principles, but also as 
contrary principles driving the psychology of human 
relationships.  On the one hand, Kant defines friendship – 
an ideal human relationship – in terms of how the worth and 
beneficence of two moral agents interact with one another.  
On the other hand, Kant argues that a failure to bestow 
beneficence in proportion to worth is to cause a loss of 
respect, of ourselves for another, or of another towards 
ourselves, and “once respect is violated, its presence is 
irretrievably lost, even though the outward marks of it 
(manners) are brought back to their former course.”17  This 
one point explains Kant’s pessimistic remarks regarding the 
vicissitudes of human relationships and especially about 
the fragility of friendship.  Ultimately, perhaps, the fact 
that these vicissitudes follow from our failure to be 
properly motivated by duty in the ‘subjective determining 
ground of the will’ will provide us with a defense of 
                     
17 MM, AK 6: 470. 
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Kant’s oft-maligned treatment of friendship as a naïve 
‘sharing of secrets.’ 
3. Friendship 
Kant defines friendship as “the union of two persons 
through equal mutual love and respect.”18  Happily, he gives 
this definition an entire sentence of explanation: 
It is easy to see that this is an ideal of 
participating and sharing sympathetically in the 
other’s well-being through the morally good will that 
unites them, and even though it does not produce the 
complete happiness of life, the adoption of this ideal 
in their disposition toward each other makes them 
deserving of happiness; hence human beings have a duty 
of friendship.19   
The most important fact to notice here is that Kant is 
describing friendship as a concrete instance of the summum 
bonum.  The end of our human relationships, the end we are 
always willing when we love other persons, is the worthy 
enjoyment of another’s company.20  This enjoyment is rooted 
in and concomitant with our working for our friend’s well-
being, and is limited only by the degree to which our will 
is good.  The apex of human sociality, in other words, 
assuming friendships involve exclusive or preferential 
beneficence, is loyalty bound by mutual respect. 
                     
18 MM, AK 6: 469. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Kant asserts this at MM, AK 6: 471, §47; but see below. 
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Let’s parse that out.  Without pretending to an 
exhaustive classification, we can easily separate human 
relationships into the following kinds: 
1. Relationships involving respect without the practical 
adoption of another’s well-being as your own; 
2. Relationships involving beneficence without mutual 
respect; or 
3. Relationships involving beneficence and respect in 
unequal and/or independent proportions. 
I have a relationship of type (1) with Mahatma Ghandi 
(who’s dead, and so beyond the reach of my beneficence), a 
relationship of type (2) towards my neighbor’s wonderful 
children, and a relationship of type (3) towards my 
parents, whom I respect more than I’ll ever be able to 
benefit (life being an infinite debt).  On the other hand, 
Kant thinks friendship constitutes a fourth kind of 
relationship, namely, 
4. Relationships in which (a) the mutual happiness of the 
agents is dependent on the good character of each 
agent, and (b) the love and respect of each agent 
toward the other is equal. 
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Because of this, there are two ways in which human 
relationships can fail to be friendly.  On the one hand, as 
in cases (1) and (2), love and respect are not related in 
dependent manner.  On the other hand, love and respect can 
be present in an unequal mixture, as in case (3).  Kant 
thinks such relationships are better described as a 
relation between a superior and an inferior than as a 
friendship.  Indeed, Kant believes that although friendship 
presupposes mutual beneficence, its actual bestowal creates 
an obligation of gratitude in its recipient and superiority 
in the benefactor, and this destruction of equality between 
friends can weaken the friendship: 
If one of them accepts a favor from the other, then he 
may well be able to count on equality of love, but not 
in respect; for he sees himself obviously a step lower 
in being under obligation without being able to impose 
obligation in turn.21 
Many of Kant’s remarks about friendship deal with the 
manner in which we should limit the intimacy we have with 
our friends precisely in order to preserve the proper 
relation of love and respect that must exist between 
friends. 
Unfortunately, that our friend loves and respects us as 
we love and respect him is something we must presume as a 
                     
21 MM, AK 6: 471. 
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condition for the possibility of friendship; it is a moral 
ding an sich we can think but not know.22  As the moral life 
itself hopes for happiness (in proportion to one’s worth) 
from we know not where, so too does even the best 
friendship rely on the presumption of – perhaps ‘faith in’ 
– a morally good will in the other as a condition for the 
possibility of worthy beneficence, else the friends come to 
regard themselves as chumps or free-riders.  If that’s 
correct, then friendship requires hope, and that hope is an 
anagogical figure for the moral life as a whole.  More on 
this later, when we’ll need to read the analogy back into 
friendship from the other direction. 
Moral Friendship 
Kant goes on to distinguish the “Ideal” friendship just 
discussed from “moral” friendship, which he defines as “the 
complete confidence of two persons in revealing their 
secret judgments and feelings to each other, as far as such 
disclosures are consistent with mutual respect.”23  He 
mentions two differences between the two kinds of 
friendship.  First, whereas confidence in or trust in the 
good will of the friend is a mark of ideal friendship, Kant 
                     
22 MM, AK 6: 469 – 70. 
23 MM, AK 6: 471. 
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has made it the genus of moral friendship, as if moral 
friendship were simply a special species of trust we can 
have in another person.  Indeed, Kant’s discussion of moral 
friendship bears this out, concentrating on the fact that a 
true friend is someone in whom one can, without anxiety, 
confide one’s secrets.24  Second, Kant explicitly contrasts 
the possibility of each kind of friendship.  Ideal 
friendship is simply an “idea,” with this supposedly meant 
in the technical sense of a regulative ideal that allows us 
to measure the worth of actual relationships. It is 
“unattainable in practice,”25 whereas moral friendship “is 
not just an ideal but (like black swans) actually exists 
here and there in its perfection.”26   
Two of Kant’s arguments in this section are relevant to 
understanding these distinctions.  On the one hand, he 
argues that insofar as we lack epistemic access to the 
thoughts of our friends, friendship is the equivalent of 
the noumenal ding an sich – that which we can think but 
never assert as actual (or actually know) – and thus can 
                     
24 MM, AK 6: 472.  Explicit criticism of the role of 
‘intimacy’ in friendship and particularly the ‘secrets 
view’ of friendship can be found in Cocking and Kennett’s 
“Friendship and the Self,” Ethics 108 (1998): 502-27 and 
their “Friendship and Moral Danger,” Journal of Philosophy 
97 (2000): 278-96. 
25 MM, AK 6: 469. 
26 MM, AK 6: 471. 
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never be said to be attained even as it functions as a 
standard guiding our judgment of other relationships.27  On 
the other hand, it seems that we can ascertain the malice 
of some human beings – their ill-willing directed at our 
well-being – and the akratic weakness of still others in 
failing to promote our well-being.  The unstated 
implication seems to be that, after some period of testing 
we can determine whether someone doesn’t harm and actually 
protects our goods and secrets.  In this way we can 
determine the reality of moral friendship.28 
We should note that both of these arguments focus on the 
character of the other: whether his good will can be known, 
and whether he is discreet, that is, will not divulge 
personal information about his friend.  If ideal friendship 
                     
27 MM, AK 6: 470.  “… how can a human being ascertain 
whether one of the elements requisite to this duty (e.g., 
benevolence toward each other) is equal in the disposition 
of each of the friends?  … how can he be sure that if the 
love of one is stronger, he may not, just because of this, 
forfeit something of the other’s respect, so that it will 
be difficult for both to bring love and respect into that 
equal balance required for friendship?” 
28 MM, AK 6: 472: “Every human being has his secrets and 
dare not confide blindly in others, partly because of a 
base cast of mind in most human beings to use them to one’s 
disadvantage and partly because many people are indiscreet 
or incapable of judging what may or may not be repeated.  
The necessary combination of qualities is seldom found in 
one person … [but?] this (merely moral friendship) is not 
just an ideal but (like black swans) actually exists here 
and there in its perfection.” 
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is impossible, it’s impossible for the same reasons on the 
that led the ‘student’ in Kant’s moral catechism to deny 
that he should give his beneficence himself in addition to 
bums and drunks: no one passes every test.   
I think there is a better story to be told here, and that 
Kant has the tools available to write it.  It is only the 
fact that human beings do not have good wills that make 
loyalty and trust the defining marks of friendship.29  If 
others always treated us with respect and looked out for 
our well-being, trust and loyalty would be guaranteed.  If 
no one has a good will, on the other hand, then none of us 
is worthy of either happiness or friendship.  Universal 
corruption in the ‘subjective determining ground’ of our 
will would make genuine friendship between men de facto 
impossible even as it stood in judgment of our failed 
relationships. 
This line of argument makes it sound as if the best 
friends are discreet friends because, like bureaucrats, 
it’s best to keep those who know our dirty secrets within 
                     
29 It is for this reason, I think, that the concept of a 
robot betraying the good of a human is so far from the 
minds of most characters in Isaac Asmiov’s I, Robot.  
Unless people can and do act otherwise than they ought, the 
concept of persevering in care for another’s good lacks 
(Kant would say) moral value: it requires us to sacrifice 
nothing in its pursuit. 
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range of our knife.  Perhaps.  Against this, however, we 
should keep in mind the following passage: 
From a moral point of view it is, of course, a duty 
for one of the friends to point out the other’s faults 
to him; this is in the other’s best interests and is 
therefore a duty of love.30 
Kant here indicates that a good friend is someone who will 
both deny his friend undeserved happiness as well as one 
who will be happy with his friend in the goodness the 
friend has.  In other words, your best friend is nothing 
other than the moral law in human form. 
So: the classic interpretation of Kant’s definition of 
moral friendship puts emphasis on the wrong part of the 
definition, on the part that emphasizes how prudent it is 
to reveal our faults to others.  Better, I think, to 
imagine the ‘confidence’ of moral friendship as the 
practical hope involved in revealing yourself, in the 
‘subjective determining ground’ of your will, to the moral 
law personified, knowing that this person will treat you 
with love and respect and make you as happy as you ought to 
be.  Maybe more. 
                     
30 MM, AK 6: 470. 
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4. Friendship as a Figure of Kant’s Summum Bonum 
As discussed above, Kant argues that neither the mere 
satisfaction of all the ends of appetite, nor the mere 
possession of a good will, is a sufficient account of the 
good for finite and rational beings such as we are.  As 
finite and rational beings we have a perfect duty to will 
to be worthy of happiness and an imperfect duty to seek 
happiness, though only in proportion to that worthiness.  
Together, these ends constitute the summum bonum, the 
‘complete’ and ‘highest’ good for finite and rational 
creatures.  When we combine this notion with Kant’s value 
theory, we get a surprising result. 
Kant begins the Groundwork by arguing that all good 
things are good in relation to the good will because the 
good will “seems to constitute the indispensable condition 
even of worthiness to be happy.”31 Even those things that 
are naturally good simpliciter – say, life, sex, food – are 
good for us only conditionally, namely, on the condition 
that the will of the person enjoying these goods is morally 
good. It follows that if a person’s will is not good, 
natural goods are not good for him: he must become good so 
                     
31 Kant, GW, AK 4: 393. 
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as to earn that worthiness by which natural goods are 
worthily enjoyed. 
As we argued in section three, Kant’s concept of 
friendship can be understood as a particular instance of 
the formal relation he calls the summum bonum.  The desire 
to enjoy the thoughts, company and security of others is a 
natural good, as Kant says,32 but it need not be thought an 
unconditional good, since no natural good is 
unconditionally good.  Rather, the respect we owe any 
person who plays the role of an object in our maxims 
constitutes the formal or moral component of the desire for 
friendship.  Friendship, on this account, is conditionally 
good and can be per accidens bad, depending on the moral 
status of the wills of the friends.  The problem that comes 
from all this is that, if each of us lacks a morally good 
will, then all of our relationships of friendship are 
fundamentally faulty.   
Support for this idea can be found in Kant’s notion of 
radical evil. In his Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere 
Reason, Kant argues that there is an ultimate subjective 
ground of our maxims, one that explains why the particular 
maxims of one being, who is either good or evil, may be 
                     
32 MM, AK 6: 470. 
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good and evil at different times.  This “first ground” is 
called one’s disposition.33  A disposition that allows a 
particular evil maxim to be willed even once has shown that 
it is open to subordinating an ethical incentive to a 
sensuous one and is therefore corrupt.  Even if its 
particular actions are mostly good, the “intelligible” 
character of such a will is yet evil.34  The propensity to 
evil, the tendency to invert the ethical order of the 
incentives of the will, is radical both because it evinces 
the corruption of the ground of all our particular maxims 
and because, as a noumenal ground outside of time, it is 
inextirpable by human powers.35  That everyone’s disposition 
is corrupt Kant (like Jesus and Socrates) demonstrates ad 
hominem: let everyone without sin throw a stone. 
Friendship and Hope 
What we need, then, is some way of imagining what a human 
relationship defined by equal love and respect will look 
like if its agents (a) are both corrupt in their 
disposition and (b) strive to be otherwise.  We’ll turn to 
the third chapter of Genesis for help, while remembering 
that friendship is an image of the summum bonum.  We need 
                     
33 Kant, Religion, AK 6: 20 ff. 
34 Kant, Religion, AK 6: 31. 
35 Kant, Religion, AK 6: 37. 
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to reconstruct the relation between the wills of Adam and 
Eve at each step of their fall and to consider the moral 
relationship between them at each step of their fall.36 
There is a brief time during which Eve has eaten of the 
tree of knowledge, and thus committed the first mortal sin, 
but Adam has not.  At this point Adam contains within his 
being, including his body, the promise of happiness for Eve 
(for he is her completeness as she was made to be his), 
while Eve is morally unworthy of the happiness her 
prelapsarian spouse promises her.  We could not call Adam 
evil on account of the sin of Eve.  He is still naturally 
good on his own account, and he is her good, though clearly 
she does not deserve this natural good. Hence he is 
“conditionally good” for her, as Kant would say, with this 
meaning that his natural goodness to Eve is dependent on 
her worthiness of her husband.  Yet Eve no longer possesses 
that condition. 
Once Eve has fallen, Adam has not become evil (he could 
still satisfy her every moral desire), but he cannot 
satisfy her immoral desires and remain just.  If this were 
a permanent state, we could imagine a point at which Adam 
                     
36 I’ve told this story before in “Good Sex on Kantian 
Grounds: A Reply to Alan Soble,” Essays in Philosophy, Vol. 
8, No. 2, June 2007. 
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would have to deny a desire of Eve’s because the desire was 
immoral (that is, to be picturesque, he could deny her 
immoral desire that he should eat an apple by refusing to 
eat it): their flesh, let us say, a similitude of the 
complete good, has become divided.  This division of the 
complete good is contingent because it need not have 
happened.  Once it does happen, however, it must 
necessarily hold not only the promise of future pain for 
Eve (some of her desires ought not be met) but also Eve’s 
shame in the knowledge that such denials are just. Perhaps 
Eve 
sees in this a lack of the respect [s]he expected from 
[her] friend and thinks that [she] has either already 
lost or is in constant danger of losing something of 
[her] friend’s respect, since [s]he is observed and 
secretly criticized by him; and even the fact that 
[her] friend observes [her] and finds fault with [her] 
will seem in itself offensive.37 
Those who are corrupt in their disposition take offense at 
the work of justice.  Of that, let us not speak.  On the 
other hand, if she had been contrite, Eve could have lived 
for a time with her unfallen husband, whose very presence, 
though painful, would have allowed only the satisfaction of 
her moral desires. In contrition she could have given 
thanks for this. 
                     
37 Kant, MM, AK 6: 470. 
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That, I think, must be the final word on Kant’s theory of 
friendship.  We are surrounded by the promise of happiness 
from the world around us and the persons in it, even as 
there are times when we are not worthy of enjoying each 
other’s company.  We no longer possess that condition, for 
in a postlapsarian world even natural goodness can be a 
temptation to evil for an unworthy will.  In this world, 
our best hope is for a friend who sees in us an opportunity 
to exercise his duty “to point out [our] faults to” us 
because “this is in the other’s [our] best interests,” 
i.e., it is a “duty of love.”38  The object of our hope is 
the person we can trust to fulfill this duty even as he 
protects our sense of self-worth.  When such trust is 
mutual – and such a thing is as rare as it is fine – then 
we have in fact “the complete confidence of two persons in 
revealing their secret judgments and feelings to each 
other, as far as such disclosures are consistent with 
mutual respect.”   This is how we strive for an ideal, the 
condition which we left a long time ago, but which retains 
the power to command us to our good and judge our attempts 
to reach it. 
                     
38 MM, AK 6: 470. 
 172 
CHAPTER 5.  KIERKEGAARD’S TASK OF LOVE: 
EROS, PHILIA, AGAPE 
 
1. Introduction 
As Søren Kierkegaard never tires of repeating, – 
especially to assistant professors (and their students) 
with a penchant for making theses – “the way to the 
essentially Christian goes through offense.”1  Works of 
Love, for example, contains a threefold criticism of the 
Aristotelian conception of virtue friendship that, until 
recently, has been less than well received.2  Specifically, 
Kierkegaard argues that the ‘pagan’ model of friendship: 
                     
1 Søren Kierkegaard, Works of Love, trans. and ed. Howard 
and Edna Hong (New Jersey: Princeton UP, 1995) p. 59. 
2 This is especially clear in the largely negative reception 
received by Works of Love.  Theodore Adorno thinks that 
Kierkegaard’s presentation of agape in WOL as indifferent 
to the uniqueness of persons is “close … to callousness,” 
in ‘On Kierkegaard’s Doctrine of Love,’ Studies in 
Philosophy and Social Science 8, 413 – 29 (reprinted in 
D.W. Conway, ed., Søren Kierkegaard: Critical Assessments 
of Leading Philosophers, vol. 2. (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2002) 7 – 21.  K.E. Løgstrup argues that WOL is 
“a brilliantly thought out system of safeguards against 
being forced into a close relationship with other people” 
in The Ethical Demand, Ed. H. Fink and A. MacIntyre, Trans. 
T. Jensen and G. Puckering (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1997).  Lorraine Smith Pangle’s Aristotle and 
the Philosophy of Friendship (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
2002), Sandra Lynch’s Philosophy and Friendship (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh UP, 2005), and Mark Vernon have all recently 
argued that Kierkegaard’s position on friendship is 
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(F1): is not a legitimate subject of ethical interest; 
(F2): would contain ethically dangerous elements if it 
were; and 
(F3): is inherently unable to make good on its claim 
to be a necessary component of human eudaimonia. 
In contrast, Kierkegaard also argues, 
(F4): Agape (“neighbor-love”) is immune to the kinds 
of deficiencies inherent in eros and philia (and is 
for that reason a better candidate for eudaimonia). 
In what follows, I will do two things.  Taking Aristotle’s 
account of friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics as a 
paradigm case of ‘pagan’ friendship, I will first explain 
and evaluate Kierkegaard’s arguments for (F1) and (F2), 
while mentioning other thinkers who have held similar 
                     
ridiculously negative, with the latter going so far as to 
claim that Kierkegaard argues for “an outright rejection of 
friendship as such” in The Philosophy of Friendship 
(London: Palgrave, 2005) pp. 77 – 78.  Only recently has 
this traditional interpretation of Kierkegaard’s position 
on friendship been challenged, most notably by M. Jamie 
Ferreira in Love’s Grateful Striving: A Commentary on 
Kierkegaard’s Works of Love (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2001).  
Defending Kierkegaard against some of these charges (while 
also arguing that Kierkegaard’s criticisms of ‘pagan’ eros 
largely attack a straw man) is John Lippit, “Cracking the 
Mirror: On Kierkegaard’s Concerns About Friendship,” 
International Journal of Philosophy and Religion 61 (2007): 
131 – 150. 
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positions.3  Though I conclude that (F1) and (F2) fail to 
address Aristotelian ethics on its own terms, I also argue 
that attention to Kierkegaard’s heretofore overlooked 
emphasis on deception and risk make his arguments for (F3) 
and (F4) at least initially plausible criticisms of the 
Aristotelian model of friendship.  Though I ultimately 
conclude that all of Kierkegaard’s arguments fail, they do 
so while addressing, in a systematic and focused way, 
historical issues that contemporary philosophy of 
friendship has only recently rediscovered. 
2. The Failure of ‘Pagan’ Eros and Philia 
Let’s briefly recall the fundamental features of 
Aristotle’s conception of friendship.  Taking virtue 
friendship as paradigmatic, Aristotle held that a friend: 
1. Wishes and does good to his friend for his friend’s 
sake. 
2. Wishes for the friend to exist and to live, for the 
friend’s sake. 
3. Spends time with his friend. 
4. Makes the same choices as his friend. 
                     
3 These historical connections play a part in my final 
evaluation of Kierkegaard. 
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5. Shares in his friend’s distress and enjoyment.4 
Aristotle adds that “we must do kindnesses” – that is, at 
least (1) – (3), and perhaps (5) – “for friends more than 
for strangers.”5  Aristotle’s explanation of this fact has 
its ground in his view that eunoia – the recognition of and 
affective response to some feature of a person we find 
valuable – is the efficient cause of philia.6  We love our 
friends in response to their perceived worth. 
Kierkegaard argues that this model of love – covering 
both eros and philia – has three characteristics that, 
taken together, distinguish erotic love and friendship from 
Christian agape.7 
1. Friendship and erotic love involve exclusive caring, 
i.e., involve caring for particular persons and not 
others.8 
                     
4 EN 9.4. 
5 EN 9.3, 1165b 34  
6 EN 9.4. 
7 These characteristics have also been discussed by Graham 
Smith, in “Kierkegaard: Responsibility to the Other,” 
Critical Review of International Social and Political 
Philosophy (2007): 181 – 97. 
8 “Christian love teaches us to love all people, 
unconditionally all.  Just as unconditionally and 
powerfully as erotic love intensifies in the direction that 
there is but one and only one beloved” (WOL p. 49). 
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2. Friendship and erotic love involve special caring, 
i.e., caring for some more than for others, on the 
basis of a unique set of features the friend 
possesses.9 
3. Friendship and erotic love are founded on 
inclination (affection), and thus on forces over 
which we have little (if any) direct control, either 
in their appearance, cessation, or direction.10 
Agape, on the other hand, is distinguished from this model 
of love in its scope, its function, and its ground.  Rather 
than being directed at a particular person exclusively, 
agape’s object is the ‘neighbor’ – and that’s everyone.  
Rather than involving exclusive caring, agape requires us 
to seek the highest good possible for the neighbor: virtue, 
if you’re Aristotle, and salvation, if you’re Kierkegaard 
(or Aquinas, who shares this particular thesis with 
                     
9 “However joyous … spontaneous love, can be itself, 
precisely in its most beautiful moment it still feels a 
need to bind itself, if possible, even more securely.  
Therefore the two swear an oath, swear fidelity or 
friendship to each other” (WOL p. 29). 
10 “Erotic love is based on a drive that, transfigured into 
an inclination, has its highest … unconditioned expression 
in this—there is but one and only one beloved in the whole 
world …” (WOL p. 49).  “The issue between the poet and 
Christianity can be defined very precisely as follows: 
Erotic love and friendship are preferential love and the 
passion of preferential love …” (WOL p. 52). 
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Kierkegaard).11  Agape distributes care equitably.  Finally, 
Kierkegaard unabashedly argues that agape is founded on a 
command rather than an affection or passion: “You shall 
love your neighbor.”  If that seems forced, remember that 
Kant made essentially the same point when he argued that 
the ground of practical love must be independent of 
inclination if it is to be required by the moral law – 
which is always expressed, to us, as an imperative.12 
The first two characteristics that Kierkegaard associates 
with erotic love and friendship are uncontroversial: a 
friend displays exclusive and partial care for her friend.  
Although Kierkegaard tends to understate the role 
deliberation and choice play in friendship, (3) 
nevertheless captures the fact that, even for Aristotle, 
both eros and philia have their roots in an affective 
response to some valued feature of a friend.  While the 
degree to which we have control over these responses is a 
matter of some debate, Kierkegaard’s position that our 
affection for the good is a passion rather than a choice is 
neither unusual nor rare: Aquinas, for one, held the same 
view.13  And if all desire is for what is, or appears to be, 
                     
11 ST II-II, q. 26, a. 6, ad. 1 
12 Kant, Groundwork, AK 4: 432 – 33. 
13 Cf. ST I-II, Q. 26 a. 2. 
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good, then everything we love as good is loved insofar as 
its goodness calls forth, deserves (or claims to), our 
esteem.  Kierkegaard’s term for eros and philia – 
“passionate preference” – captures these three features 
rather well: eros and philia require exclusive, partial 
affection for a particular other in response to some unique 
set of features that (we think) merits our affection. 
(F1) Friendship is Amoral 
In chapter IIB, “You Shall Love the Neighbor,” 
Kierkegaard attacks this model of friendship on several 
grounds.  His first claim is that “erotic love and 
friendship … contain no moral task.”14  Kierkegaard may have 
Aristotle’s account of the value of friendship in mind 
here.  Aristotle opens Book 8 of the Nicomachean Ethics by 
asserting (a) that friendship “is an excellence, or implies 
excellence” – that is, is or involves virtue, and (b) that 
friendship is the most valuable and necessary external good 
insofar as friendship is an activity whose particular aims 
are constitutive and enabling of the good life as such.15  
Kierkegaard disagrees: 
Erotic love and friendship are good fortune.  In the 
poetic sense, it is a stroke of good fortune … to fall 
                     
14 WOL, p. 50 – 51. 
15 EN 8.1, 1154b 3 – 4. 
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in love, to find this one and only beloved.  … At 
most, then, the task is to be properly grateful for 
one’s good fortune.  But the task can never be to be 
obliged to find the beloved or to find this friend.  … 
Therefore, the task depends upon whether fortune will 
give one the task, but in the moral sense this simply 
expresses that there is no task.16 
Kierkegaard’s idea here is that, even if it’s true that 
friendships are a source of ethical obligations, we have no 
independent obligations to seek friends.17  Aristotle, in 
contrast, argued that human beings are by nature political 
animals because we have natural drives and inclinations to 
seek the society of others; thus deficiency in social 
graces unfits us for a fully flourishing life in human 
society, just as a lack of worthy friends makes such a life 
unachievable.18  Likewise, he thought that, if the point of 
ethics is to be good rather than to make judgments about 
it, it is precisely an ethical task to seek good friends – 
a necessary condition for which is to become such a one –  
both as a requisite to our full moral development and as a 
component of the good life itself.  Be this as it may, 
Kierkegaard’s deontological objection is that however good 
                     
16 WOL, p. 51. 
17 Cf. Smith, p. 185. 
18 As Aristotle says in EN 1.7, 1097b 8 - 11: “By self-
sufficient we do not mean that which is sufficient for a 
man by himself, for one who lives a solitary life, but also 
for parents, children, wife, and in general for his friends 
and fellow citizens, since man is born for citizenship.”  
Cf. Aristotle’s Politics, 1.2. 
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such relationships may be, however necessary they are for a 
minimally choiceworthy human existence, friendship itself 
remains desirable rather than obligatory.  As Kant would 
say, even friendship is a qualified rather than an absolute 
good. 
An action or relation can be the source of an obligation, 
Kierkegaard suggests, if it can be commanded.19  Friendship 
fails that test.  Imagine that, like a one-eyed man in the 
land of the blind, you are the uniquely virtuous person in 
Copenhagen.  Friendship being a form of love, its existence 
depends on the prior existence of persons worthy of your 
affection.  Just as it is compatible with your being a 
brilliant philosopher that you haven’t anyone to call your 
‘dear reader’ – just as it is compatible with being the Son 
of God that you haven’t anywhere to lay your head – so too 
is it compatible with your being ethically faultless that 
you haven’t any friends.  Perhaps there’s no one worthy of 
your attention, no one who excites your eunoia (like Dr. 
Manhattan in Moore and Gibbon’s Watchmen).20  To suggest, in 
such circumstances, that your failure to be excited is a 
                     
19 “But the task can never be to be obliged to find the 
beloved … On the other hand, when one shall love the 
neighbor, then the task is, the moral task …” (WOL, p. 51).   
20 Alan Moore and Dave Gibbons, Watchmen (New York: DC 
Comics, 1995). 
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breach of some obligation – you shall have friends! – is 
absurd. Just as comic, on the other hand, as someone 
insisting on her right to be your friend or lover in virtue 
of her qualities.  
All this is to say that it’s possible for something to be 
a bad state of affairs – call it loneliness, though 
existentialists can be more creative – and for it not to be 
wrong on a person’s part that it exist.  Going to the 
dentist is like that too.  Aristotle says that the fully 
ethical life consists in realizing eudaimonia – being good 
and having sufficient external goods and fortune in 
society.21  Kierkegaard, on the other hand, takes the 
Kantian position that being good requires (though it 
certainly isn’t exhausted by) principled abstention from 
evil deeds.  Thus, the soundness of Kierkegaard’s argument 
depends on the outcome of a meta-ethical debate about the 
correct priority of the good and the right, as W.D. Ross 
put it. 
(F2) Passionate Preferences are Fundamentally Forms of 
Self-Love 
Kierkegaard’s second argument asserts that “Christianity 
has misgivings about erotic love and friendship simply 
because preferential love in passion or passionate 
                     
21 EN 1.7. 
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preference is actually another form of self-love.”22  It is 
important to see at the outset what Kierkegaard is and is 
not claiming here.  He is careful to distinguish the claim, 
1. Passionate preference is essentially a form of self-
love 
from the claim that 
2. Passionate preference is essentially selfish 
for not every instance of self-love is selfish.  Aristotle, 
for instance, drew a distinction between good and bad self-
love: good self-love is love for what is good for you in 
fact, a truly ethical motive to seek what is noble and in 
the interest of your ‘self’ understood in a teleological 
and normative sense.23  Bad self-love gratifies your 
immediate inclinations in a vicious way.  Kierkegaard is 
not concerned with this distinction, though he mentions it 
in passing.24  Neither does he argue that preference is 
                     
22 WOL, p. 53. 
23 Aristotle, EN 9.8: “In all the actions, therefore, that 
men are praised for, the good man is seen to assign to 
himself the greater share in what is noble. In this sense, 
then, as has been said, a man should be a lover of self; 
but in the sense in which most men are so, he ought not.” 
24 WOL, p. 55: “[Christianity] is well aware that there is a 
self-love that one must call unfaithful self-love, but it 
is also just as aware that there is a self-love that must 
be called devoted self-love.” 
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iterative, which would be simply false.25  What Kierkegaard 
is after, rather, is the claim that the admiration of 
another that is a necessary condition of friendship (if the 
one admired is a friend) is at the same time an implied 
demand for reciprocity.  Friendship is self-serving if not 
badly selfish. 
Kierkegaard’s argument for this depends on the 
Aristotelian position that eunoia (admiration) alone is not 
sufficient for friendship; eunoia must be reciprocal in 
friendship.  It follows, as Aquinas argued, that in order 
to admire Jones qua beloved or qua friend, one must admire 
at the same time Jones qua reciprocal lover of oneself.  
One necessarily loves a friend as a reciprocal admirer.26  
As Kierkegaard puts it, 
to admire another person is certainly not self-love; 
but to be loved by the one and only admired one, would 
not this relation turn back in a selfish way into the 
I who loves – his other I?  And so it is also with 
friendship.  To admire another person is certainly not 
self-love, but to be the one and only friend of this 
one and only admired person – would not this relation 
                     
25 The akratic individual, for one, doesn’t prefer that he 
prefers x. 
26 Aquinas argued for this thesis.  See III, Sent. d. 29, a. 
3, ad 2, as well as ST II-II, q. 23 a. 1 c.  See also Paul 
De Letter’s discussion in “Hope and Charity in St. Thomas,” 
Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review, 13 (1950): 204 – 
48. 
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turn back in an alarming way into the I from which we 
proceeded?27 
this view regards loving as a demand (reciprocal love 
is the demand) and being loved (reciprocal love) as an 
earthly good, as temporal – and yet, alas, as the 
highest bliss.28 
Kierkegaard could here be suggesting, in connection with 
his first argument, that insofar as erotic and friendly 
love are forms of self-love they are also amoral by virtue 
of failing to be obligatory.  Self-love is what is 
presupposed by the Royal Law – ‘You shall love your 
neighbor as yourself’ – rather than commanded by it.29  Yet 
this interpretation is not only contradicted by 
Kierkegaard’s book, but it is also surely false.30  That is 
in part what a claim of loyalty amounts to – an obligation 
that your beloved show you reciprocal care – and you can 
fail your friends and lovers in this.    A better 
suggestion is to focus on Kierkegaard’s weak assertion that 
                     
27 WOL, p. 54. 
28 WOL, p. 237.  Later on this page Kierkegaard refers his 
argument back to p. 54. 
29 WOL, p. 17: “When it is said, ‘You shall love your 
neighbor as yourself,’ this contains what is presupposed, 
that every person loves himself … Is it possible for anyone 
to misunderstand this, as if it were Christianity’s 
intention to proclaim self-love as a prescriptive right?  
Indeed, on the contrary, it is Christianity’s intention to 
wrest self-love away from human beings.” 
30 WOL, p. 12: “Your friend, your beloved, your child, or 
whoever is an object of your love has a claim upon an 
expression of it also in words if it actually moves you 
inwardly. The emotion is not yours but belongs to the 
other; the expression is your debt to him …” 
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“Christianity has misgivings about erotic love and 
friendship … [because they are] actually another form of 
self-love.”  Here the concern is about the temptation 
inherent in these relationships to degenerate into a 
constant exchange of assurances and admiration.31  Insofar 
as vanity is a vice, erotic love and friendship are at 
least near occasions of sin. 
Recently, however, some have argued that Kierkegaard’s 
Christian misgivings about erotic and friendly love are 
better understood as a threat to the genuine alterity, 
independence and autonomy of the beloved.  Kierkegaard 
seems to give evidence for this claim when he writes that 
while the friend is another-self, another-I, the object of 
agape is another-you.32  As Smith puts it, in erotic love 
and friendship, “at best, the other becomes a willing, but 
conditional, participant in the friend’s conception of 
well-being and self-worth; at worst, the other is the 
instrument of the friend’s own self-concern, and the 
unrecognized and devalued victim of selfishness.”33  The 
threat inherent even in virtuous friendship, then, is that 
the other is conceived as a quasi-Nietzschean mirror 
                     
31 Cf. WOL, 155-6, 237, 267. 
32 WOL, p. 57. 
33 Smith, p. 192. 
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whereby I perceive my own self-worth – and Aristotle indeed 
thinks the virtuous friend fulfills that function.34  This 
is simply not possible with neighbor-love, whose ‘shall’ 
commands us to seek the good of the other regardless of 
their qualities.  Only neighbor-love can demand that we 
love our enemies.35 
Despite these concerns, Aristotle insists that virtuous 
friends are not good as mere means, but are pleasant and 
useful as well as noble – in fact, because they are noble –  
and that they should be.36  Friends are not knickknacks: 
part of what makes them good for their own sake is their 
being good for ours, as being beneficial is a better-making 
property of friends.  Furthermore, it seems right to say 
with Aristotle that insofar as virtuous friends love each 
other for their own sake, both homogenization and abuse of 
the sort Smith is concerned with are already incompatible 
with virtue friendship.  If these are Kierkegaard’s 
‘Christian’ worries, in other words, they’re not uniquely 
Christian anxieties.  With some misgivings, then, we should 
conclude that there’s not much force in Kierkegaard’s 
objection that self-love tends to uniformity, uniformity in 
                     
34 See Aristotle, EN, 9.9 and Magna Moralia 1213a 10 - 26. 
35 WOL, pp. 54 – 56. 
36 Aristotle, EN 8.2 – 8.3. 
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use or abuse, for it’s the essence of justice, as Hamlet 
says, to use each according to his worth – even if charity 
treats a person better. 
2. Interim 
Contrary to often made criticisms of Kierkegaard, he 
never claims that exclusivity and passionate preference are 
bad in themselves, but merely – if Christianity is true – 
that they are bad if they haven’t been transformed and 
redeemed by agape. 
If in order to love the neighbor you would have to 
begin by giving up loving those for whom you have 
preference, the word ‘neighbor’ would be the greatest 
deception ever conceived.  Moreover, it would be a 
contradiction, since inasmuch as the neighbor is all 
people surely no one can be excluded …37 
Rather, he argues, Christianity is fundamentally an 
inversion of an Aristotelian privileging of special 
relationships over universal obligations.  Christianity, 
rather, 
is so far from being a matter of first having to get 
busy to find the beloved that, on the contrary, in 
loving the beloved we are first to love the neighbor.  
To drives and inclination this is no doubt a strange, 
chilling inversion … Your wife must first and foremost 
be to you your neighbor; that she is your wife is then 
                     
37 WOL, p. 61. 
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a more precise specification of your particular 
relationship to each other.38 
Indeed, 
the wife and the friend are not loved in the same way, 
nor the friend and the neighbor, but this is not an 
essential dissimilarity, because the fundamental 
similarity is implicit in the category ‘neighbor.’  
The category ‘neighbor’ is like the category ‘human 
being.’  Each one of us is a human being and then in 
turn the distinctive individual that he is in 
particular, but to be a human being is the fundamental 
category. … Thus Christianity has nothing against the 
husband’s loving his wife in particular, but he must 
never love her in particular in such a way that she is 
an exception to being the neighbor that every human 
being is …39 
This is more than sufficient to refute Mark Vernon’s claim 
that Works of Love contains “an outright rejection of 
friendship as such,” and Løgstrup’s claim that Works of 
Love is “a brilliantly thought out system of safeguards 
against being forced into a close relationship with other 
people.”40 
The book does, however, want to “seize [passionate 
preference], purify it, sanctify it, and in this way make 
everything new while everything is still old.”41  Insofar as 
this is offensive, Works of Love employs that incomparable 
                     
38 WOL, p. 141. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Cf. footnote 2. 
41 WOL, p. 145. 
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Kierkegaardian sugar to make the pill go down: seduction 
and irony.  Let me explain. 
It hasn’t been emphasized in the literature – excluding 
Ferreira – that Kierkegaard is particularly concerned about 
the effect that Aristotle’s grounding of eros and philia on 
preferential passion has on their qualifications to be what 
Kierkegaard calls the ‘highest’ good – what Aristotle 
called, at least in the case of friendship, the greatest 
external good.  In fact, before Kierkegaard engages in the 
arguments discussed above, the initial chapters of both 
halves of Works of Love focus on (1) the impact deception 
and risk have on non-agapic love, and (2) the fickleness of 
human fidelity.  He responds to these concerns by arguing 
that Christianity’s conception of neighbor-love is superior 
to, and more attractive than, both erotic love and 
friendship on their own criteria of success.  Only agape – 
as a praxis, task, practical love, or what have you – is 
immune to the effects of deception, niggardly fortune and  
stepmotherly nature on our poor, frail affections. 
In other words, Works of Love intends to seduce ‘the 
poet’ in us away from mere erotic love and friendship to 
agapic love using a sweet catharsis, which is ironic, since 
precisely what’s at stake is loyalty to a conception of 
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‘the highest’ that is secure against deception, risk, and 
fickleness.  Kierekgaard’s method is that old Socratic 
standby of dialectic, the cure for which is a decision.  In 
section 3 the dialectic will be reconstructed.  It will be 
shown that Kierkegaard uses apparently equipollent 
arguments to support (F3) and (F4).  In section 4 
Kierkegaard’s arguments will be evaluated. 
3. Kierkegaard’s Tragic and Comic Lovers 
Anyone who wishes to be a happy lover must deal with the 
following problem: people lie.  Given that unfortunate 
fact, says Kierkegaard, there’s no word or deed about which 
we can say without qualification, ‘the person who says or 
does x unconditionally demonstrates her love by it,’ since 
he could always be deceiving us.42 This isn’t the worst of 
it, however.  We’ve all known the person who wonders (after 
accepting a marriage proposal, perhaps) whether she really 
                     
42 WOL, p. 13: “There is no word in human language, no one 
single one, not the most sacred one, about which we are 
able to say: If a person uses this word, it is 
unconditionally demonstrated that there is love in that 
person. … [For] it is true that one and the same word can 
convince us that love abides in the one who said it and 
does not in the other, who nevertheless said the same 
word.” A few sentences later he argues the same point about 
behaviors: “There is no work, not one single one, not even 
the best, about which we unconditionally dare to say: The 
one who does this unconditionally demonstrates his love by 
it. [For] it depends on how the work is done.”  
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loves her betrothed.  In other words, our worries that our 
beliefs about love are justifiably extend to ourselves as 
well.43 As Kierkegaard puts it, 
In the same way the honest person surely admits that 
however often and many times he willingly and gladly 
gave to charity, he has never done it [perhaps] except 
in weakness … [with the consequence that] the work of 
love really would not be a work of love in the highest 
sense.44 
What we have here is a problem of a vaguely Kantian 
sort.45  On the one hand, Kierkegaard says, what qualifies a 
human action as a work of love is the manner in which it is 
performed.  On the other hand, our beliefs about love 
aren’t incorrigible because we lack transparent access to 
                     
43 Cf. Kant, Groundwork, AK 4: 407: “In fact we can never, 
even by the strictest examination, completely plumb the 
depths of the secret incentives of our actions.” 
44 The complete quotation is: “In the same way the honest 
person surely admits that however often and many times he 
willingly and gladly gave to charity, he has never done it 
except in weakness, perhaps disturbed by an incidental 
impression, perhaps with capricious partiality, perhaps to 
make amends for himself, perhaps with averted face (but not 
in the scriptural sense), perhaps without the left hand’s 
knowing about it, but thoughtlessly, perhaps thinking about 
his own cares instead of thinking about the cares of the 
poor, perhaps seeking alleviation by giving to charity 
instead of wanting to alleviate poverty—then the work of 
love really would not be a work of love in the highest 
sense” (WOL, p. 13). 
45 Kant recognizes this problem (Cf. Groundwork, AK 4: 407); 
however, Aristotle recognizes something like it too. 
Compare EN 8.2 and 8.4, where Aristotle argues that mutual 
recognition of reciprocal good-will and well-wishing is a 
necessary condition of friendship, with his concerns about 
feigning friends in EN 8.13 and 9.3. 
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the relevant motives, in ourselves and others, that would 
determine the issue once and for all.  By bringing up this 
problem Kierkegaard is not asserting that we need 
demonstrative certainty in order to justify our love 
lives.46  Heaven forbid!  Rather, he’s trying to get us to 
focus for a moment on the Cartesian – Lutheran? – anxieties 
this situation invariably occasions.  If we’re going to 
talk honestly about happy love and the conditions for its 
possibility, we have to talk about deception too. 
So Kierkegaard begins the first chapter of Works of Love 
by examining the ways in which we can be deceived.  He 
mentions two: “We can be deceived by believing what is 
untrue, but we are certainly also deceived by not believing 
what is true.”47  This allows Kierkegaard to distinguish 
between the lover who is in love defrauded (begrages) out 
of love – that is, the lover who is deceived by another – 
and a second lover who defrauds herself (begrages for) out 
of love, who deceives herself by refusing to believe she is 
loved.  A closer examination of Kierkegaard’s distinction 
between the two lovers reveals that he has used two 
                     
46 Johannes Climacus, for example, the pseudonymous author 
of the Concluding Scientific Postscript, argues in several 
places that one can be satisfied with and even morally 
required to accept less than apodictic proofs in matters of 
love. 
47 WOL, p. 5. 
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standards of division.  The first criterion concerns the 
doxastic difference between the lovers: one believes in 
love, the other does not.  The second criterion concerns 
whether their beliefs are veridical, that is, whether 
reciprocity is present. 
Let’s assume that none of the lovers in question have 
formed their beliefs ex nihilo, but rather have formed 
their beliefs in virtue of some evidence I’ll call the 
promise of love.48  A proper division of Kierkegaard’s 
lovers thus gives us four possible relationships (we’ll 
borrow from Shakespeare to help keep them straight): 
 Does not believe she is 
loved 
Believes she is 
loved 
Is Not 
Loved 
Lover #1: Tamara Lover #3: 
Cordelia 
Is Loved Lover #2: Ophelia Lover #4: 
Rosalind 
 
First, we can imagine a person who is not loved and who 
doesn’t believe she is loved, like Tamara in Titus.  This 
person’s belief is obviously veridical.  We can likewise 
imagine a person who is loved and who truly believes that 
she is loved (Rosalind, or Dante’s Beatrice).  Deception 
                     
48 Aristotle calls them “the marks of friendship” at EN 8.4, 
1156b 30. 
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enters into the picture only when there is a gap between 
the doxastic state of the lover and the relevant fact about 
her beloved.  We can imagine a person who is not loved but 
who believes that she is, like King Lear’s daughter 
Cordelia; her belief is non-veridical, and assuming that 
she has had some reason for believing as she does – a false 
promise from her beloved – she is deceived out of love.  We 
can likewise imagine a fourth person who is loved but who 
does not believe that she is loved (Hamlet’s Ophelia, or 
Leontes of Winter’s Tale); her belief is also non-
veridical.  Assuming again that she has some reason for 
believing as she does (some evidence contrary to the 
promise of love), we would call this person self-deceived 
out of love. 
Who is the true lover?  Our first instinct is to choose 
the fourth lover as our ‘comic’ lover, for only she meets 
the conditions of being loved and believing she’s loved. If 
that’s right, then none of the others are happy lovers.  
Tamara is not loved, and she does not believe she’s loved.  
Perhaps there’s a kind of virtue in that: she doesn’t 
believe in anything that’s false, so she’s not deceived.  
On the other hand, she’s really missing out on something 
good – love.  Ophelia and Cordelia seem stupid and naïve, 
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respectively, but this is a bit quick.  Both of them have a 
promise that they are interpreting as people normally and 
rightly do.  Ophelia knows that she cannot apodictically 
infer love from its being promised, but takes her rules for 
the direction of her heart from her father’s dualism about 
men – and so ceases to believe.  The problem is that she’s 
wrong, and so she cheats herself out of happy love.  
Cordelia knows that a promise is some evidence for being 
loved, and so she believes she’s loved; the problem here is 
with the nature of the evidence and the villainy that 
abuses it.  She believes falsely, and is so far unhappy.  
Read in different ways, our three lovers aren’t exactly 
blameworthy, but they aren’t happy lovers either.  Even if 
they fulfill all of their epistemic duties, they can still 
be deceived: being a happy lover depends a lot on luck. 
One problem with the above analysis is that although 
Lover #4 is intuitively our first pick for the prize of 
being the happiest lover, many people want to say that 
Lover #3 is happy too. Luckless though she is, she 
possesses the virtue of the lover if not the beloved.  
Kierkegaard will say that too, but not for the reasons of 
the many, who argue that insofar as she doesn’t know that 
she’s being deceived, she’s happy.  The assumption here is 
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that there’s nothing more to happiness than our subjective 
experience of it.  When students argue this point with me, 
my first response is a bald ad hominem: you wouldn’t really 
tell your spouse that adultery is fine so long as you don’t 
know about it, would you?  Sometimes that works.49 
Kierkegaard’s response is more sophisticated, but it’s 
also problematic.  ‘The poet’ suggests that the third lover 
is a ‘tragic’ lover, since “the sight of someone unhappily 
deceived in love” moves us to tears.50  Cashing this out in 
an Aristotelian manner, Cordelia is tragic because we pity 
her for being deceived and fear the circumstances of her 
deception (we all know what it is to be lied to).  In 
contrast, Ophelia would appear “ridiculous and laughable if 
the ridiculousness of it were not an even stronger 
expression for horror, since it shows that [s]he is not 
worthy of tears.”51  Insofar as this unhappy lover is 
                     
49 Not only does the student’s objection fail to distinguish 
between happiness in the sense of being pleased and of 
being fulfilled – the former being a state of 
consciousness, and relatively trivial compared to the 
latter – but it assumes that one cannot be harmed without 
being hurt.  Hurt requires consciousness of the hurt, while 
harm requires only requires the invasion of an interest, 
the worsening of a life.  Thanks to Michael Wreen for 
pointing out the role consciousness plays in these 
distinctions. 
50 WOL, p. 5. 
51 WOL, p. 5. This is a strange line. If she’s ridiculous, 
her situation, almost by definition, isn’t horrible, but a 
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somehow at fault for her deception – she’s both agent and 
subject of her deception – she’s not really pitiable, even 
though her self-deception deprives her of a good.  Perhaps 
the only reaction raised by the unhappy sight of her – that 
is, the sight of a ‘bad’ person suffering – is what 
Aristotle calls the ‘human feeling’: ouch.52  Once our 
emotional reactions to the lovers are settled, Kierkegaard 
suggests, it’s tough (though never impossible) to think 
Cordelia is happy and still prefer, in virtue of her 
objective situation, to be Ophelia. 
Unfortunately, although we do indeed tend to pity the 
third lover more than the second, it’s not clear that this 
is justified.  Both lovers suffer because of an excusable 
error of judgment – excusable because the promise is 
ambiguous, erroneous because their beliefs don’t match the 
facts of the matter – and it seems strange to think that 
the self-deception of lover two performs is villainous, in 
the way the deception performed on lover three is.  
Aristotle thinks decent people suffering due to excusable 
                     
harmless shame. If her situation is horrible, then it seems 
wrong to laugh at it. And either way, if this lover is 
fulfilling her epistemic duties, she’s not completely at 
fault for her deception, so she’s still worthy of tears 
insofar as she’s pitiable. This sentence is one of the 
mysteries I hope to unravel in what follows. 
52 Aristotle, Poetics, section 13. 
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errors of judgment are paradigmatically tragic.  
Kierkegaard’s analysis of the lovers must force us to 
reconsider, under the Christian understanding of the 
qualification, what counts as an error in judging others, 
and what counts as tragic, supposing the Royal Command is 
true.53  Likewise, while Aristotle observes that we tend to 
find the sight of a good person suffering – think of 
Iphigenia, of Desdemona, of Cordelia – odious rather than 
tragic.54  Even if Kierkegaard is right about the lowly 
character of Ophelia, shouldn’t she thus be more tragic 
than Cordelia?  What is it that Kierkegaard thinks is so 
shameful about the second lover – who gives up on the 
command, helped by her father – and what justifies our 
honoring the third? 
Counterpoint 
Anyone who wishes to be a happy lover must deal with the 
following evidential problem: not everyone lies.  Given 
that fortunate fact, says Kierkegaard, there’s no word or 
deed about which we can say without qualification: it’s 
impossible that the person who says or does x demonstrates 
her love by it. 
                     
53 Aristotle, Poetics, section 14, 1453b27 ff. 
54 Aristotle, Poetics, section 13, 1452b 30 – 36. 
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There is nothing, nothing at all, that cannot be done 
or said in such a way that it becomes upbuilding, but 
whatever it is, if it is upbuilding, then love is 
present.  … One person can do exactly the opposite of 
what another person does, but if each person does the 
opposite – in love – the opposite becomes upbuilding.  
There is no word in the language that is itself 
upbuilding, and there is no word in the language that 
cannot be said in an upbuilding way and become 
upbuilding if love is present.55 
Any word can be a word of love: love is the philosopher’s 
stone that turns lead into gold, an act of grace that, 
hidden under worldly accidents, turns the dross of language 
sacramental. 
What we have here is a dilemma of an explicitly Thomistic 
sort.  Veracity and deception are coextensive with a 
promise of love.  It is equally possible – from the 
standpoint of logic – that your ‘lover’s’ sweetest words 
are a deception and that your ‘enemy’s’ vilest actions are 
done out of love.  The intellect, according to both Thomas 
and Kierkegaard, can only set out the logical 
possibilities.56  Belief (as opposed to simple cognition) 
                     
55 WOL, p. 213.  Here the ethicist in me objects: some deeds 
seem unambiguously to be impossible mediums of love.  
Having just read Aristotle, eating babies and committing 
adultery come to mind.  Having never done either, perhaps I 
simply lack imagination, but even so, that’s precisely my 
objection: I cannot even imagine how these acts could 
express agape. 
56 Kierkegaard holds that “Mistrustingly to believe nothing 
at all (which is entirely different from knowledge about 
the equilibrium of opposite possibilities) and lovingly to 
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consists in assent to the propositions the intellect but 
considers.  If belief is principled rather than ad hoc, 
then we have two possible principles of presumption that 
could guide our assent: 
1. Cartesian Doubt: If deception is possible, we should 
believe nothing that cannot be demonstrated 
apodictically. 
2. Thomistic/Kierkegaardian Trust: If love is possible, 
we should interpret the wills of others charitably.57 
As a praxis, assent is a confession: to choose (1) is to 
choose to mistrust the goodness of the other, while to 
choose (2) is to choose a love that “consists only of 
presupposing” goodwill in the neighbor and working for 
                     
believe all things are not a cognition, nor a cognitive 
conclusion, but a choice that occurs when knowledge has 
placed the opposite possibilities in equilibrium; and in 
this choice, which, to be sure, is in the form of a 
judgment of others, the one judging becomes disclosed.  
That … naivete [believes] all things is a cognition, that 
is, a fatuous cognition; lovingly to believe all things is 
a choice on the basis of love” (WOL, p. 234). 
57 WOL, p. 228: “If, then, someone can demonstrate on the 
basis of the possibility of deception that one should not 
believe anything at all, I can demonstrate that one should 
believe everything – on the basis of the possibility of 
deception.  If someone thinks that one should not believe 
even the best of persons, because it is still possible that 
he is a deceiver, then the reverse also holds true, that 
you can credit even the worst person with the good, because 
it is still possible that his badness is an appearance.” 
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their good (like a Socratic midwife).58  Thus Kierkegaard’s 
assertion that agape is a task rather than an affection, a 
rule of belief, so to speak, that can in itself merit our 
praise or blame. 
(F3) and (F4): The Superiority of Agape 
By making itself a task, agape secures itself from all 
deception.  For consider the conditions under which ‘love’ 
can be deceived.  Both eros and philia, as Aristotle 
argued, require, as conditions of their satisfaction, 
proportional reciprocity of affection and care, and the 
model on which we are to think of this reciprocity – and 
possible deception – is, as Aristotle also says, the case 
of economic exchange.59  As Kierkegaard draws the analogy, 
A person pays out money in order to purchase some 
convenience; he has paid out the money, but he did not 
get the convenience – well, then he has been duped.  
He makes a love deal; he barters his love, but he did 
not receive reciprocal love in exchange – well, then 
he has been deceived.60 
Consider: what makes deception possible in friendship and 
romantic love is the hidden will of the beloved, who may or 
may not reciprocate love.  Agape, on the other hand, 
possesses all of the marks of friendship but does not 
                     
58 WOL, p. 217. 
59 Aristotle, EN 8.13, 9. 3. 
60 WOL, p. 237. 
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demand reciprocity.  The model on which we are to think of 
agape is the model of self-gift and loyalty: to 
persistently presuppose in the other the goodness you hope 
and work, for his sake, for him to have.61  This entails 
that agape cannot be deceived, for to say that a giver of 
self could be deceived would be like “sticking money in a 
person’s pocket and calling it stealing.”62  The only 
deception we can find in agape is self-deception: I can 
fail to love my neighbor while believing that I am.  To use 
a Kierkegaardian turn of phrase, I can (a) fail to love my 
neighbor – like the Pharisee who asks Christ, ‘Who is my 
neighbor?’ and tries to ignore that one’s neighbor is 
everyone – or (b) fail to love my neighbor by refusing to 
charitably believe him. 
                     
61 WOL, p. 216 – 17: “The one who loves presupposes that 
love is in the other person’s heart and by this very 
presupposition builds up love in him … provided, of course, 
that in love he presupposes its presence in the ground.”  
In the same vein, Kierkegaard later argues that love “hides 
a multitude of sins” either by choosing “silence … as a 
mitigating explanation,” or “by forgiveness” (p. 289). 
62 WOL, p. 241.  Again: “… the love that demands reciprocal 
love … can be deceived by remaining ignorant of the 
unworthiness of the object.  … [But] by not requiring the 
slightest reciprocal love, the one who truly loves has 
taken an unassailable position; he can no more be deceived 
out of his love than a man can be tricked out of the money 
he tenders as a gift and gives to someone” (WOL, 241 and 
242) 
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Eschewing his usual example of the maiden in love, 
Kierkegaard uses two new examples of agape overcoming 
deception, despair, and betrayal to make his point: the 
father of the prodigal son, who by believing and hoping all 
things for his son is never deceived that “it is possible 
that even the most prodigal son could be saved” – and 
Christ’s love for Peter at the moment of Peter’s betrayal.  
This latter case might seem a counterexample to 
Kierkegaard’s claim that agape can never be deceived, since 
it is precisely a case in which a friend has sworn an oath 
of loyalty and then, “in the moment of danger … remained 
standing there as a spectator.”63  Let us see who is 
deceived: the one who swore the oath, or the one who, 
without demand for reciprocity, loved Peter unto the edge 
of doom? 
And how did Christ look at Peter?  … it was as when a 
mother sees the child in danger through its own 
carelessness, and now, since she cannot manage to 
grasp the child, she watches it with her admittedly 
reproachful but also saving look.  … [He] who is 
called the Savior of the world always saw clearly 
where the danger was, saw that it was Peter who was in 
danger, saw that it was Peter who should and must be 
saved.  The Savior of the world did not make the 
mistake of seeing his cause lost if Peter did not 
hasten to help him, but he saw Peter as lost if he did 
not hasten to save Peter.64 
                     
63 WOL, p. 168. 
64 WOL, p. 170. 
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Back to our four lovers.  Suppose that Cordelia loves 
Lear without demand for reciprocity.  It follows that she 
is secure against being deceived out of love – what Lear 
says is as nothing to her.  To the world (or at least to 
her sisters), this is foolishness: Cordelia goes through 
her life unloved by those around her, staking her happiness 
on a promise that might be a lie, ridiculed by everyone for 
her naïvite.  She looks to the prudent world as if she’s 
pitiable and tragic, yet she is in fact a martyr to love.65  
This explains our strange intutions about her tragic state 
in the previous section: we love her more than lover two 
because of Cordelia’s fidelity to her task even as we pity 
and fear her suffering in a world that makes fidelity a 
road to death. 
The first two lovers are not so secure.  They require 
words, and deeds, and promises, trusting none of them 
insofar as they believe (or come to believe) that promises 
are hollow.  They’re pitiable because they’ll never be 
happy, and we fear their fault because they’re responsible 
for it (as we are for our own).  To be cleverly prudent in 
love, from the standpoint of agape, is to tragically self-
deceive oneself out of the highest good, just as 
                     
65 WOL, p. 6.  
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Shakespeare’s Lear deceives himself out of love by testing, 
and doubting, Cordelia. 
Let’s briefly rehash.  Our original question was, what 
conditions must obtain for us to call a lover happy?  This 
is a reasonable question because no one really wants to be 
justified here – philosophy won’t find you a soulmate – but 
everyone does want to be happy in love. However, as we’ve 
seen, it’s easy to conceive of a maiden in love who is both 
deceived about love and who, on the basis of available 
evidence, is justified in her non-veridical belief.  Just 
as Solon and Aristotle would refrain from calling any man 
happy until he is dead, so too could we, given our God-like 
knowledge that her beloved is lying, refuse to call such a 
maiden happy.  The problem is that happiness in love seems 
to unacceptably depend on an element of fortune beyond our 
control, namely, actually reciprocated love, and on a 
belief that is only inductively supported by available 
evidence. Hence the risk, and the tragedy and comedy, of 
love. 
Kierkegaard’s suggestion that we remove the demand for 
reciprocity likewise removes the unacceptable element of 
fortune from the conditions of happy love, focuses our 
attention on the value of the simple faith of the third 
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lover, and makes clear why we love her more than the other 
unhappy lovers.  It gives fidelity an intrinsic value 
independent of the facts of the matter.  This explains his 
attitude toward Ophelia: someone took a risk and promised 
her love, and she betrayed it through her infidelity, her 
failure to believe in charity.  She’s the villain.66 
However, there’s another conflict here.  On the one hand, 
we would call uninformed belief naïve, and perhaps 
blameworthy as such; perhaps, as William Clifford says, we 
have a moral duty to believe nothing we have no 
justification for.67  On the other hand, we want to grant 
the third lover’s fidelity some intrinsic value, since this 
explains our intuitive characterization of her as tragic 
rather than odious.  Yet how can believing all things as 
such be valuable?  Is the value of fidelity enough to 
legitimate its pursuit in the absence of convincing 
objective evidence of love in the beloved?  We’re caught 
between an objective passion for certainty and a subjective 
                     
66 Cf. Gene Fendt’s discussion of Ophelia in, Is Hamlet a 
Religious Drama?: An Essay on a Question in Kierkegaard 
(Marquette Studies in Philosophy, 21). 
67 William Clifford, “The Ethics of Belief.”  Originally 
published in Contemporary Review, 1877. Reprinted in 
Lectures and Essays (1879). 
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passion for being happy lovers, as Johannes Climacus says.68  
We want the facts to conform to reason, and vice versa, but 
sometimes they don’t; yet belief in love is a condition for 
the possibility of happy love. 
Kierkegaard eventually admits that the highest good is to 
love and be loved (in that order) – if we’re talking about 
love as agape.69  We would not call the person who truly 
thinks she is loved a happy lover if she herself (a) did 
not love her beloved or (b) was not believed to love her 
beloved by her beloved.  Yet the task of the happy lover, 
as Kierkegaard puts it, is to love while believing that one 
is loved.  Only this activity meets, on the side of the 
lover, the conditions of happy love.  On the other hand, 
such a task is epistemically blind, since a person cannot 
be said to know whether she is loved or whether her beloved 
believes that he is loved.  The independently necessary and 
jointly sufficient reasons for happy love seem to be three, 
whether we’re talking about eros and philia or agape: 
                     
68 Climacus discusses this distinction in the Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments (trans. 
Howard and Edna Hong [Princeton: Princeton UP, 1992])  “The 
historian seeks to reach the greatest possible certainty, 
and the historian is not in any contradiction, because he 
is not in passion; at most he has the research scholar’s 
objective passion, but he is not in subjective passion” (p. 
575). 
69 WOL, p. 244. 
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 Eros and Philia Agape 
1. Epistemic 
Condition  
Reciprocal and 
veridical belief 
about the other’s 
will 
Presumption of 
Value 
2. Ontological 
Condition 
A response to some 
excellence 
Ability70 
3. Volitional 
Condition 
Care and fidelity Fidelity (to task) 
and care. 
 
The conditions of happy (fulfilled) eros and philia are 
defeasible because their justification depends on 
particular, contingent, changeable, and ambiguous 
characteristics of the other.  The conditions of agape are 
not defeasible in this way, but only by 
mistrust/infidelity: failure at one’s task of being-a-
lover. 
We are now in position to ask the important question: Is 
it reasonable to believe in love on the basis of a 
promise?71  Suppose you wish to be a happy lover.  Whether 
                     
70 I assume any candidates for love must be lovable and have 
an intellect and will capable of supporting charitable 
presumption and virtuous fidelity. 
71 Or (equivalently?) to believe in a God of Love on the 
basis of a promise?  I read Kierkegaard as cashing out 
God’s promise in terms of testimony and other historical 
evidence, as we find him doing in the Concluding 
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you are in fact happy causally depends upon the actual 
existence of a love whose existential status you cannot 
know.  However, the existence or non-existence of love in 
the beloved does not change your task as a lover, for 
insofar as you are a lover you have a requirement: to love 
while believing you are loved.  The problem with this is 
that being-a-lover seems to require that you renounce your 
objective passion for epistemic certainty as a guarantee of 
your happiness.  Indeed, as we said in regard to Lear, a 
desire for guarantees is a temptation rather than a 
safeguard of love.  On the other hand, renouncing your 
subjective passion for being happily in love entails that 
you are not a lover, which guarantees only that you will 
never be happily in love, and not that you could not have 
been happy. 
On what grounds does one decide between being-a-lover and 
not being-a-lover?  Are some grounds for so choosing 
morally (or philosophically?) condemnable?  William 
Clifford would say that the choice must be grounded in the 
project of reason, which ought never be overridden by any 
other project.  For Kierkegaard, the pursuit of the project 
                     
Unscientific Postscript, and of raising the question of the 
value of fidelity to the lover’s task in Fear and 
Trembling.  
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of reason as overriding all other projects is itself a 
choice – and why assume it’s the nobler one?72  Relative to 
what end?  A second-critique Kantian would probably say 
that these questions are strange, since one condition for 
the possibility of reason itself is the coherence of its 
practical and speculative projects.73  
Love hopes all things. 
4. Evaluating Kierkegaard 
There are three legitimate objections to Kierkegaard’s 
attack on philia. 
Problem 1 
Kierkegaard’s primary criticisms of eros and philia 
require that he prove two things. 
1. That these forms of love are necessarily unstable 
insofar as they are grounded on affections that are 
themselves inherently fickle; i.e., the idea of 
steadfast eros and philia is incoherent. 
                     
72 WOL, p. 231: “There is no decision in knowledge … the 
mistrustful person and the loving person have knowledge in 
common, and neither is the mistrustful person mistrustful 
through this knowledge nor is the loving one who loves 
through this knowledge.” 
73 This is the problem of the ‘antinomy of practical reason’ 
in Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, AK 5: 113 - 114. 
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2. That agape is necessarily steadfast – perhaps ‘loyal’ 
is a better word – insofar as it grounded on a 
decision that is inherently stable.   
Only if both of these assumptions are true will Kierkegaard 
have shown that agape is superior to eros and philia. 
However, both assumptions seem to me to be false.  
Consider the first: there is nothing at all incoherent in 
the idea of an enduring affection for some good – 
contingent though that affection may be – yet that is 
precisely what proving (1) requires. Suppose we assume what 
is undoubtably the case, that (a) nothing but a perfect 
good adequately known to be good can command our affection, 
so that as long as we live we retain the ability to shift 
our affection from one imperfectly good thing to another, 
and that (b) these imperfectly good things are contingently 
good insofar as they can gain or lose their valuable 
properties.  Nevertheless, we can imagine (a) an 
imperfectly good being that is the object of someone’s 
persistent fidelity, and (b) a contingently good thing 
that, despite its ability to lose some valuable feature, 
simply doesn’t: the pre-lapsarian love of Adam in Eve in a 
possible world in which they never fall.  Or, to take a 
more mundane yet perfectly good example, consider the 
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everlasting gobstopper invented by Charlie of chocolate 
factory fame: it’s both everlasting and constantly 
attention-grabbing.74  While not everything that’s coherent 
is possible, coherency is at least a necessary condition of 
being possible.  The point is that that we can admit that 
it’s possible for our affections to shift and for beings to 
lose their value while denying any necessity of such 
changes, which is what Kierkegaard requires in order to 
cinch his case. 
Neither does it matter if common sense descries some fast 
hand-waving here and objects that it remains the case that 
our affections do shift and things do gain and lose value 
over time.  Aristotle himself admitted that the lower forms 
of friendship are inherently unstable and self-serving for 
those very reasons.  However, he also argued that virtue 
friendship achieves stability precisely in loving the 
humanity of the other, and in a shared vision of the good, 
both of which, by nature or achievement, are “lasting 
things.”75  There’s only one reason to think that the 
decision to live an agapic life contained in the 
hypothetical statement, “If you want to be a happy lover …” 
                     
74 Roald Dahl, Charlie and the Chocolate Factory (New York: 
Puffin, 1964). 
75 Aristotle, EN 8.3. 
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is any less settled or dependent on an affection than a 
character state that’s by definition a settled disposition, 
a hexis, as Kierkegaard requires in (2).  That reason is 
one Augustine mentions in the first paragraph of the 
Confessions: if our nature is such that the desire to love 
and be loved is assertoric for human beings, if our “heart 
is restless until it rests in you,” in the arms of an 
Eternal Beloved, then there’s no one who’s human who 
doesn’t satisfy the antecedent.76  But of course there are 
people – Augustine was one of them – who deceive themselves 
into thinking that they have no need for Love, just as 
Aristotle can point to people who deceive themselves into 
thinking that virtue isn’t a necessary condition of 
eudaimonia.  It’s precisely because of that freedom that we 
praise saints and moral heroes, and it’s because the saint 
and the hero decide to be good that we praise them, and 
their love is stable - and (2) fails to be true. 
Problem 2 
My second criticism of Kierkegaard concerns the fact that 
he secures the intrinsic value of loyalty (to the task of 
agape) only by asserting that loyalty has value 
                     
76 Augustine, Confessions, trans. John Ryan (New York: Image 
Books, 1960) 
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independently of the value of the object of loyalty.  This 
seems to be fundamentally wrong. 
The easiest way to see this is to use an analogy from 
Descartes.  In the second Meditation, Descartes attempts to 
prove that the proposition, that ‘Beliefs founded on sense 
perception are reliable,’ is false.  His second argument, 
the famous ‘Argument from Dreaming,’ tries to show this on 
the grounds that there is no internal criterion by which we 
can distinguish the ‘false’ perceptions we have in dreams 
from the ‘true’ perceptions we have while awake.77  If we 
put all of our dreaming perceptions in one bucket and all 
of the waking perceptions in a second bucket, shook them up 
together in a third bucket, and then took them one by one 
for examination, we’d be unable to tell them apart.  The 
difference between the two kinds of perceptions lies in 
their source or cause rather than in their nature qua 
perceptions.  Thus Descartes can show that even if it’s the 
case that some perceptions are reliable, we have no 
principled and independent way to tell which perceptions 
are reliable. 
Regardless of the soundness of the ‘Argument from 
Dreaming’ itself, the following does seem to be true: what 
                     
77 This argument occurs in Meditation 1, AT VII: 19 – 20. 
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makes a perception part of a dream are external conditions 
rather than internal conditions.  If I’m asleep and having 
an image of x, then I’m dreaming.  If I’m awake and having 
an image of x, then I’m not dreaming, whatever else I’m 
doing (I could still be hallucinating or daydreaming or 
whatever).78  Thus, from I have an image of x, neither I’m 
awake nor I’m dreaming follows – that has to be determined 
independently of the perception in question. 
I think the value of loyalty similarly depends on 
conditions external to the virtue of loyalty itself.  
Kierkegaard argues as if the distinction between the 
Cartesian rule of doubt/mistrust and the 
Kierkegaardian/Thomistic rule of presumption is an 
exclusive one – although it’s not79 – and that we should 
praise the person who uses the latter but not the former.  
As a result, Kierkegaard argues, the value of fidelity to 
the task of agape consists in its “believing all things” 
and thereby securing itself against external deception.  
What Kierkegaard fails to see is that construing the value 
of fidelity this way allows for martyrs to love, but it 
also allows for suicide bombers.  In an unqualified sense, 
                     
78 I’m indebted to James Mahon for this formulation of 
Descartes’ argument. 
79 As Aquinas argued; see chapter four. 
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both forms of loyalty are praiseworthy as instances of 
loyalty.  Yet it doesn’t follow from this that all 
loyalties are unqualifiedly goods.   
Whether a loyalty is an unqualified good depends on 
external circumstances that include the object of loyalty 
itself.  As Descartes might say if faced with the same 
problem, from the fact that x is loyal, neither x’s loyalty 
is praiseworthy nor x’s loyalty is blameworthy follows – 
that has to be determined independently of the concept of 
loyalty itself.  Insofar as we must distinguish between 
praiseworthy loyalty and blameworthy fanaticism, and 
Kierkegaard doesn’t or can’t, his account of loyalty – and 
his criticism of eros and philia on those grounds – is 
seriously defective. 
Problem 3 
Finally, Kierkegaard seems to think that his account of 
agape doesn’t do violence to special relations.  He writes 
that, 
Your wife must first and foremost be to you your 
neighbor; that she is your wife is then a more precise 
specification of your particular relationship to each 
other.80 
                     
80 WOL, p. 141. 
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Against the traditional interpretation of Kierkegaard – 
which takes Works of Love as prescribing that there be no 
more marriages – I take Kierkegaard to be arguing that 
philia – which in marriage takes up and transforms pure 
eros – generates obligations in addition to the general 
obligations which we have to every human being (our 
‘neighbor’).  To practice agape is to “seize [passionate 
preference], purify it, sanctify it, and in this way make 
everything new while everything is still old”81 rather than 
trump or replace it.  At the risk of putting words in his 
mouth, Kierkegaard’s theory of special relations seems to 
hold that our duties of special obligation cannot conflict 
with our duties of general obligation; both types of 
obligation can in principle be simultaneously satisfied. 
This seems wrong on two counts.  First, only purely 
negative obligations cannot in principle conflict.  Insofar 
as friendship and loyalty involve positive obligations of 
care, they can come into conflict with our general 
obligations, say, of justice.  In fact, it is exactly 
conflicts of this sort between care and respect, loyalty 
and justice that have generated so much interest in recent 
decades in the form of ethical dilemmas that are now 
                     
81 WOL, p. 145. 
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staples in introductory ethics courses.  Second, it’s far 
from clear – judging from the contemporary literature – 
that universalistic ethical theories either need, or if we 
do think they need, can account for special relations and 
obligations.  Even St. Paul had his doubts, though he 
admitted that it was better to marry than to burn. 
5. Conclusion 
Despite the fact that, in the end, we must reject 
Kierkegaard’s arguments as unsound, this isn’t to say that 
these arguments are without value.  For the focus of his 
arguments – on the ethical status of friendship as a moral 
(or amoral) phenomenon, on the contingency and fickleness 
of its ground, and on the effect that possible deception 
and consequent risk have on the limits of loyalty – tend to 
bring to focus and summarize historically grounded 
philosophical concerns surrounding friendship and loyalty. 
They also set the stage for contemporary scholarship that 
takes up these issues with a vengeance.82 
                     
82 To take one example: Neera Kapur Badhwar makes these 
issues the focus of her introduction to a recent book of 
contemporary philosophy of friendship, Friendship: A 
Philosophical Reader, Neera Kapur Badhwar ed. (Ithaca: 
Cornell UP, 1993): 1 – 36. 
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CHAPTER 6.  LOYALTY, CARE, AND JUSTICE 
 
You, son of man, I have appointed watchman for the house of 
Israel; when you hear me say anything, you shall warn them for 
me.  If I tell the wicked man that he shall surely die, and you 
do not speak out to dissuade the wicked man from his way, he (the 
wicked man) shall die for his guilt, but I will hold you 
responsible for his death.  But if you warn the wicked man, 
trying to turn him from his way, and he refuses to turn from his 
way, he shall die for his guilt, but you shall save yourself. 
--Ezekiel, 33: 7 - 9 
1. Two Objections 
It might be thought that reasons involving friendship and 
loyalty cannot sufficiently ground the rightness or 
wrongness of an action because of (a) their general 
irrelevance to such judgments or (b) their being expected 
or supererogatory, but not obligatory.  In what follows 
I’ll argue that (b) commits a category mistake, and (a) is 
false: reasons involving friendship and loyalty constitute 
prima facie grounds for the rightness or wrongness of some 
actions. 
(a) The Genuine Reasons Objection 
Not so long ago, H.L.A. Hart argued that your mobster 
uncle can have a right that you keep your promise to him 
that you’ll whack the shopkeeper down the street even if 
whacking the shopkeeper is morally wrong.  Obligations are 
owed to assignable persons who have correlative rights, he 
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argued, and are justified by the relationship between two 
persons rather than by the nature of the action in 
question.  Rights are fundamentally powers to create, 
waive, or enforce obligations in others, and thus a person 
can have a right that you do wrong.  Claim-rights (ius) are 
fundamentally claims of enforceability, and thus distinct 
from claims about the rightness or wrongness (iustia) of an 
action.1 
This cannot be fully correct. Surely claims of justice 
limit what someone can have a genuine claim-right to, for 
someone’s assertion of her moral rights ultimately function 
as grounds for a judgment about the rightness or wrongness 
of an action.  Claim-rights are ultimately claims about 
justice, or what someone deserves.   
In fact, there are many sorts of reasons for thinking 
that an action is wrong.  If Carl is about to punch Lewis 
in the face, you might mention the likely consequence that 
Carl will be sent to jail, or that it’s not nice to punch 
people, or that were he in Lewis’s shoes, Carl wouldn’t 
want to be punched.  Given such variety among kinds of 
practical reasons and the fact that such reasons can 
                     
1 H.L.A. Hart, “Are There Any Natural Rights?” Philosophical 
Review (64) 1955: 175-82. 
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compete with each other, W.D. Ross’s position that any 
practical reason has prima facie force is at least 
methodologically reasonable.  If claim-rights are but one 
reason among others for thinking that an action is wrong, 
then it’s possible that they can sometimes be overridden by 
competing considerations.   
Consider the fact that Lewis is a friend of Carl.  For 
many – including Ross – special relations, including 
friendship and loyalty, constitute excellent reasons to 
think that Carl’s punching Lewis in the nose is wrong 
independently of other reasons of the sort just mentioned.2  
That is, X’s invocation of Y’s friendship, an invocation 
that may also point out X’s obligations of loyalty on the 
basis of that friendship, give X reasons to ϕ, and to 
believe that ϕ is right or wrong.  These reasons may 
operate independently of or even in opposition to reasons 
having to do with ϕ’s being virtuous, good, or within Y’s 
rights.3   
                     
2 See W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: Oxford UP, 
1930). 
3 See, for instance, David McNaughton and J. Piers Rawling, 
“Deontology,” in Principles of Health Care Ethics, 2nd ed., 
Ashcroft, Dawson, Draper and McMillian, eds. (West Sussex, 
EN: John Wiley and Sons Ltd., 2007): p. 69. 
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Not everyone thinks that is true.  Some argue that 
practical reasons involving friendship and loyalty 
constitute a ‘moral danger’ to responsible, disinterested 
ethical decision-making.  There are two forms this worry 
takes.  The weaker one is that loyalty will be over-valued 
among competing practical reasons.  The second, stronger 
concern is that this allows fundamentally irrational 
considerations, of which friendship and loyalty are 
paradigm cases, to play a function in moral reasoning: 
given their nature, friendship and loyalty shouldn’t be 
valued at all, or aren’t reasons for morally right action 
at all.4  Just as many informal fallacies aren’t logically 
persuasive, even if they’re persuasive for other reasons, 
reasons involving claims of friendship and loyalty simply 
aren’t properly moral reasons to do anything, even if 
                     
4 Simon Keller articulates both concerns in The Limits of 
Loyalty (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007), without clearly 
discriminating them.  Voicing the strong concern, he argues 
that “your loyalty to X is expressed as loyalty in belief 
if being loyal to X inclines you to hold or resist certain 
beliefs, independently of the evidence” (p. 6), which is 
distinct from the weaker concern that a loyal person is 
“someone who is undiscriminating, and whose emotional 
attachments to particular entities play too much of a role 
in determining how she will live her life” (p. 157). 
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they’re psychologically powerful reasons-for-action, like 
fear, love and jealousy.5   
(b) Non-Obligatory Reasons 
Traditionally it is said that there are three sorts of 
judgments we can make about an action.  We can determine 
that an action is (a) morally required, (b) morally 
neutral, or (c) morally forbidden.  Actions of the first 
sort are those that it is right to do and wrong not to do; 
in general, we talk here about a person having an 
obligation to ϕ (where ϕ denotes any action for which 
someone can be held responsible).  Actions of the second 
sort are not morally required but not wrong not to do.  
Here we talk about a person having moral permission to ϕ.  
Actions in the final category are those it is not right to 
do, and which it is definitely wrong to do, and these are 
the actions we have an obligation not to do, i.e., that are 
morally prohibited. 
We gain many of our obligations by making contracts or 
something like them; some philosophers think these are the 
                     
5 See, for example, Cocking and Kennet, “Friendship and 
Moral Danger,” Journal of Philosophy 97 (2000): 278-96.  
Also see R.E. Ewin, "Loyalties, and Why Loyalty Should Be 
Ignored." Criminal Justice Ethics 12 (1) 1993: 36-42. 
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only ways we gain obligations.6  Our obligations can also be 
of wide or narrow scope.  Some obligations are those we 
have to everyone, and are thus called ‘general’ 
obligations, while others we have only in relation to 
specific persons and are thus called ‘special’ obligations.  
Combining these categories regarding the origin and scope 
of our obligations generates various classes of morally 
required actions: 
1. Contracted, Specific Obligations: Obligations we 
possess in virtue of an explicit or implicit 
agreement with a specific person, such as the 
                     
6 Glaucon (in Plato’s Republic, 358e – 359b) is the most 
famous example of this, though Jan Narveson might be the 
most recent. (Narveson has asserted this position in many 
plases.  For a recent example, see his “Is There a Duty to 
Die”? in Is There a Duty to Die, Humber and Almeder eds. 
(New Jersey: Humana Press, 2000) pp. 23 – 40.)  Ultimately 
one must decide whether a person can have obligations he 
doesn’t explicitly contract for by the nature of things and 
the circumstances in which he finds himself (like being 
human and finding oneself in the situation of being able to 
save a child drowning in a shallow pond), or whether these 
obligations are consequences of what Locke called a ‘tacit 
agreement’ to a Social Contract (and thus that all 
obligations are at least quasi-contractual).  Ultimately I 
don’t think Contractualism has the power to ground 
morality.  Among other problems, the notion of ‘tacit’ 
agreement makes no sense unless there is some action by 
which one agrees to cooperative behavior that is explicitly 
recognized as tacit agreement – e.g., as abstention from a 
binding vote implies acceptance of the outcome of the vote 
– in which case the action is not tacit. 
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obligation to keep one’s promise to Jones, or to 
meet him for lunch as always next week. 
2. Non-Contracted, Specific Obligations: Obligations we 
possess in virtue of our relationship (voluntary or 
involuntary) with specific other persons – usually 
our kin or friends – such as the obligation to 
support one’s children, or the duty to take care of 
your parents when they’re elderly.7 
3. Non-Contracted, General Obligations: Obligations we 
possess in virtue of our humanity, such as the 
obligation not to unjustifiedly harm other persons, 
to tell the truth, not to wantonly destroy the 
environment, etc.8 
4. Contracted, General Obligations: Obligations we 
possess in virtue of an explicit agreement with a 
                     
7 Michael Sandel calls these “obligations of solidarity,” 
and argues that loyalty falls into this class of 
obligations, in Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do? (New 
York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2009): p. 225 ff. 
8 Regarding the obligation to tell the truth, Ross and 
others hold that this obligation is grounded on our own 
past behaviors, and not in general.  The Natural Law 
tradition and I think this is backwards, i.e., that the 
obligatoriness of truth-telling is rooted in the nature, 
objects and value of the human intellect antecedent to any 
particular behaviors of ours.  See, for example, Alfonso 
Gomez-Lobo, Morality and the Human Goods: An Introduction 
to Natural Law Ethics (Washington D.C.: Georgetown UP, 
2002): p. 20 – 21. 
 226 
large or indefinite number of people.  These 
obligations are instantiated in positive law, and 
include (among others) the obligation to pay taxes 
and not to engage in nuclear war. 
There are three sub-categories of action within the class 
of morally neutral actions, including: 
5. Non-Agentic Actions: Behaviors persons do through no 
explicit exercise of their agency (e.g., without 
deliberation or choice), such as scratching one’s 
beard or shouting when one stubs one’s toe.9 
6. Reasonable Expectation: Permissible actions that 
other persons have some justification to expect us 
to perform or refrain from performing, but which we 
have no obligation to perform and to which they have 
no correlative right to demand that we perform.  
Such actions might include driving one’s friend to 
work and giving backrubs to lovers. 
7. Supererogatory: Permissible actions that are not 
reasonably expected by others, and to which others 
                     
9 This category was identified by Aquinas, who distinguished 
actions of men from actions men do on these grounds, and 
who limited moral responsibility to the former.  See 
Treatise on Happiness, Q1. a. 1 c. 
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have no right, but which it is praiseworthy or 
heroic to perform, such as a civilian jumping into a 
raging river in order to save a stranger’s drowning 
child. 
Classes (2) and (6) are going to be most important for the 
purpose of discussing the nature of loyalty, with (6) being 
the most controversial.  One important objection is that 
(6) isn’t a class of permissible actions, but of at least 
weakly obligatory ones, and thus reducible to categories 
(2) or (3). 
Consider (2) again.  It is reasonable to expect that your 
friend will defend your interests when you’re not around – 
say, at the office coffee cooler.  In fact, it would also 
be wrong of her not to do so.  Against Hart – who might 
deny the existence of an obligation with no correlative 
right – this is the case even if you have no right to 
demand that she defend your reputation against office 
slander, and the action is so far unenforceable.  Yet there 
is also a class of actions we reasonably expect others to 
perform, and which we lack the right to enforce, and which 
are not obligatory, i.e., the actions (6) is intended to 
cover.  Not everything we are obliged to do has a 
correlative right, and while we can reasonably expect 
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(insofar as these are prima facie reasons for action) that 
others will keep their obligations and respect our rights, 
we reasonably expect things of others which we neither have 
a right that others perform nor which others are obligated 
to perform.  If you need a dictionary to solve a 
particularly nasty crossword puzzle clue, you can 
reasonably expect that your brother will allow you to 
borrow his dictionary to do so, even though he has no 
obligation to let you borrow the dictionary.  The book is 
his, after all.   
One way to capture this difference between (2) and (6) is 
to say that (6) merely involves virtue, while (2) involves 
justice (what someone deserves) as well.  Indeed, the 
performance of what is reasonably expected of an adult 
person is quite nicely captured by the phrase ‘what a 
virtuous or mature person would do.’  For example, we 
expect people to act politely in public, to dress modestly, 
and to leave a bit of food for us at the buffet; the sort 
of person who does these things is someone who is refined, 
modest, and moderate.   We might even criticize people who 
violate these expectations, making judgments about their 
character, e.g., that so-and-so is wearing a vulgar dress, 
or is crass or gluttonous.  The violation of these 
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expectations can be offensive to our sensibilities, and may 
set a vicious example to impressionable youths, but usually 
such violations stop short of definite and concrete harm to 
others.  J.S. Mill argued that this is an important reason 
for allowing such actions to be legally and (he held, much 
more controversially) morally permissible, however crass 
they may be.  Some vicious actions might nevertheless be 
private, and so escape claims of both ius and iustia.10 
Kant disagrees with Mill about this last point by arguing 
that some self-regarding actions can involve wrongdoing 
towards oneself.11  Our obligations toward ourselves cover 
beneficence in addition to iustia; we have imperfect duties 
to perfect ourselves, duties Kant calls duties of virtue 
(rather than duties of right) on grounds of the former’s 
unenforcability.12  One condition for this is that the 
Kantian notion of the ‘self’ is a normative, teleological 
concept – a regulative ideal of practical reason that is 
itself practical, or action-guiding.  This is similar to 
the concept of self I attributed to Aristotle in chapter 
two.  However, whereas Aristotle grounds the value of this 
                     
10 Cf. Mill’s On Liberty, especially chapters 2 and 4 where 
he discusses his ‘harm principle’ for distinguishing 
private (permissible) and public (impermissible) behaviors. 
11 Kant argues for this in his treatment of suicide in the 
Groundwork, AK 4: 422, 430. 
12 Kant, MM, AK 6: 417 – 418. 
 230 
self in the analytic relation between actuality and 
goodness, Kant roots it in the analytic relation between 
autonomy and value.13  Put in these terms, the existence of 
category (6) depends on whether we have a general 
obligation to be virtuous – to act on reasons of a certain 
sort – over and above general obligations to do the sorts 
of actions that virtuous persons do,14 and that problem 
hinges on the ground of moral value in the world.  
Henceforth we will set such problems aside, and 
provisionally accept that category (6) exists for the sake 
of argument. 
There is much disagreement as to whether loyalty falls 
into class (1), contracted special obligations, class (2), 
non-contracted special obligations, or class (6), 
reasonable expectation, as defined above.15  In general, the 
debate focuses on how our loyalties are generated, whether 
they have the force of obligations, and whether loyalty is 
                     
13 Aristotle argues that excellence implies the full 
actuality of a natural kind (EN 10.7), whereas Kant argues 
that all value is dependent on the existence of autonomous 
rational agents: everything other than the wille has 
conditional worth (GW, AK 4: 428, 434 - 37). 
14 This is a peculiarly Kantian problem, I think, which 
cannot even arise in Aristotelian ethics. 
15 Cf. Kleinig, John, "Loyalty", The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), 
URL= <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries 
loyalty/>, for an overview of the debate. 
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an unenforceable virtue or a behavior someone can demand as 
their due.  One difficulty in deciding this issue is that 
many acts we would call ‘loyal’ fall into each of these 
classes.  Consider class (1): our political representatives 
have an obligation – and we have a right to demand – that 
they reliably act in our interests in virtue of an oath of 
office made to the public they serve.  On the other hand, 
many people consider a citizen’s saluting his country’s 
flag, and a customer’s repeat business, as expressions of 
loyalty, but don’t consider such actions obligatory except 
in very peculiar circumstances.  Such acts of loyalty thus 
fall into class (6).  Yet it is also the case that we wrong 
a friend by failing to reliably act in his interests 
analogous to the way in which a politician can wrong his 
constituency by failing to reliably act in their interests.  
This is so even when we have not promised our friends that 
we’ll do so.  Alcibiades wronged Socrates in addition to 
Athens when he betrayed his city to the Spartans during the 
Peloponnesian War, for instance, and among the many reasons 
his action was wrong is the reason that it betrayed his 
obligations of friendship to his mentor, Socrates.16 
                     
16 Plato has Alcibiades insinuate as much in the Symposium, 
and many interpreters take Plato to be arguing that 
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(c) Some Theses 
All morally interesting claims of loyalty, I’ll argue 
below, fall into class (2).  The paradigm cases of these 
loyalties exist between kith, kin and friends.  Thus do we 
rightly accuse negligent parents, for example, of moral 
wrongdoing towards their children.  I’ll also argue that 
the difference between (2) and (6) that makes (2) but not 
(6) morally interesting consists partly in a confusion of 
of rights with interests.  Special relations can generate 
right-like obligations that strangers lack even when both 
need assistance.  This distinction is not always important 
– a child drowning in a shallow pond generates an 
obligation in you, a passerby, to help him out of the 
predicament even if the child is a stranger to you and 
lacks a right to your beneficence.  Minimally decent 
Samaritanism, to borrow a phrase from J.J. Thomson, 
requires as much.17  However, the distinction does make a 
difference when there are two children drowning in a pond, 
one of whom is your son.  Failure to save him first, to 
prioritize his interests over those of the other child, 
                     
Socrates was betrayed by, rather than in collusion with 
Alcibiades at Republic VII, 490c ff. 
17 Though she herself famously denies this of a case 
involving Henry Fonda in J.J. Thomson, “A Defense of 
Abortion,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1971): 47 – 66. 
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would constitute an wrong towards your son insofar as it 
violated care from you that is due to him.  Loyalty, I’ll 
argue, primarily involves the obligation to reliably assist 
those to whom we stand in special relations to satisfy 
their weighty interests, i.e., over time. 
Finally, I’ll argue that if loyalty is a ground for 
wrongness – if loyalty is a species of justice having to do 
with reliable provision of care – then ‘wrongful loyalty’ 
will be a contradiction in terms.  There will be no cases 
in which A is loyal to B by ϕ-ing when ϕ-ing is an act that 
it is wrong to do.  R.M. Hare’s infamous Fanatical Nazi, 
who never questioned the morality of actions commanded by 
Hitler’s Germany, is often cited as an example of someone 
who acts loyally but wrongly.18  However, this is a misuse 
of the term ‘loyalty.’  As Kierkegaard pointed out, no 
expression of an attitude or character trait is by itself 
sufficient for having that attitude or character trait.  A 
Fanatical Nazi can do and say everything that a truly loyal 
person would do without being, for that reason, truly 
loyal.  His actions can share a symptomology with loyal 
actions while differing in their aietiology.  The two 
                     
18 Cf. R.M. Hare, Freedom and Reason (Oxford: Oxford UP, 
1963). Reprinted in 1990.  R.E. Ewin denies that loyalty 
can be a virtue on just these grounds in “Loyalty and 
Virtues,” Philosophical Quarterly 42 (169): 403-19. 
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actions are for that reason different kinds of actions, in 
the same way that homonymns share sounds but not meanings – 
think if ‘be’ and ‘bee’ – and are therefore different 
words.   
More confusing is the fact that a truly loyal person can 
sometimes exercise her loyalty by failing to provide what 
most of us would regard as ‘loyal’ assistance.  Loyalty can 
sometimes share a symptomology with betrayal.  We’ll end 
with a partial explanation of this phenomena. 
2. Loyalty 
Let’s begin by assuming, quite uncontroversially, that 
loyalty requires us to persevere in care, where by care we 
mean a disposition to protect or promote the interests of 
particular others.19  The kind of care loyalty is concerned 
with cannot be simply understood as what Kant called the 
‘practical love’ that I have for everyone in virtue of some 
non-accidental, universal property all persons enjoy (like 
rationality, or being a child of God).20  It is impossible 
for everyone to be the equal recipient of my care because 
                     
19 See, for example, John Kleinig, "Loyalty", The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/loyalt
y/>.  
20 Kant, Groundwork, AK 4: 399. 
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my resources are limited and people’s interests conflict.  
Even more importantly, practical love (like justice) is 
founded on a relation that I lack the ability to sever; I 
am necessarily related to others qua persons or qua 
children of God in virtue of the kind of thing they are.  
As a consequence, such relations are necessarily universal: 
they apply to all members of a kind qua members of that 
kind.  For example, I have an obligation not to 
unjustifiably kill any person; this obligation is not one I 
can rid myself of (as one discharges a promise, say), nor 
one that applies only to bald people, or whomever.  Given 
the nature of practical love, then, it simply makes no 
sense to talk about getting rid of the obligation insofar 
as I cannot desist from it and because it is generated by a 
relation in which I stand to every other moral agent qua 
moral agent. It’s intuitively clear that loyalty, whatever 
else it is, is not going to involve a strictly necessary 
relation, or one that extends to everyone: some loyalties 
can be gained and lost, and loyalty justifiably prioritizes 
some interests over others.   
Nevertheless, loyalty does involve relations of justice.  
While it’s not the case that every act of injustice 
involves disloyalty – the stranger who demands your wallet 
 236 
at gunpoint does something unjust, but isn’t disloyal to 
you – a disloyal action between friends does involve 
injustice.  A friend deserves the loyalty of his friend 
insofar as such relations are in part defined as relations 
of reciprocal benevolence and beneficence.  If Smith’s 
friend Jones wins the lottery, and Smith is about to lose 
his house due to financial insolvency, Jones does something 
wrong by failing to help Smith out when he’s able to. 
Loyalty and care are related in similar ways.  Failures 
of care do not always constitute failures of loyalty, even 
those when such failures are unjust.  I once saw a 
television show in which a doctor negligently gave his 
patient the wrong medication because he was preoccupied 
with a particularly buxom and flirtatious nurse.  The 
doctor failed to care for his patient as he should have, 
and did so unjustly (he was contracted by the patient to 
provide care), but he wasn’t disloyal to the patient.  In 
fact, the doctor’s loyalty to his patient was never really 
at stake.  On the other hand, it’s possible to care for a 
person without being loyal to her.  Don Giovanni, Mozart’s 
famously serial lover, cared for 1,001 women in Spain, but 
it would be ridiculous to talk of Giovanni’s loyalties.  
Nevertheless, a person who is loyal to another is disposed 
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to perform caring acts for her; he intends and attempts to 
look out for her interests.  Further, such attempts must be 
regularly forthcoming.  Putatively loyal persons who 
regularly fail to display care lose their right to be 
called loyal.  A spy, for example, who consistently fails 
to display care for the side he’s spying for will gradually 
lose his credibility as a spy and will eventually be 
identified as a double-agent or no agent (of loyalty) at 
all. 
These points show that loyalty, understood as involving 
the intention to reliably provide positive care for a 
special relation, is a species of both justice and care, 
where ‘care’ means both helpful and non-harmful action.  
Loyalty entails care as man entails animal, and loyalty 
involves behavior that a person deserves, and who would be 
treated unjustly if the behavior weren’t forthcoming.  
However, villains and cads can do the occasional just or 
beneficent act without being for that reason loyal – acts 
of loyalty require motives of loyalty as their causes.  
Loyalty is a kind of reason for kinds of just and caring 
actions.  Finally, an important mark of loyalty is that 
someone who is loyal to another is someone who consistently 
attempts to care for the other’s interests, successfully or 
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otherwise, in virtue of the special relationship between 
them.  This is so, as noted above, because consistent 
failure to display care counts as evidence against the 
presence of loyal motives in one’s friend. 
3. Strong Relations and Deep Interests 
In this section I will offer an analysis of the ways in 
which special relations can generate right-like obligations 
of loyalty that distinguish such obligations from our 
general obligations to assist others and their expectations 
that we do so.  This analysis will thus distinguish between 
categories (2) and (6) and place loyalty firmly in (2). 
First, let’s remember Socrates’ initial objection to 
Polemarchus and his father in Plato’s Republic: no friend 
would return a weapon to a friend if doing so would bring 
the friend harm.21  The true friend does what is truly good, 
i.e., what is in the interests of his friend, and does not 
do what merely appears good to his friend but is in fact 
bad for him.  Loyalty is directed at a friend’s good, and 
not at what he merely desires. 
One way of determining where a person’s true interests 
lie uses the relative concepts of good and harm.  Without 
                     
21 Plato, Republic 331a and 331e. 
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pretending to provide a deep analysis of either term, 
something is prima facie good for us – in our interests – 
if it meets the following conditions.  The first is derived 
from Aristotle: x is in P’s interest if x is either 
necessary or sufficient for P’s flourishing as a member of 
her kind.22  Second, an important clue to which goods are 
necessary to human flourishing is that they involve things, 
like food, which we desire involuntarily, i.e., which one 
cannot in normal circumstances not desire.  Involuntary 
desires generate non-volitional needs, as opposed to free 
volitional needs, to borrow a distinction from Henry 
Frankfurt, those that have goals we can, in normal 
circumstances, fail to, cease to, or desire not to, 
desire.23  Failure to achieve the necessary means to human 
flourishing thus brings about unavoidable harm, the 
                     
22 This way of putting things leaves it an open question 
whether there are moral goods that are sufficient but not 
necessary for our flourishing, such as education, 
meaningful work, religion, aesthetic value, friendship and 
play.  I have argued throughout that such goods are 
necessary as well as sufficient for human flourishing, in 
keeping with the Grisez school of Natural Law.  The best-
known proponent of this position is John Finnis, Natural 
Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1980). 
23 Henry Frankfurt, “Necessity and Desire,” in Necessary 
Goods: Our Responsibilities to Meet Others’ Needs, ed. 
Gillian Brock (Lanham, MA: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998): 
19 – 32.  Originally published in Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 45 (Sept. 1984): 1 – 13.   
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invasion of a non-volitional interest, such as occurs in 
starvation. 
We can go beyond this analysis by noticing that not all 
morally interesting intersts are equal.  Some involve 
persistent needs – things we need all the time, or so often 
that their provision is a matter of constant concern, like 
food, water and air – while some are variable needs, such 
as medicine, or a rope if you’ve fallen down a well, which 
are morally interesting at the time they are needed but the 
need for which arises and fades over time or occurs more or 
less by chance.  We always need to eat, drink, and breathe; 
we are not always sick or at the bottom of a well. 
Actions in classes (2) and (6) both involve provision of 
positive care, and such provision becomes morally weighty 
when the interests of the person being cared for become 
increasingly serious in the ways described above.  (This 
similarity, we’ll see below, is cause of the temptation to 
place loyalty in both classes.)  We reasonably expect our 
friends to concern themselves with our interests.  Many 
friends will treat the interests of their friend as their 
own; minimally, at least, we expect friends to help friends 
satisfy their important interests when they need assistance 
to do so. 
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Consider two examples.  If I’m single and lonely, I might 
expect that my best friend Bob will introduce me to that 
single employee he just met at work; if he doesn’t, I might 
accuse Bob of failing to look out for my interests and of 
contributing to my life as an unhappy and asocial hermit.  
Still, this wouldn’t seriously impact our relationship 
unless Bob displayed a pattern of such behaviors.  On the 
other hand, in the case of Smith and Jones mentioned a few 
paragraphs back, Smith would have serious reason to 
question his friendship with Jones if Jones failed to offer 
Smith and his family the opportunity (say) to live in the 
basement of his mansion until they were back on their feet.  
One important difference between these cases derives from 
the importance and weight of the interests in question.  
Other things being equal, insofar as I stand to suffer less 
harm from being dateless on Saturday than Smith and his 
family stand to suffer from being homeless, Jones has a 
greater obligation based on friendship to provide shelter 
to Smith than Bob has to provide me with dates.  This is so 
in part because Jones’ failure to look after Smith’s 
interests carries more evidential weight against the 
judgment that Jones is a good and loyal friend than does 
Bob’s failure to hook me up with his coworkers.  That 
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evidential weightiness derives from the persistent, non-
volitional interests in question. 
However, a person who fails to be responsive to his 
friend’s weighty interests wrongs his friend in ways in 
which he doesn’t wrong strangers by failing to be 
responsive to theirs.  This distinguishes (2) and (6) in 
important ways.   
Consider: although every special relationship is by its 
nature contingent, some are severable while others are not.  
For example, it is a contingent fact that Aristotle was the 
student of Plato, and it was possible, at any time while he 
was Plato’s student, for Aristotle to cease being Plato’s 
student by quitting the Academy.  Let’s call these kinds of 
special relations dissolvable.  We also know that Aristotle 
fathered a son named Nichomachus.  Like ‘being a student of 
Plato,’ the fact that Aristotle is ‘father of Nicomachus’ 
is a contingent fact about Aristotle.  However, unlike the 
contingent, relational property ‘being Plato’s student,’ it 
is not possible for Aristotle to quit the relation of 
‘father of Nichomachus’; such a relation even survives 
death.  Let’s call these sorts of special relations 
indissolvable.   
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Unfortunately, as soon as we begin to discuss the 
morality of dissolution, we find that our neatly 
distinguished pair of metaphysical terms fails to 
adequately capture the messy fact that we often think of 
our relationships in terms of degrees of moral 
dissolvability.  Most of us recognize that it is much 
harder to exit a romantic relationship that has existed for 
seven years morally lien-free, so to speak, than one that 
has existed for seven days.  Many (perhaps most) of our 
otherwise dissolvable relationships become less 
dissolvable, in the moral sense, the longer they last.  We 
become caught up in webs of promises, debts, habits and 
expectations that define our moral communities, and the 
farther in we go the more tangled we become.  The strands 
of these webs are our obligations, and prominent among them 
are our obligations of loyalty.   
We need to recognize two points about ‘dissolvability,’ 
then.  Metaphysically, relationships are dissolvable or 
they are not.  Morally, we mean that a relationship 
approaches the necessity of metaphysical indissolvablity 
the ‘closer’ the bonds of obligation tie two persons, and 
that blood, tragedy, promises, and the circumstances and 
happenings of normal life all play their part in increasing 
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such ties.  Moral indissolvability, as we’ll use the term 
below, refers to someone’s inability to leave a 
relationship or fail to show loyalty in a relationship 
without thereby incurring moral blame. 
Many of these thoughts are not new.  Aristotle spends 
much time in the latter half of Book 7 of the Nicomachean 
Ethics trying to sort out the implications of just these 
sorts of distinctions.  As he writes, 
The claims of justice differ … injustice increases by 
being exhibited towards those who are friends in a 
fuller sense; e.g., it is a more terrible thing to 
defraud a comrade than a fellow citizen, more terrible 
not to help a brother than a stranger, and more 
terrible to wound a father than any one else.  And the 
demands of justice also naturally increase with the 
friendship, which implies that friendship and justice 
increase between the same persons and have equal 
extension.24 
Interpreted in terms of the distinction I have just made 
between dissolvable and indissolvable special relations, 
Aristotle is pointing to two moral claims: 
                     
24 EN 7.9, 1159b 34 – 1160a 8, my italics.  This phrase, 
“friends in a fuller sense,” cannot be read as referring to  
the distinction between the three kinds of friendship 
already discussed earlier in Book 8.  Rather, the qualifier 
“fuller” picks out the dissolvability of the relationships 
in question. What I have called an indissolvable 
relationships is what Aristotle would call friends in the 
‘fullest’ sense. 
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1. Moral obligations of friendly care are greater in 
morally indissolvable special relations than in 
dissolvable special relations, and increase the more 
morally indissolvable a special relation becomes. 
2. Claim (1) is a natural fact about human relationships. 
The term ‘greater’ in (1) needs explanation.  It means that 
the justice or injustice of an act should be judged 
relative to the moral dissolvability of a special relation, 
such that the justice or injustice of the same act x should 
be judged differently depending on the dissolvability of 
the relationship of the parties between whom the act 
occurs.  Reference to the nature or depth of a special 
relationship – indicated by the moral dissolvability of the 
relationship – independently of what interest is at stake 
is one important factor in gauging the strength of an 
obligation of loyalty.   
Claim (2) simply holds that (1) supervenes on human 
relationships as such.  Thus, while special relationships 
involve claims of justice – claims which can exist between 
any two persons whatsoever – Aristotle is at pains to 
distinguish the kind of justice that obtains between 
friends, a paradigmatically ‘natural,’ non-contractual type 
of special relation, from the kind that exists between 
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strangers or even business partners.  He draws the 
distinction this way: 
The moral type [of justice between friends] is not on 
fixed terms; it makes a gift, or whatever it does, as 
to a friend; but one expects to receive as much or 
more, as having not given but lent; and if a man is 
worse off when the relation is dissolved than he was 
when it was contracted he will complain.25 
The result of the combination of (1) and (2) is that the 
more morally indissolvable a relationship is, the greater 
the strength of the obligation of one party to the 
relationship to display loyalty by looking after the 
persistent, non-volitional interests of the other by 
reliably providing assistance or positive provision of 
care.  The greater this obligation is, the harder it is to 
fail to meet this expectation, or to dissolve the 
relationship, without incurring moral blame. 
While the depth of a special relationship is one 
determining factor of the strength of a special 
relationship, what interest is at stake is another.  Prima 
                     
25 EN 7.13, 1162b 30 – 34.  Aristotle continues: “This 
[complaining] happens because all or most men, while they 
wish for what is noble, choose what is advantageous; now it 
is noble to do well by another without repayment, but it is 
the receiving of benefits that is advantageous” (1162b 35 – 
1163a 1).  Truly noble friends, in other words, love using 
an entirely different model of philia – perhaps caritas? – 
than ‘all or most men,’ who say one thing while expecting 
another. 
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facie, we have a greater obligation to protect and help 
people satisfy their persistent involuntary interests than 
other kinds of interests, and thus our failure to do so is 
more blameworthy than our failure to protect or satisfy 
other people’s purely volitional needs, say, of a coozee 
for a cold soda on Superbowl Sunday. 
For clarity’s sake we could imagine interests and depth 
of relationship as axes of a Cartesian grid, and figure 
current moral debates between, say, Kantians (like Onora 
O’Neill) and Utilitarians (like Peter Singer) as debates 
about how, exactly, to plot the strength of our obligations 
of care on the graph.26  However we draw the line of 
obligation, both parties are agreed in this: at no point 
does the line touch either axis, for there is no need so 
great that it overrides all other considerations, and no 
relation so indissolvable that we are obligated to satisfy 
someone’s every demand in virtue of it.   
Perhaps the value of a loyalty can be jointly derived 
from the strength of the obligation that, but for the 
special relationship in question, would not exist.  This 
                     
26 See their debate surrounding famine relief.  Peter 
Singer, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1 (1) 1972: 229-243; 
Onora O’Neill, Faces of Hunger: An Essay on Poverty, 
Justice and Development (Allen & Unwin: London, 1986). 
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suggests that loyalty is valuable because human flourishing 
is social, and for reasons having to do with the human 
condition, namely, as a moral corrective to the fragility 
of human communities and the vulnerability of our 
interests, personal and social.  Loyalty, like the 
irascible passion of hope, makes the difficult acts of 
friendship, love and family less so by giving us reason to 
expect assistance from those best placed to give it when we 
have need of it. 
It is the fact that both features ground the value of 
loyalty that leads us to confuse (2) and (6).  The strength 
of the obligation increases – as does the injustice of 
failing to satisfy it – as the importance of someone’s 
interest and the depth of the relationship generating the 
demand for care increases, and weaker as they decrease.  
This captures the phenomena that we can and do reasonably 
demand that those closest to us are most beholden to help 
us protect and satisfy our deep interests, and that we have 
greater moral permission not to assist strangers than not 
to assist friends (relative, always, to the depth of the 
interests in question and the depth of the friendship, or 
special relation in general). 
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Two explanations of this phenomena have been suggested by 
our survey of philosophers in this study.  Both can be 
found in Aristotle.  The first is that relations both 
strong and deep help constitute our identity as 
individuals.  Individuals are in part constituted by their 
relations with other persons.  Filling such roles as 
‘father,’ ‘son,’ or ‘brother’ help to define us as moral 
agents.  Someone who lacked others to whom he was obligated 
to be beneficent would not be a recognizably human agent. 
Second, according to Aristotle, relations both strong and 
deep constitute the conditions for the possibility of 
political life.  Human beings lack self-sufficiency in the 
radical sense that we cannot bring our essential nature to 
full actuality purely through our own efforts.  We need a 
community of parents, friends, lovers and companions to 
teach and rear us, to give us a language without which 
conceptual thought is impossible and shared activities 
through which we realize our potential excellences.  When 
we combine this dependence with the fact that human beings 
have needs that must be satisfied by a finite amount of 
resources, we have the beginnings of political justice – 
the first act of which, Aristotle notes, occurs between 
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those indissolvably related to us as parents in order to 
satisfy the acutely deep need for the necessities of life.27 
However, Aristotle, Aquinas and Kant also suggest that 
one of our deepest and most persistent interests is not 
some set of physical and psychological necessities, but 
rather for friends who function as our moral correctives.  
If the good of one’s friend includes the moral state of his 
character – whether this is understood as the full 
actualization of an Aristotelian self, or the fate of one’s 
immortal soul, or one’s fundamental disposition – then a 
truly good friend will be loyal not only by refusing to do 
or be complicit in our evil designs, but also by 
confronting us with the fact that our follies are follies 
(perhaps at risk of the friendship) in the hope that we 
reform.  According to the analysis above, those most 
closely related to us have a greater obligation to us in 
this regard than in any other.  Blind obedience to the 
                     
27 Aristotle, Politics 1.2.  This description misses the 
fact that such relations are by nature enjoyed, pursued and 
valued by us, of course.  But then it need not be the case 
that a analysis of the social function of special relations 
captures their moral value or the reasons agents pursue 
them in societies.  For an excellent discussion of this 
problem, see Roger Scruton, “Sacrilege and Sacrament,” in 
The Meaning of Marriage: Family, State, Market and Morals, 
Robert P. George and Jean Bethke Elshtain, eds. (Spence 
Publishing Company, 2006). 
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whims of another isn’t loyalty; it’s a blamable failure to 
fulfill the duty of friendly care.28 
4. Functions of Loyalty in Moral Discourse 
In this final section I’d like to respond to objection 
(a) by examining the ways in which claims of loyalty can 
interact with claims of moral right. 
One classic view of what a moral right involves is known 
as the Protected Permissions view.29  It holds that a person 
P’s moral right to ϕ consists of the following Hohfeldian 
incidents: 
1. P’s claim right against interference by Y with P’s 
ϕ-ing. 
2. P’s claim right against interference by Y with P’s 
not ϕ-ing. 
3. P’s moral permissions (a) to ϕ and (b) not to ϕ, 
i.e., the absence of a moral duty on the part of P 
to ϕ or not to ϕ. 
                     
28 True friendship, then, constitutes the opposite of ‘moral 
danger.’  It is, in fact, a near occasion of grace.  For an 
explicitly contrary position, see Cocking and Kennet (2000) 
above. 
29 Throughout this section I’ll be relying on William 
Edmundson’s An Introduction to Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge 
UP, 2004), especially chapter 8, “A Right to Do Wrong? Two 
Conceptions of Moral Rights.” 
 252 
Ultimately, this understanding of moral rights holds that 
they involve both positive freedoms to perform or not to 
perform morally permissible actions, and negative 
obligations on the part of others not to interfere that 
freedom.  In short, rights ‘protect’ our permissible 
activities, public or otherwise, from unreasonable outside 
interference. 
Importantly, the protected permissions view entails that 
no one has a right to do what is morally wrong.  For if to 
have a moral right is by definition to have a moral 
permission (such that one does nothing wrong by ϕ-ing or 
not ϕ-ing), then an action’s being morally permissible is a 
necessary condition of having a moral right to perform that 
action. 
One objection to this view of rights is that it 
identifies the permissibility of an action with the 
possession of a moral right.  This objection won’t do, 
however, for the protected permissions view only requires 
that ϕ’s being permissible is a necessary (and not a 
sufficient condition) for P’s having a moral right to ϕ.  
Seeing this, H.L.A. Hart went further and argued that moral 
permissibility isn’t even a necessary condition for the 
possession of a moral right.  Insofar as we can distinguish 
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between (a) having a right (ius) to ϕ and (b) ϕ’s being the 
right (iustia) thing to do, he held that a person can have 
a right to ϕ without ϕ being the right thing to do, i.e., 
without there being good or overriding moral reasons that 
one ought/ought not to ϕ.30  Having a right to x entails 
that x is prima facie permissible, even if doing x is, as 
such, prima facie wrong.  If I owned a home on the National 
History Registry, for instance, my property rights to the 
home would entail that it is prima facie permissible to 
bulldoze it in order to build a parking lot, even if 
destroying buildings of national and historical value 
merely for profit is prima facie wrong. 
We cannot, however, make rights and rightness completely 
independent of each other, for two reasons.  First, if 
having a right to ϕ is a prima facie moral permission to ϕ, 
then the possession of a right entails something about the 
prima facie rightness of the act by definition.  Second, 
nothing whatever would follow from the wrongness of an act 
about our permission, or duty, to interfere in it, 
especially in the case of our friends.  Yet surely that is 
absurd: were Superman to play interested bystander while 
                     
30 See Hart (1955).  Hart ultimately concludes that 
obligations are not justified by the character of an action 
but by the relationship of the parties who transact them. 
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Carl punched me in the face, we would seriously doubt 
Clark’s right to wear the cape.  A fortiori it is precisely 
because God is the ultimate Superman – able everywhere and 
always (and partly for that reason obligated) to interfere 
in wrongdoing – that the existence of evil counts as 
evidence against His existence.  This is not to say that 
the performance of every morally prohibited act generates 
obligations in others to interfere with the performance of 
the act; perhaps some acts, even wrong ones, are better off 
left ‘private.’31  Nevertheless, even one case of an act 
whose wrongness generates an overriding obligation in 
others to interfere with its performance is sufficient to 
show that we cannot conceive of moral rights as trumping 
every other consideration (such as the intrinsic wrongness 
of an act).  Insofar as some moral rights can be rendered 
prima facie considerations that can be overridden by the 
antecedent general moral obligations of others (such as the 
prima facie obligation to prevent evil when possible, 
especially in the case of our friends), the assertion that 
moral rights as a class override all other moral 
considerations is false. 
                     
31 Where this line should be drawn is a matter of some 
debate, beginning with J.S. Mill On Liberty, chapters 2 and 
4. 
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Much more could be and has been said on this topic.  We 
are merely concerned with the possibilities this conclusion 
opens for thinking about the function of loyalty in 
morality.  Let us assume that the wrongness of an action 
can be a sufficient reason to override a person’s prima 
facie right to do it (or fail to do it).  Might there not 
be other instances of the same phenomena?  Specifically, 
can claims of loyalty have precisely the same function, 
i.e., of special antecedent obligations weakening, and 
perhaps overriding, claims of right?  
Let me make a comparison.  Alice works hard for her 
money; in fact, she earns it, meaning that through the 
performance of some labor she gains property rights to 
remuneration.  A simple molecular analysis of Alice’s 
rights would involve several Hohfeldian incidents, namely, 
• A claim against any other person(s) B spending 
Alice’s money; 
• A pair of privileges to spend Alice’s money (or not) 
more or less as she wishes; 
• A power of Alice to waive, annul, or transfer her 
claim to her money; and 
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• An immunity of Alice against B’s altering her power, 
privilege, or claim to her money. 
What I wish to focus on is the immunity, the Hohfeldian 
incident that states that B lacks the ability to alter A’s 
other incidents.  Immunities are what make theft wrong: 
they alone make it the case that a burglar cannot grab your 
television and make it his own by fiat (the way the 
government grabs your money, say, every April 15th).  Most 
of the time, most of us rightfully exercise our property 
rights over our money in positive freedom, and Joe Schmoe 
on the street has no justification for interfering in our 
doing so, assuming that what we do with our money is 
morally permissible.  Suppose a person wants to buy $30,000 
worth of comic books.  Even if the noble Society for the 
Elimination of Comic Art thinks this is an affront to good 
sense, the person is within her rights to tell them to mind 
their own business.  Were the person to attempt to use her 
money to buy illegal substances for underage youths, on the 
other hand, most of us (I assume) would feel the 
appropriate authority was entirely within its rights to 
confiscate the means of her wrongdoing.  Her right to spend 
the money to do ϕ doesn’t include every possible ϕ, since 
some ϕ’s are in fact morally impermissible. 
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A demand of loyalty works in precisely the same way.  
Imagine Scrooge handing over $30,000 for several first 
edition comic books for his personal collection while 
Scrooge’s young son, Miles, who needs a rare $30,000 drug 
to survive a childhood cancer, whimpers nearby in the arms 
of his frazzled nurse.  Imagine that the son has the 
chutzpah to ask his father to spend comic book money on the 
medicine he needs.  Imagine, finally, that Scrooge responds 
as follows: “Well, my boy, I earned this money, and 
therefore I own it; and thus I do nothing wrong by 
exercising my Hohfeldian privilege not to spend it on you 
rather than myself.  To say otherwise would make my rights 
of ownership over this money trivial and pointless.”   
Miles has three responses.  First, he can appeal to the 
unequal weight of the interests at stake: his are deep, 
while Scrooge’s are shallow.  Miles stands to lose his life 
– a necessary condition for the realization of value – and 
incur a debt of gratitude, while Scrooge stands to lose 
$30,000 (which he was going to spend anyway) and the 
opportunity to own some comic books, but keep his son.  
Given the depth of Miles’s interests – caused by the 
weightiness of life – his claim has more prima facie weight 
than Scrooge’s.  That’s evidence for the claim that it 
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would be wrong for Scrooge to spend $30,000 on comic books 
in these circumstances. 
That evidence in and of itself, however, might not be 
sufficient to override Scrooge’s property right.32  If it 
could, anyone’s weighty interests could override Scrooge’s 
property rights.  Given the vast number of poor, 
downtrodden, and extremely needy people, Scrooge’s property 
rights would be practically worthless if weighty interests 
were sufficient to make it wrong to spend money on 
oneself.33  Insofar as most of us think that property rights 
are meaningful, Miles needs another argument to supplement 
his first argument.  Here he can appeal to the nature of 
the relationship between himself and Scrooge: they are 
specially related as father and son.  This relationship is 
an involuntary (on Miles’s part), indissolvable 
relationship, and these kinds of relationships, I’ve argued 
– for reasons having to do with the very possibility of the 
polis – generate the strongest kinds of welfare rights.  
                     
32 Aquinas would disagree, as he argues in ST I-II, Q. 66, 
a. 7. c and ad. 2: “It is not theft, properly speaking, to 
take secretly and use another's property in a case of 
extreme need: because that which he takes for the support 
of his life becomes his own property by reason of that 
need.” 
33 Essentially, this is the picture famously painted by 
Peter Singer in “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (3) Spring 1972: 229 – 244. 
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While everyone has an imperfect obligation to assist others 
when they are able to do so, Scrooge’s obligation is 
specially directed towards his son, and in the 
circumstances we’ve described he wrongs Miles if he fails 
to discharge it. 
For most philosophers, Miles’s appeals to the depth of 
the interests at stake and the strength of his relationship 
with Scrooge are jointly sufficient to ground Scrooge’s 
obligation to assist Miles when he’s able (as he is in our 
story). 
Perhaps, however, Scrooge still wavers, mumbling that he 
has assisted Miles already, and that Miles should consider 
his debt paid.  After all, Scrooge has been after these 
comic books for twenty years of his life, and like the 
oligarchic man in Plato’s Republic, has organized his life 
around the goal of acquiring these particular comic books.  
Admittedly comic books are trivial things, but they are not 
trivial to Scrooge.  What if Scrooge was a scientist on the 
verge of a world-changing discovery, or an artist about to 
complete his masterpiece: would Miles deny him that 
opportunity? 
Miles’s response to this final objection should be two-
fold.  First, he should point out that the examples of the 
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scientist and the artist aren’t exactly analogous; Scrooge 
is falsely treating knowledge and art as if they were 
valuable only for their discoverers or creators.  
Furthermore, Scrooge’s objections presuppose that a person 
is encumbered only by those responsibilities he himself has 
chosen.  This too is false: a person is in part constituted 
by the community in which he finds himself, and he is bound 
to that community by reciprocal ties of obligations of 
care.  Second, Miles should point out, those communal ties 
of obligation, strongest in families and indissolvable 
relations, do not fade over time or disappear like a coin 
in a Salvation Army bucket.  They are persistent 
obligations of care, and thus obligations to be loyal to 
the persons to whom we are specially related, i.e., are 
obligations that demand reliable and regular satisfaction 
(much like the deep interests they ultimately protect).  
They cannot be discharged once and for all like the terms 
of a business contract.   
Perhaps Miles even says these things out of care for 
Scrooge’s character, noting that the slippery slope to 
viciousness is paved, in Scrooge’s case, with first-edition 
comic books. 
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Perhaps Scrooge isn’t denying that his relationship with 
Miles is dissolvable, but that his resulting obligations 
are limited, and that the limit has been reached.  (In the 
story we have told this is hardly the case.)  Yet the main 
point is this: if Miles’ arguments in fact carry 
evidentiary weight in support of his demand for assistance, 
then moral reasons grounded in special relations and 
loyalty are genuine moral reasons.  Otherwise all of Miles’ 
arguments are simply instances of non sequitor. 
More formally, what I mean is this: A’s demand that B 
exercise positive care for A, if based on friendship or 
special relations, is a justified demand – that is, 
entailing an overriding obligation – if and only if A’s 
special relationship with B is ‘strong,’ A’s need for B’s 
care is ‘deep,’ and those properties are involved in a 
relationship of loyalty in the senses described in the 
second part of this chapter.  B’s failure to discharge 
obligations such as tehse through the reliable exercise of 
positive care entails, ceteris paribus, entails that B has 
done something both wrong (unjust) and blameworthy (i.e., B 
can be held responsible for the effects of his action on 
A).  Furthermore, the stronger the relationship between A 
and B and the deeper A’s need for B’s assistance – the 
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greater the justification A has for claiming B’s loyalty – 
the more right-like and overriding A’s claim becomes. 
If this is correct, then claims of friendship and loyalty 
have at least two roles to play in morality.  First, as 
illustrated above, a claim of loyalty helps motivate 
particular obligations of care in special relations. 
Second, claims of loyalty can render claims of moral right 
prima facie moral reasons, able to be overridden in 
particular circumstances like nearly all other moral 
reasons.  Rights and loyalties function as a system of 
checks and balances on each other in moral discourse, 
perhaps even more so than the traditional opposition of 
rights and considerations of utility.  Thus their claim to 
be genuine moral reasons. 
5. Conclusion 
In this final chapter we have sought to locate loyalty in 
the wider sphere of morality by identifying it as a 
genuinely moral reason.  After arguing that we can analyze 
the force of claims of loyalty in terms of the ways in 
which the strength of a special relation focuses the 
direction of an obligation to assist someone to satisfy her 
deep interests, we concluded that one function of claims of 
loyalty is to motivate persons to reliably provide positive 
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care, sometimes by providing reasons that override contrary 
assertions of moral rights. 
Ultimately, however, the loyal person – over and above 
the person who simply does caring acts – is a person who is 
motivated by the desire that the object of his loyalty be 
as good as possible.  This entails two things.  First,  
1. X can reliably perform outwardly beneficent acts for 
Y without being for that reason loyal to Y. 
This is so because it is possible for X to reliably care 
for another person in unjust ways, or in ways that do not 
assist Y in being as good as possible.  It is also possible 
because X may just, like St. Francis, perform beneficent 
acts for everyone, while being loyal to no particular 
person.  Hare’s Fanatical Nazi is a case in point of the 
first possibility.  Second, 
2. X can fail to reliably perform outwardly beneficent 
acts for Y without being for that reason disloyal to 
Y. 
If the truly loyal person works for our good when we are 
not ourselves good, then the person who is truly loyal to 
us may criticize us, withhold affection from us, refuse to 
spend time with us, refuse to participate in some of our 
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activities, and even fail to share in our joys and pains 
insofar as these are bad – that is, fail to display the 
‘marks of friendship’ Aristotle attributes to virtuous 
friends.  Loyalty is in this regard like courage: the 
excesses of courage and loyalty are symptomologically 
similar to their respective virtues while differing in 
their motives.  Yet loyalty differs from courage in that 
the symptomology of true loyalty can be similar to its 
deficiency.  Sometimes the work of love is the work of 
upbuilding.  Perhaps always. 
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CONCLUSION 
In the Introduction, we set out to survey the positions 
several prominent thinkers regarding the relationship of 
friendship and loyalty.  There we noted that the various 
thinkers in our historical survey disagree with one another 
about the role that beliefs about the character of one’s 
friend play in the justification of special relations and 
obligations of loyalty.  Aristotle argues that we can have 
good reasons, based on beliefs about the character of our 
friends, for friendship and loyalty.  Aquinas argued that 
in addition to beliefs about the character of the other 
person, love requires further beliefs and dispositions 
(hope and charitable presumption) to provide a motivational 
warrant for friendship and loyalty.  Although Kant argued 
that ideal friendship is unattainable, and loyalty is 
grounded in nothing outside of our own quest for 
perfection, we discussed a Kantian position similar to 
Aristotle’s that justifies friendship and loyalty in our 
imperfect will and our obligation to become good.  
Kierkegaard argued that the only possible happy love – 
agape – does away with belief entirely.  Unlike eros and 
philia, which cannot escape the risk caused by their 
dependence on beliefs about the other, Kierkegaard argued 
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that a agapic love contains its own justification for 
friendship and loyalty regardless of the worthiness of its 
object. 
We then tried to capture the concern of these 
philosophers about the relationship between belief and 
justification in the following argument: 
1. Loyalty is a necessary condition of friendship. 
2. Loyalty requires beliefs about the value of the 
friend or the relationship which derive its 
justification from knowledge (justified true 
beliefs) about (a) one’s own character and 
commitments, (b) the friend’s character and 
commitments, and (c) some shared properties between 
(a) and (b). 
3. There is no knowledge of (a) and (b). 
4. Loyalty is never justified, and neither is 
friendship. 
Our survey has suggested a simple response to this 
argument. 
The response is that (2) is too strong, since issues of 
uncertainty – what we called the ‘epistemic’ problem – are 
in some sense overcome by the nature of the self.  For 
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instance, both Aristotle and Kant – each in their own way – 
hold that  
1. The self is a teleological and normative concept. 
Each of them also holds that 
2. The self is naturally social,  
meaning that to be a person is ‘always already’ to be 
engaged in morally indissolvable relationships with other 
selves.  Other selves, as normative beings, demand our 
moral attention to the point of generating obligations in 
us to look out for their interests.  The strength of these 
obligations vary, as discussed in chapter six, according to 
the nature of the special relationship and the depth of the 
interests at stake.  Yet in the end we find that we are 
obligated despite some risks to our own interests: risk 
alone is not independently sufficient to override our moral 
obligations to our loved ones. 
Kierkegaard got this much correct, loosely speaking: love 
requires action for the sake of the other even in the 
absence of knowledge of the character of the other.  And 
all of our thinkers believe that love requires virtue as 
well, be this Thomistic hope, Kantian respect, or 
Kierkegaardian fidelity.  Such hope, respect and fidelity 
 268 
are all ways of describing loyal motives, and are all 
practical dispositions to care for the interests of others 
that override our lack of certainty about whether our 
friends deserve it.  Finally, consider the possibility of 
heroic loyalty, say, of a loyalty that is praiseworthy 
without knowledge of the character of the other: Desdemona, 
having consecrated her “soul and fortunes” to Othello 
(I.3.254), for instance, presumes Othello’s ignorance of 
her fidelity and commends herself to her “kind lord” 
(V.2.125).  We could believe that through this final 
action, Desdemona gives Othello the evidence he needs to 
overcome his false beliefs and – reciprocating his 
suggestion that she reconcile herself with heaven (V.2.26-
8) – to reconcile himself to the same.  If loyalty such as 
this is praiseworthy in the absence of knowledge – as 
distinct from loyalty in the face of definite immorality – 
then (2), as it stands, is false.1   
                     
1 I admit that this scene can be read other ways.  It is 
important to the argument above, for instance, that 
Desdemona believe that Othello’s ignorance lessens his 
responsibility for her murder to some degree, and that her 
final words be interpreted as working for his redemption 
rather than expressing ignorance of plain evidence of his 
moral blameworthiness, e.g., of her death at his hands.  
The latter would not count as a praiseworthy act of 
loyalty, as I argued in chapter six in respect to Hare’s 
Fanatic Nazi. 
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Rather, our authors have suggested, love works for 
lovability in its object through hope and charitable 
presumption, as Aquinas would say, and the condition for 
this possibility isn’t positive knowledge of another 
person’s deserving of that love, but rather their 
redeemability.  If it is part of the logic of love and 
special relations to work for the good of the other, and 
the ultimate interest of persons qua persons is the 
development of a morally good will, then our obligation to 
work for this interest cannot be discharged so long as we 
and our friends or special relations live.  While our other 
obligations may be limited in ways discussed in chapter 
six, I submit that the ‘sticky’ quality of loyalty, as 
Kleinig put it, and its value, are ultimately grounded both 
by this more fundamental obligation, which has no limit, 
and the teleological nature of the human person. 
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